Timor-Leste:A Year of Democratic Elections
Timor-Leste held its first democratic election in 2007. The political and military crisis of 2006 had brought the country to a "failed state" condition. The dismissal of 560 soldiers from the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) in 2006, the removal of the former military commander, Alfredo Reinado, from the F-FDTL's Command in May the same year, the armed conflict between F-FDTL and the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL), which left eight PNTL members dead, and the resignation of Mari Alkatiri from his position as Prime Minister demonstrated that Timor-Leste was in a fragile and critical condition requiring immediate assistance.
In order to restore peace and security, the leaders of the country invited an international peace keeping force from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Portugal and Philippines for urgent intervention in the east-west ethnic-based conflict. The presence of the international peace keeping force was able to reduce the scale of violence, particularly in Dili city. In addition, they were also mandated to secure the 2007 elections in Timor-Leste.
With the assistances of the international stabilization force (FSI) from Australia and New Zealand, and the International Peace Keeping Force under the United Nations, the 2007 elections were conducted generally peacefully though small scale of violence did occur in some parts of the country.
This review focuses on the 2007 democratic elections and their impact on the socio-economic as well as the political development of the country. [End Page 359]
The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections
As the concept of democracy includes free and fair elections, freedom of association and freedom of expression, the presidential and parliamentary elections held in Timor-Leste in 2007 signalled a growing democratic process in the country.
The presidential elections were the first national elections conducted according to the Timor-Leste's law. Through both the first and second rounds of this election, Timorese voters showed their understanding of and commitment to peaceful democratic processes in the country.
The campaign for the presidential elections started on 15 March 2007, three weeks before the voting day of the first round election.1 Eight presidential candidates competed in the first round of the election, including Francisco Guterres Lu-Olo representing Fretilin Party, Fernando de Araujo "Lasama" the candidate of the Democratic Party (PD), and Francisco Xavier, Lucia Lobato, and Joao Carrascalao representing the Timor-Leste Social Democratic Association Party (ASDT), Democratic Socialist Party (PSD), and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) respectively. There were three independent candiates: Avelino Coelho, Manuel Tilman, and Jose Ramos Horta.2
The election campaign was generally peaceful, though there was minor violence on the last day of campaign in several cities in the country involving the throwing of rocks between the supporters of certain political parties which resulted in injuries to several people, but no fatalities.
A clear point of irregularity was that some candidates put forward programmes and made promises to people which were out of their competence as president of the republic, since in the Timor-Leste political system the president has quite limited executive power.3
The first round of presidential election was held on 9 April 2007 and the second round was held thirty days later on 9 May 2007.
Though in both rounds the majority of polling booth staff and voters were familiar with voting procedures, the experience of the first round improved the second. The queue control at the voting centres for instance, according to the Solidarity Observer Mission for Timor-Leste (SOMET), was generally better organized in the second round than in the first round.4 There were fewer instances of disorderly crowds of unauthorized people assuming queue control functions than noted in the first round. [End Page 360]
According to SOMET's observation, in the first round some voters' fingers were not checked for ink.5 However, in the second round this improved. The identification of voters at the polling stations generally proceeded efficiently and no major problems were reported in the second round. Problems observed in the first round such as voters bypassing the identification staff and mistakes in record keeping were not noted in the second round.6
In addition, some ballot paper issuers in the first round did not provide guidance to voters on how to mark the ballot and where to deposit it. As a result, some voters were confused, and party agents were providing information to voters that should have come from polling staffs. In the second round, observers noted that most voters were familiar with the process and did not appear to need guidance.
In both rounds of the presidential election counting was done in the voting centres, which made the counting more transparent and fair for the voters. According to some observers, counting improved considerably in the second round. National observers and supervisors for all candidates were present in most of the polling stations.
In the first round of the presidential election, none of the candidates was able to reach the minimum vote (50 + 1 per cent) in order to win the election outright. The three top polls were 45 per cent for Francisco Guterres Lu-Olo, 21 per cent for Ramos Horta, and 17 per cent for Fernando Lasama.7
In the second round Jose Ramos Horta won the election with 67 per cent of the votes versus 30 per cent for Francisco Guterres Lu-Olo.8 The latter and his political party, Fretilin, accepted the victory of Jose Ramos Horta.
During his swearing-in speech, Jose Ramos Horta promised to do four things: (1) To reduce poverty in Timor-Leste by providing cash for the poor. The country may use the interest earned from a $1.2 billion oil fund, together with international aid and possibly bilateral borrowing, to create jobs and slash poverty. He added that if necessary, direct cash transfers would be made into the pockets of the poor people. (2) To be mediator and conciliator particularly in solving the problems of Alfredo Reinado and petitioners. (3) To be a bridge builder between Timor-Leste and other countries, particularly Indonesia, Australia and Portugal. (4) To maintain good cooperation with United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), UN agencies, international and national non-government organizations (NGOs) and religious group in Timor-Leste.9
In line with the promises made during the presidential campaign, President Jose Ramos Horta later proposed a total amount of US$25 million through a transitional budget of the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) government [End Page 361] for poverty reduction.10 However, the Fretilin Party took this unconstitutional proposal to the court and the High Court did not support it since the constitution of Timor-Leste does not permit the president to execute the budget.11
Twelve political parties and two coalition parties competed in the campaign. National Unity and Resistence Party of Timor (UNDERTIM), National Counsel of Reconstruction of Timor Party (CNRT), Republic Party (PR), Democratic and Republic Party of Timor-Leste (PDRT), Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Democratic Union of Timor-Leste (UDT), Democratic Party (PD), Millennium Democratic Party (PMD), Timor-Leste Socialist Party (PST) and Democratic Social Association of Timor —Democratic Social Party Coalition (ASDT-PSD coalition), Democrat Alliance (AD KOTA-PPT), Front Revolution Party of Timor (FRETILIN), Timor-Leste National Party (PNT) and National Unity Party (PUN) were registered by National Election Commission (CNE) to participate in the election.12
The election campaign lasted from 29 May to 27 June 2007.13 In order to avoid violence and irregularities, all political parties agreed to sign an accord and a code of conduct. The campaign were largely lawful, though there were some technical issues pertaining to the role of some officials. One clear area of concern was campaign finance. There were obvious discrepancies in the resources available to the parties, in particular with CNRT and Fretilin, the two biggest parties, having major advantages over all other parties.14 Since the legal framework does not provide adequate mechanisms to regulate campaign financing, it was impossible to assess the extent to which this funding could have been legitimate.15 Apart from that, some candidates still used inappropriate or inflammatory language, which was especially risky given the recent history of conflict in Timor-Leste.16
Unlike the presidential election, the counting process in the parliamentary elections was not held in polling centres but at the district level. The disadvantage of this was that voters might not witness the counting process.17
The national tabulation process for the parliamentary elections included the calculation of the electoral threshold for political parties and coalitions by applying the "d'Hondt formula"18 which provided for a proportional representation system after converting the total number of valid votes received by each party and coalition into allocated seats
Table 1 displays the results of valid votes received by each political party and coalition. As the table shows, to convert votes into seats in Parliament, a [End Page 362] political party or coalition must meet a threshold of at least 3 per cent of the total number of valid votes received (415,604).19 Therefore, the political parties or coalitions that received less than 12,468 valid votes were not entitled to any seats, according to the election laws of the country.
List of Valid Votes of Each Political Party and Coalition
|Party/Coalition||No. of Valid Votes||% of valid votes||No. of seats|
The results showed that the ruling Fretilin Party had won 29 per cent of the votes and was allotted twenty-one seats, CNRT had 23 per cent of vote and won eighteen seats, while the ASDT-PSD won eleven seats and the Democratic Party eight in the sixty-five-seat chamber.20 Five parties and two coalitions won parliamentary seats in proportion to their share of the vote, but no single party held an absolute majority of the sixty-five seats in Parliament.21
Since no single party had an absolute majority, the President of the Republic called upon Fretilin Party which had acquired the most votes in the election to colligate with other political parties to form the government. The Fretilin Party tried many times to negotiate with other political parties to form a government.22 Unfortunately, its approaches encountered negative responses from the other parties. On the other hand, CNRT, with the second highest vote, successfully invited other political parties to join it to form a majority in Parliament (AMP).23 [End Page 363]
Number of Seats Allocated to Women
|Party/Coalition||Number of Women Allocated Seats|
|1. Frente Revolucionario de Timor-Leste Independente
|2. Nation Councel of Reconstruction of Timor-Leste
|3. Colligation of ASDT-PSD||4|
|4. Democratic Party (PD)||2|
|5. National Unity Party (PUN)||1|
|6. Democratic Alliance of KOTA/PPT||0|
|7. Timorese Resistance of Democratic National Unity Party
The Timor people had enthusiastically registered and voted both in the presidential and parliamentary elections. In parliamentary election, 529,198 people had registered on the electoral roll and 426,210 exercised their right to vote.24 This indicates that 80.5 per cent of the population went to the polling stations across Timor-Leste to vote. From the total number of votes cast by the voters on the day of election, the political parties and coalitions received 415,604 (97.51 per cent) valid votes; 2,636 (0.62 per cent) were blank votes; and 7,970 (1.87 per cent) invalid votes.25
From the total number of voters, 47 per cent were women and 53 per cent were men.26 After converting voting results into allocation of seats, it is evident that eighteen female candidates from the candidate lists of political parties and coalitions succeeded in obtaining seats as deputies in the national Parliament. This amounted to 27.69 per cent from the total number of sixty-five seats allocated.27 See Table 2.
Women occupy some positions in the new Cabinet though the number is still small compared with men. Three were appointed as ministers —Minister for Finance, Minister for Justice, and Minister for Social Solidarity —one a Vice-Minister for Health, and one Secretary of State for the Promotion of Gender Equality.28 [End Page 364]
Role of National and International Observers in the Election
A significant number of national and international observers watched over the process of both the presidential and the parliamentary elections. Almost 1,900 national observers from more than 50 Timorese organizations observed the process of elections in 504 polling centres in thirteen districts across Timor-Leste.29
There were 255 international observers for the presidential election in 29 groups,30 and for parliamentary elections there were 288 observers in 30 groups.31 Another 28 observers, supported by an expert Core Team, were from the European Union. They were joined by a delegation of senior parliamentarians from the European Parliament.32 Japan and the Association of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), Australia, the Republic of Korea and Brazil sent their observers and a number of countries with embassies in Timor-Leste, including the United States, Indonesia, and China mandated their diplomats to act as impartial observers.33
Most of the observers assessed that both the presidential and parliamentary election were quite free, fair, and transparent.34 They made a number of recommendations to the government of Timor-Leste including that future elections should be administered by an independent agency outside the jurisdiction of any Government ministry.35 There should be a clear and consistent regulatory framework for elections, and provisions should be made for absentee voting for hospital patients, prisoners, the home bound and Timor-Leste citizens abroad.36
Role of UNMIT and UN Agencies and Programmes in the Election Process
UNMIT was mandated through Security Council Resolution 1704 to support Timor-Leste in all aspects of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary election process including technical and logistical support, electoral policy advice, and verification.37 There were more than 250 United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) from seventy countries working with the UNMIT in Timor-Leste to assist the electoral process in April, May, and June 2007.38 The UNMIT and UNVs served as elections advisers in Dili.
Further, at the district level, UNMIT and UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) provided language assistants and translators as a vital link between UNVs and the local population.39 This enabled electoral advisers in districts to engage successfully with local stakeholders such as government officials and village heads [End Page 365] to ensure that targets were met —indeed exceeded —in voter registration and voter education. The effectiveness of this was as attested to by the 81 per cent turnout for all three elections and the positive relations maintained with local communities at all times in all locations.40 UNDP also supported the national election process and the institutional capacity of media.
Formation of New Government
The president of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) invited the AMP to form the government on 6 August 2007.41 The AMP comprises the CNRT, Democratic Party, and ASDT/PSD Coalition.
He did this after consulting many people and organizations. The reason for inviting AMP to form the government was that it occupied the majority of seats in Parliament, which would ensure easy passage of the state annual budget and other legislation. Therefore, according to the President, his decision was legal under Article 106 of the constitution of the Republic, which states that "the Prime Minister shall be designated of the political party or alliance of political parties with parliamentary majority and be appointed by the president of the republic after consultation with the political parties sitting in the national parliament."42 Xanana Gusmao's appointment as the Prime Minister received much positive reaction from the international community.
The reactions of the political parties towards the formation of the new government varied. Soon after the announcement, the leaders and supporters of Fretilin Party reacted angrily to the invitation of the president to the AMP to form the government. They felt that the Fretilin Party, which had received the largest number of votes, should have been invited first to form a government and given the opportunity to negotiate the acceptance of its programme in Parliament.43 The party with the second highest vote may be invited to form the government only after programmes of the party with the highest vote has been rejected twice and the government has been subsequently dismissed.44
Further, Fretilin also questioned the coalition between CNRT and its allies because it was not a coalition registered to compete in the parliamentary elections, but a loose grouping that was brought together in the days after the election results were announced.45 The Secretary General of Fretilin Party, Mari Alkatiri angrily said "we regard the decision as a political and illegal decision. Therefore Fretilin will never want to cooperate with this de facto government in the future".46
The people in Viqueque, Baucau, Lospalos, Manufahi, and Ambeno reacted violently to the decision. Supporters of Fretilin Party burnt 332 houses and damaged [End Page 366] 52 others.47 The functioning of public transport and schools was disrupted, and food, water, and medical supplies were short on the market.48
Violence erupted because of the failure of Fretilin leaders to explain to their supporters the difference between Fretilin as a historical movement struggling for the independence of Timor-Leste from 1975 to 1999 and the transformation of Fretilin into a political party. As a political party, Fretilin has to compete with other political parties by presenting its programme to the people. If the people prefer the programme of some other party and give it more support, Fretilin has to accept the result gracefully in the spirit of democracy.
Generally, the international and national NGOs in Timor-Leste had no clear statement of position on the President's decision regarding the new government. However, the Catholic Church in the country took a very distinctive position in welcoming the formation of the new government. Prime Minister Xanana promised to give financial help to the church in the Catholic majority country.49
In carrying out the promise, the government included financial assistance for religious groups in its transitional budget between July to December 2007, amounting to US$300,000 for the Catholic church and US$100,000 each for the other religious groups: Protestant, Islamic and Buddhist.50 The aim was to assist religious groups in their efforts to educate and change the violence-prone mentality of the Timorese youth and to help create a culture of peace, tolerance and freedom.51 The budget proposal was passed by a majority of members of parliament.52
The rule by the AMP Government had several advantages: (1) The fact that the government was made up of a number different political parties with different programmes contributed to some sense of national unity in this newly independent country in which institutions of the state are still fragile. (2) As Timor-Leste is still in a transition period and full of conflicts, it needs the leadership of Xanana Gusmao as a charismatic leader and leader of independence movement in the past. In addition, he is also best placed to unite different factions, ideologies, and groups in the country. (3) Xanana Gusmao is a bridge builder between Timor-Leste and other countries particularly its closest neighbours Australia and Indonesia as well as Portugal. His leadership would also make it easier for the international community to maintain sustainable relationships with Timor-Leste.53
However, the AMP government will also face a number of challenges in the future. First, Fretilin still regards the process by which the AMP was installed as unconstitutional and its uncompromising reaction might lead to prolonged political deadlock and instability.54 If the Fretilin Party refuses to cooperate with the AMP government, the coalition government might survive in a much-weakened state. [End Page 367] The tensions might even cause the fragile CNRT–led coalition to collapse.55 The coalition has only about thirty-seven seats out of a total sixty-five, so any internal friction could endanger the government's majority. For instance, members of the Democratic Party, some of whom are close to Fretilin, might threaten to resign.56
Second, two of the new ministers and at least three of the Secretaries of State backed the 1999 autonomy option with Indonesia.57 In this case, people might lose their trust in the government since they feel that they might be betrayed by the Xanana administration. In particular this could cause resentment among people who had dedicated themselves to the struggle for independence in the past but received no position in the current government.
Third, former army Major Alfredo Reinado, an escapee wanted for murder, remains at large and a potential embarrassment to the new government. Xanana Gusmao, the Prime Minister, is widely believed to have backed Reinado's armed rebellion.58 The UN investigation into the 2006 crisis diplomatically labelled Xanana's connection with Reinado as unwise but not criminal.59 Reinado might yet have his say on this matter if he faces trial. In view of the failure to arrest and prosecute the high-profile escapee, resolving the Reinado problem is now widely seen as Xanana's responsibility. In addition, Mari Alkatiri, the Secretary General of Fretilin repeatedly stated that "in order to solve the problem of Alfredo Reinado and Petitioners, Xanana Gusmao, the actual Prime Minister and I should be out of the government".60 He was implying that Xanana was involved in the crisis that erupted in 2006/2007; therefore he was not the right person to address the problems.
Fourth, the issue of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps which caused multi-dimensional problems has yet to be clearly dealt with in the programme of the new government.61 The unsolved IDP issue is not just a security issue per se but should also be seen in terms of land and housing problems in the country.62 Most of the houses of the IDP people are occupied by other illegal persons now. Some IDP people have no right to make the occupants leave their houses since they themselves were also illegal occupants of the Indonesian houses in 1999.63
Fifth, unemployment was one of the roots causes of the 2006/2007 conflicts in Timor-Leste. The country has a shockingly high unemployment rate, verging on 44 per cent for urban youth.64 Poverty is expected to worsen following serious crop failures in 2007. Public investment projects were suspended and commercial activities curtailed because of the conflicts.
Sixth, the AMP government is under pressure from the World Bank and IMF to borrow money from the World Bank to reduce the poverty in Timor-Leste.65 It [End Page 368] is also under pressure from the U.S. and Australian governments to alter the law of land ownership to allow foreigners to own land in Timor-Leste. In addition, the government is also being pressured by the Australian Government to extend the oil pipeline to Darwin, Australia, otherwise, the Australian Government might withdraw the FSI from Timor-Leste which ensures the existence of the AMP government.66
Seventh, the foreign policy of Timor-Leste has to consider that geo-politically Indonesia is not only the giant next door, but it is also its main trading partner. The Indonesia and Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship (CVA), created in March 2005 as a bilateral initiative of the two states, is aimed at closing the bitter and highly sensitive chapter in the two countries' shared history. More importantly, it was supposed to uncover the truth about the 1999 mayhem in Timor-Leste. But even when its composition was still being drawn up, few believed the commission would be able to achieve that particular goal.
Most of the families of victims of the 1999 violence, some local and international NGOs, UNMIT, and the local church did not receive the establishment of the commission and its mission favourably.67 This might be a challenge for the AMP government led by Xanana Gusmao since he is well known for wanting to close that bitter chapter, even at the expense of neglecting justice for the victims of the 1999 violence.
Most of the Timorese were well aware of the importance of the two democratic elections in 2007 in Timor-Leste. Men and women queued for hours to register and to vote without any violence. As citizens, they did not want to lose their rights to vote once in five years to elect their leaders. Most of the political leaders showed maturity in contesting in the elections. UNMIT, UNPOL, and other UN agencies, programmes and funds extended their very significant contribution in terms of security, technical and logistic assistance to the successful conduct of the election process.
However, the opposition to the formation of the AMP government in the Fretilin Party has remained a big challenge for the government. The Fretilin political leaders and their supporters can make use of various problems that still exist in the country to impede or even try to overthrow the AMP government which, in their perception, is an unconstitutional government. [End Page 369]
Jose Cornelio Guterres is Professor at the Faculty of Political and Social Science, East Timor National University.
2. See Election News of UNMIT's Weekly Journal; April 2007 special edition.
3. See SOMET Summary Report on Timor-Leste Presidential, 22 May 2007, p. 6.
4. See Summary Report of the Solidarity Observer Mission for Timor Leste (SOMET) on the Timor-Leste Presidential Election, 22 May, 2007, pp. 9–10.
5. See Report of the Solidarity Observer Mission for Timor-Leste (SOMET) on the first round of the 2007 Presidential Elections, Dili, 2007, p. 8.
7. See "No Outright Winner after the First Round Election of the Presidential Election", Suara Timor Lorosae (a national newspaper of Timor-Leste), 24 May 2007.
9. See the Speech of President of RDTL, Jose Ramos Horta, during his swearing in on 7 May 2007.
10. See the Report on the Transitional Budget of the AMP Government, Dili, 2007, p. 20.
11. The rejection by the high court of the budget proposal of the President of Republic; See Suara Timor Lorosae, 7 December 2007.
12. CNE received list of twelve political parties to participate in the 2007 parliamentary elections at <http://www.cne.tl/boletim_CNE/HTML_eng/Bol_eng_V3.htm>, 22 June 2007.
13. CNE announced the date of the political campaign of the 2007 Parliamentary Election at <http://www.cne.tl/Boletim_CNE/Pic_Boletim/Ingles/Boletim%20CNE2_ENG.gif>, 12 April 2007.
16. Irregular mistakes committed by certain political parties; See Suara Timor Lorosae, 27 May 2007.
18. See the National Provisional Results from the 30 June 2007 parliamentary elections, the National Commission of Elections of Timor Leste, no. 679/RE-CNE/VII/2007, 9 July 2007.
23. "Xanana Gusmao Had Succeeded to Have Coalition with other Political Parties", see Timor Post, 27 July 2007. [End Page 370]
24. National Provisional Results from the 30 June parliamentary elections. See the Announcement of the CNE of Timor-Leste no. 679/RE-CNE/VII/2007 p. 10, 9 July 2007.
25. Ibid, p. 11.
26. Ibid, p. 10.
28. Women holding position in the new government, see Suara Timor Lorosae, 20 August 2007.
34. SOMET congratulates the people of Timor-Leste, see on Parliamentary Election as observers continue to monitor counting; in the report of SOMET, 4 July 2007.
36. Important Point for Electoral Reform and Legal implementation in Timor-Leste, see the Report of Coalition for Electoral Monitoring and Observation (KOMEG) and Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), 12 April 2007.
38. See the Report of the Solidarity Observer Mission for East Timor (SOMET) on the First Round of the Timor-Leste 2007 Presidential Elections, 18 April 2007, p. 5.
39. Ibid, p. 6.
40. See Electoral Assistance Section (EAS) —Electoral Bulletin, 19 August 2007.
41. The unconstitutional, irrational and damaging decision by President Jose Ramos Horta —A legal opinion on the formation of an unconstitutional government, see Diario Nacional, 6 September 2007.
42. See Constitution of RDTL, Article 106.
45. See "Fretilin Leaders questioned about the Coalition of CNRT post election", Suara Timor Lorosae, 8 August 2007.
46. "Gusmao to be Timor-Leste's new PM: independence hero Xanana Gusmao has been chosen as Timor-Leste's new Prime Minister by President Jose Ramos Horta", Timor Post, 7 August 2007. [End Page 371]
47. See the Secretary General SG/SM/11101: Department of Public Information. News and Media Division. New York.
49. "Bishop of Dili, Dom Alberto Ricardo, Met the new Prime Minister", Timor Post, 25 August 2007.
50. See the "Report on the Transitional Budget of the AMP's Government", August 2007.
51. The statement of the PM of Timor-Leste during his response to some members of Parliament in the National House of Representative, see Timor Post, 3 September 2007.
52. "The budget proposal for the assistant of religious groups passed in the parliament members", Timor Post, 6 August 2007.
53. Author's personal observation and reflection.
54. "Frelitin Party still regards the AMP Government as an unconstitutional government", Suara Timor Lorosae, 13 November 2007.
55. See an article that provides an overview of the difficulties confronting East Timor: "The Asia Pacific's Newest and Poorest Nation, and an interview of Geoffrey Gunn and Andre Vitcheck with Mr Mari Alkatiri, the secretary General of Fretilin in his visit to Jakarta —Indonesia", 11 September 2007.
57. Ibid, 4 October 2007.
58. See "Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor Leste", Geneva, 2006, p. 63.
59. Ibid, p. 30.
60. "In order to solve the problem of petitioners and Alfredo Reinado, the current PM, Mr Xanana Gusmao and myself should be out of the government", said Mr Mari Alkatiri, the Secretary General of Fretilin on the Timor-Leste National Radio (RTL) broadcasting, 26 November 2007.
61. "The unsolved problem of the IDP camps", Timor Post, 11 June 2007.
62. See the World Bank and ADB's Report, "Economic and Social Development Brief", Dili, 2007, p. 47.
63. "Problem of the illegal occupation of the houses", Suara Timor Lorosae, 8 October 2007.
67. Author's personal observation. [End Page 372]