Fighting at Sea in the Eighteenth Century: The Art of Sailing Warfare (review)

This book argues that contemporary understanding of eighteenth century naval warfare, systems of command and tactics is unrealistic, unduly influenced by the theoretical texts of land-lubbers like Paul Hoste, the Comte de Tourville's chaplain, and Scots armchair admiral John Clerk. The first chapter focuses on how ships recognised each other, the next two deal with pursuit and escape, followed by station keeping - the basic building block for fleet action - and communications. In the key chapter, 'Unwritten Rules', Willis demonstrates that initiative was the critical component in fleet action. After the inconclusive Battle off Toulon in 1744 four British Captains were cashiered for not using their initiative. Successful admirals managed the problem by simplifying the task for their subordinates. Nelson used three distinct systems in his three battles: mission-analysis, directive control and exemplary leadership. In each case his object was to reduce the possibility of confusion. His stricture that any fool could obey orders, but the best officers did their duty, was the norm, not an exception. Because they were skilled, practical seamen the British did not formalise or publish doctrine, they preferred to rely on initiative and unwritten rules like the duty to engage, to steer to the sound of battle and provide mutual support.

The final five chapters examine command, the weather gage, fleet tactics, fighting tactics and damage. They sustain the theme that there were no fixed rules, only flexible case-by-case solutions to emerging situations. Nelson's genius lay in selecting the best answer on the day. Usually this was a question of context, something most works on eighteenth century naval warfare, including this one, fail to develop. Essentially concerned with British experience there are occasional references to French practice; the United States did not have a battlefleet.

While the critique of contemporary command and control texts is well made, Willis underestimates their educational function. In the absence of any formal education in command, leadership and tactics, let alone strategy, these texts helped to shape service discussions and transmit experience to new generations. They were avidly read by the great masters: Nelson enjoyed Clerk's book because it made him think; it was useful as a sounding board rather than a set of rules. He knew that the key to victory lay in developing an overwhelming firepower advantage, tactics were merely a means to that end. The study of sailing ship tactics in the steam age has been a profoundly present-minded enterprise, generating a literature to meet educational needs, rather than advance understanding of past practice. In 1905 the Royal Navy issued Julian Corbett's edition of eighteenth century tactical texts to prompt fresh thinking. A closer examination of the standards texts that are under review, which are hardly ever mentioned by name, would have helped to locate this book more clearly in a specific body of scholarship.

With fleet battle receding into the realms of the unimaginable, it is high time historians re-examined naval warfare under sail. By emphasising the critical role of practical seamanship and unwritten rules, this book offers students of the subject a new angle on an old subject.