Three Days in the Shenandoah: Stonewall Jackson at Front Royal and Winchester (review)

Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign continues to fascinate students of Civil War military history. A drama in four acts highlighted, in turn, by the battles of First Kernstown (March 23, 1862), McDowell (May 8), Front Royal and First Winchester (May 23-25), and Cross Keys and Port Republic (June 8-9), it catapulted Jackson to great fame. Much of the extensive literature on the campaign has focused on the Mighty Stonewall, treating Nathaniel P. Banks and other Federal officers as almost comically inept.

Gary Ecelbarger offers the best account to date of the maneuvering and fighting on May 23-25, giving full attention to both Confederates and Federals. Wary of participants' testimony "laced with hyperbole and teetering toward fiction," he deplores works that have "cloaked . . . Jackson's escapades and Banks's downfall in the Valley in a shroud of lore" (pp. xiii-xiv). Three Days in the Shenandoah presents a detailed narrative of the operational and tactical action, allocating approximately fifty pages each to the "battle of Front Royal" (others might deem it a glorified skirmish) and the combat and pursuit at First Winchester. The text also explores planning in Richmond and Washington, while correctly framing events in the Shenandoah as ancillary to George B. McClellan's advance against the Confederate capital.

Many of Ecelbarger's arguments will not surprise veteran readers. He lauds Jackson's operational skills but, like many other historians, finds his tactical execution clumsy. Jackson often achieved less than might be expected tactically, in part, observes Ecelbarger, because he habitually committed his units piecemeal. Confederates Richard S. Ewell and Richard Taylor also come in for sharp criticism, though Charles S. Winder, who led the Stonewall Brigade, receives high marks. General Banks emerges as a soldier of some ability, especially after First Winchester when he managed "to cross the Potomac River . . . with more than 80 percent of his supply train and 75 percent of his . . . army" (p. 219). Ecelbarger's estimate of the Union commander accords with other recent work, including Peter Cozzens's Shenandoah 1862 (2008).

Ecelbarger credits Jefferson Davis with strategic vision, pointing out that he urged a diversion in the Valley before Robert E. Lee embraced the idea. But although Davis deserves "credit for masterminding the notion of using Jackson's offensive to accomplish broader strategy" (p. 222), Abraham Lincoln did more to ensure Jackson's grand success. The decision to send Irvin McDowell's troops to the Valley rather than to reinforce McClellan was "at best a poorly conceived and exaggerated response to Jackson's presence in the northern Valley." Joining scholars such as Ethan Rafuse and Cozzens, Ecelbarger ascribes to Lincoln a "military blunder . . . in his most active role as Commander in Chief " (p. 222).

Although a solid piece of scholarship, Ecelbarger's book will not force "an entire reconsideration of the narrative and analytic history" of the action on May 23-25. Most scholars would agree that this phase of the operation "had the greatest impact on Union and Confederate strategy both in and outside the Valley" (p. xv). Most also appreciate its influence on Confederate civilian morale and the military situation at Richmond. Interestingly, Jackson's mystique seems to have worked a bit of its magic on Ecelbarger, who speaks of the dour general's "grand achievements" (p. 216) that crafted "a marvel at the operational level of warfare" (p. 223). "Jackson's dominance at maneuver, his refusal to allow obstacles to paralyze his momentum, and his insurmountable determination outshone his tactical shortcomings and split-decision miscues to conquer his adversary and overcome adversity" (p. 220). Although parts of the text suggest that Banks had not really been conquered, most admirers of Jackson will put down this book with their image of the general intact.