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Abstract

This article identifies five waves of Canadian immigration over four centuries and connects them with their dominant political outlooks and partisan expressions. Taking a panoramic historical perspective, it locates immigrant groups in their regionally concentrated settings and connects Old and New World ideological currents. Immigrants proved to be formative and continuing influences in Canadian party politics by establishing and sustaining parties identifiable today. Ripples within the immigrant waves meant that their ideological orientations were neither monolithic nor static. Some of the immigrant groups in the first four waves were charter ones; they determined what other groups would be admitted and they established political parties that are identifiable today. The fifth wave, coming since the Second World War, has not ideologically reoriented party politics nor created new parties, but it has compelled the established parties to reorient themselves to and accommodate its presence. Political personalities and newspapers are presented as reflectors of their wave's ideological bias. Differentials in the political participation in the fifth, or global, wave are noted.

Résumé

Dans cet article nous identifions cinq vagues d'immigration au Canada en quatre siècles et faisons le lien avec les points de vue idéologiques et expressions partisans de chacune d'entre elles. Une perspective panoramique et historique permet de localiser les groupes d'immigrants dans les régions où ils se sont concentrés et de voir le lien entre les courants idéologiques de l'ancien et du nouveau monde. Ces groupes ont effectivement eu une influence formative continue sur les politiques des partis au Canada en créant en soutenant des partis qui existent encore aujourd'hui. Plusieurs cascades d'immigration indiquent que leurs orientations idéologiques n'étaient ni monolithiques, ni statiques. Certains immigrants au sein des quatre premières vagues furent des fondateurs qui déterminèrent quels autres groupes seraient admis et qui mirent sur pied des partis politiques encore identifiables aujourd'hui. La cinquième vague, arrivée depuis la seconde guerre mondiale, n'a pas réorienté idéologiquement la politique des partis ni n'en a créé de nouveaux, mais elle a amené ceux qui étaient établis à s'ajuster et à s'accommoder à sa présence. Des personnalités politiques et des journaux reflèteront les biais idéologiques de chacune de ces vagues. On remarquera des différences dans la participation politique de la cinquième vague, et son caractère international.

INTRODUCTION

This article identifies five waves of Canadian immigration over four centuries and connects them with their dominant political outlooks and partisan expressions. It

identifies ideological-cultural clefs in Canadian politics and traces them to the country's immigrant settlement patterns. It is a broad conceptual piece that uses historical findings to draw out points of similarity and difference across historical eras. This panoramic treatment links Old and New World politics, locating specific immigrant groups in their regionally concentrated settings. The five waves, respectively, are: New France's *canadiens* in the seventeenth century; the Loyalist decampment following the American Revolution in the eighteenth century; an early modern, largely British, flood into Upper Canada in the first half of the nineteenth century; the mix of Britons, Americans, and continental European prairie pioneers at the turn of the twentieth century; and that motley polyphonic wave from around the globe settling in Metro Canada in the past half-century. The ideological orientations of these waves were neither monolithic nor static. This article points to their formative and continuing influences on Canadian party politics. Some of the immigrant groups in the first four waves were charter ones; they determined what other groups would be admitted and what they would do (Porter 1965, 60, 63). They established political parties that are identifiable today. The fifth wave is a *Charter* one in that its diversity helped to impel the equality and multicultural provisions of the *Charter of Rights*. This wave influenced public policy and changed the face of public administration. It transformed English Canada's older perception of itself as a British nation. Political parties had to accommodate this wave and reorient themselves to its presence.

To be sure, one may identify an even earlier immigrant group, Canada's First Nations. They came to the land in the distant past. Diverse tribes speaking different languages, steeped in different cultural traditions, were spread across the continent. Indigenous peoples' political orientations stand apart from those of other immigrant groups as they exhibit a predilection for political decision-making by consensus, respect for authorities and elders, disapprove of intense egoism, and are intensely spiritual. Collectively, aboriginals generally pursue harmony, non-interference, persuasion, and unanimity (Brock 1994).

THE FRENCH WAVE

New France received no more than 10,000 settlers between its foundation in 1608 and conquest in 1759. After 1681, only a trickle arrived, although the importation of young girls, incentives for procreation and disincentives for bachelorhood, boosted the colony's numbers to 55,000 by 1754 (McRae 1964, 225-7; Lower 1958, 34). By 2001, there were nearly seven million or 23 percent of Canadians reporting French as their mother tongue (Statistics Canada 2001). French Canadians have more than survived; they have thrived. The genesis of their enduring cultural welfare and constitutional status is traceable to Britain's *Quebec Act* of 1774. Their civil law was recognized

Immigrant Waves	Period	Primary Region	Dominant Orientations
1. <i>Canadiens</i>	To 1760	Quebec/Acadia	quasi-feudal conservative
2. Loyalist	1780s	Maritimes/ Ontario	tory-touched liberal
3. Early Modern (Britain)	1815–1851	Ontario/ Maritimes	reform liberal
4. Modern Britain a) U.S. b) Continental c) Europe	1890s–1920s	West/ Ontario	a) labour-socialist b) populist-liberal c) deferential
5. Global a) Europe b) Rest of World	1945–	Metro Canada	multicultural/ assimilation

Fig. 1. Immigrant waves by period, region, and orientation

and, although they were Catholic, they were permitted to participate in public affairs unlike the case in Britain at the time. In recent decades, federal and provincial policies have promoted the French language and parliament has recognized the *québécois* – those living in the only North American jurisdiction where the French language prevails – as a “nation” (Canada 2006, 5412). An ironic upshot is that, outside Quebec, the use of French shrank after governments became active in its cause. In contrast, French usage grew when the language was suppressed in provincial educational systems (McRoberts 1997, 103-6; Wiseman 1992). More harmful to the cultures of French Canadians and their language have been urbanization, intermarriage, a lower birth rate, the eclipse of the extended family, mass communications, advances in transportation, increased mobility, and the declericalization of their society.

New France was a consciously modeled cultural fragment of its European parent. Religious orthodoxy was a condition of migration to Canada in the context of a semi-feudal and moderately absolutist state. The landowning seigneurs monopolized political and economic power before the Conquest. After it and the return of most of the seigniorial class to France, the clergy rose to the fore, controlling the educational and spiritual spheres. No printing press existed throughout the French colonial period. In this, the colony contrasted with pre-revolutionary British North America, which served as a place of refuge for religious and political dissenters.

To be a French Canadian until the 1960's Quiet Revolution was to be a pre-Enlightenment, pre-liberal, Catholic in a collectivist society that defined itself as hierarchical, organic, cooperative, and authoritatively ordered. There is dispute regarding the economic retardation of Quebec after the Conquest (Rudin 1997; Ouelette 1980), but there is little disagreement regarding its *mentalité collective*. The New World's challenging frontier environment helped level the conditions of seigneur and *habitant* so that the former could not access all the perks of his European counterpart and the latter's status was not as low as the French peasant's. Catholic-centred collectivism fed an ideological orientation where obligations – tithing, praying, obeying – preceded rights and where duty (exemplified in the press title *Le Devoir*) had primacy over freedom. Long after the Conquest of 1760, New France's idealized past – the moral goodness and superiority of its faith and rural lifestyle – continued to be promulgated. Lionel Groulx, the priest and long the province's foremost historian and nationalist, was fond of citing reactionary dicta, assuming the Christian resignation of a de Maistre rather than the rationalist liberal bent of a Rousseau or Voltaire. There were liberal streaks in *québécois* political culture – the 1837 rebellion and the young intellectuals in the *Institut canadien* – but they were pallid. The rebellion's *patriote* leader, Louis-Joseph Papineau, was at all times a temperamental conservative and a loyal son of the Church. He tried, but failed, to reconcile modern liberal thought with Catholicism's insistence on the supremacy of religious over civil society (Monière 1981, 183). Church opposition crushed the *Institut*. The residual rights of the seigneurs, established by Bourbon France, were only terminated in the 1930s. It was a time when the clergy, as the society's dominant ideological force, stressed theories of class and social harmony and nodded approvingly to the fascist models of Iberia and Italy.

Edward McWhinney expresses the common misconception that Anglo bias against the French and the French language discouraged this wave's spread across Canada (1982, 28). It was actually retarded by French Canadians' attitudes. They were not magnetized by the western frontier and did not share the optimistic, expansive, and independent mentality of others who headed there. They disbelieved in the value of prairie land, and their leaders feared that out-migration from Quebec would weaken the French fact in an expanding country. In brief, the French exhibited "pessimism, defeatism, or demoralization," and a fortress Quebec mentality took hold (Silver 1969, 27). In 1958, Pierre Trudeau bemoaned the fact that French Canada's conservative ideology, its lack of liberal thought, meant that it was neither "psychologically nor politically prepared" for democratic representative government in the nineteenth century. Quebec's women were only enfranchised in 1940, more than two decades after other provinces. As evidence of the continuing power of the Old World's pre-liberal *ancien* outlook, Trudeau cited the intermeshing of Church and public broadcasting in a prayer aired by Radio-Canada on Quebec's 1956 election day:

Sovereign authority, by whatever government it is exercised, is derived solely from God, the supreme and eternal principle of all power.... It is therefore an absolute error to believe that authority comes from the multitudes, from the masses, from the people, to pretend that authority does not properly belong to those who exercise it, but that they have only a simple mandate revocable at any time by the people. This error, which dates from the Reformation, rests on the false principle that man has no other master than his own reason.... All this explanation about the origin, the basis, and the composition of this alleged sovereignty of the people is purely arbitrary. Moreover, if it is admitted, it will have as a consequence the weakening of authority, making it a myth, giving it an unstable and changeable basis, stimulating popular passions and encouraging sedition (Trudeau 1977, quoted on 110-1).

The political expression of this first wave's long enduring ideology was its support for conservative parties: the *parti bleu* – associated with English-speaking Tories – in the nineteenth century and the Union Nationale in the twentieth. Parishioners, according to legend, were exhorted from the pulpit to remember that “Heaven is Blue and Hell is Red” – the colour of the anti-clerical *parti rouge* (Lemieux 1978, 248). Another distinctively *québécois* party that this wave produced was the Bloc populaire canadien which arose during the Second World War in opposition to conscription and in favour of provincial autonomy. It came to hold five seats in parliament. Generally, however, for most of the twentieth century, French Canadians became the electoral backbone of the federal Liberals, but this was not on account of a *rougiste* appetite. The Conservatives – with their execution of *métis* leader Louis Riel, their enthusiasm for the Boer War and for conscription in both World Wars, and their positions on the schools questions in Ontario, Manitoba, and New Brunswick – appeared as the party of the *maudits anglais*: militant pro-British Protestants led by the Anglo-Canadian barons of St. James and Bay Streets. The federal Liberals succeeded in projecting a more bi-ethnic image, especially under the leadership of Wilfrid Laurier, Louis St. Laurent, and Trudeau.

The Quiet Revolution began with a cry of *maitres chez nous* and fed on the grievance that French Quebecers were, in the words of a best seller, the *White Niggers of America* (Vallièrs 1971). The Parti Québécois' 1976 election, combined with the influx of Canada's fifth immigrant wave in the 1970s, led to turning the older notion of *la nation québécoise* on its head. The intellectual classes redefined Quebec as a *société neuve* with language replacing religion as its glue. The denouement is that Quebec now officially embraces diversity, promotes the integration of minority cultural communities, and posits a common civic culture, a *culture publique commune* (Salée 2002). In this it is similar to English-speaking Canada's subscription to the universal values of democracy, freedom, and equality. The idea of an exclusive ethnic history is muted.

The lingering collective mentality of the first immigrant wave is reflected in

Quebec's contemporary focus on socio-economic solidarity, on its corporatist inclinations, and on its sensitivity to social exclusion and poverty (Montpetit 2004; Noël 2002). Conservative collectivist values of old still reverberate in modern Quebec – *je me souviens* is stamped on automobile license plates and a cross hangs above the Speaker's chair in the National Assembly – but they have evolved in a social democratic collectivist direction. The PQ applied to join the Socialist International, the SI's president attended René Lévesque's funeral, and PQ leaders continually reaffirm their social democratic objectives. As a measure of their collectivist and statist inclinations, Quebecers created the largest stable of publicly owned crown corporations in Canada. As a sign of its socialist inclinations, the PQ introduced the most progressive tax regime and most severe anti-strike breaking law in the land. It has had the continuous support of the labour movement and, when in office, attempted to achieve a form of partnership between government and its public service unions (Gow 2000, 301-2). The revolution in this French wave's ideological outlook is also reflected in its posture on social questions. From abortion and same-sex marriage to teenage promiscuity, gun control, the legalization of marijuana, and capital punishment, Quebecers are the most socially liberal of Canadians (Edwards and Mazzuca 2000a; Edwards and Mazzuca 2000b; Edwards and Mazzuca 2000c; Mazzuca 2001a; Mazzuca 2001b; Hartley and Mazzuca 2001).

A *nouvelle bourgeoisie* came to the fore after the 1960s, personal per capita incomes in Quebec came to exceed those in most provinces, and some Quebec corporations – collectively labeled “Quebec Inc.” in the 1980s – became world leaders in their fields. The emergence of this new class and the rise of the PQ fed revisionist and post-revisionist accounts of Quebec's evolution (Couture 1998; Couture and Kermol 2003). They contend that the changes ushered in by the Quiet Revolution were merely a realignment of forces in an already modern and liberal society as evidenced by Quebec's earlier urbanization and its ethnic diversity. These schools of thought challenge the notion of Quebec as a monolithically traditional society and suggest that alliances – such as the one forged by the Church, business, and the provincial Conservative party in the last third of the nineteenth century – reflected modernity's typical contradictions. They were more complex in Quebec because its society sprang from European colonialism. The 1980 and 1995 referenda were attempts by separatist nationalists to use the ballot box to reverse what British muskets had accomplished in 1759. In federal politics, the French wave's power is evident when one considers that Quebecers served as Canada's prime minister for 34 of the 36 years between 1968 and 2005. Since 1993, francophone Quebecers have expressed themselves in parliament via the Bloc Québécois, giving it a majority of the province's seats in five consecutive elections.

THE LOYALIST WAVE

America's War of Independence produced two new countries: the revolutionary United States and, in reaction, a counter-revolutionary Canada. Approximately 40,000 British North Americans (some of German origin and a few of French) relocated north of the new international border in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The Crown conferred on them the inheritable honorific designation UE or UEL (for United Empire Loyalist) for their faithful allegiance. About three-quarters of them settled in the Maritime colonies, swamping the existing population of about 20,000 – the remaining Acadians and already established British Americans. The Loyalists melded with the latter; together they represented the formative force in defining the region's political culture. New Brunswick was specifically carved out of western Nova Scotia to accommodate the influx. A royal charter established St. John, known as "the Loyalist city," and an annual Anglican service celebrates its Loyalist origins.

Atlantic Canada continues to have the highest percentage of Canadians of British ethnic roots, and the region has the most affinity for things British because it was largely bypassed by subsequent immigrant waves. Atlantic Canadians are the most supportive of maintaining the monarchy, and the region has been characterized as exhibiting features of a traditional political culture where religion, long established families, patronage, localism, and deference to leaders are more pronounced than elsewhere in English Canada (Beck 1978; Fitzpatrick 1978; MacKinnon 1978). In this context, patronage as part of the spoils of office is more likely than in other parts of Canada to be perceived as blameless (Adamson and Stewart 1985, 329-30; Buker 2005, 120-3). In Prince Edward Island, a system of alternating senior civil service appointments between Protestants and Catholics prevailed, as did an informal agreement among the political parties that they would only nominate Protestants in some seats and Catholics in others (MacKinnon 1978, 237).

The approximately 10,000 Loyalists that settled in what was then western Quebec came to have the greatest influence in shaping Canadian politics and in the self-definition of English Canada because this region, the future Ontario, became the country's demographic and economic centre of gravity. Upper Canada, created for the Loyalists by Britain's parliament in 1791, immediately began to embellish and mythologize its self-perceived status as the British Empire's foremost colony. Its first governor, John Graves Simcoe, tried to create an aristocratic class as a counterbalance to "the rising tide of colonial democracy" (Burnet 1972, 13) via land and office grants. Frontier conditions, however, limited social stratification in comparison with Britain. Social classes were somewhat levelled downwards in the backwoods, as they had been in New France, because the land-owning class included many poor people. The Loyalist elite became the backbone of the oligarchic Family Compact, that powerful grouping of colonial administrators, judges, lawyers, ranking clergymen, and

captains of commerce and finance described by British Whig Lord Durham as a “petty, corrupt, insolent Tory clique.” They considered themselves part of an “imperial” people (Noel 1997, 58). Some, it appears, may even have had “a quasi-aristocratic contempt for business and mere money-making.” The French Revolution and the War of 1812 – when Loyalists again served as British ramparts against American invasion – were pivotal in shaping their worldview. “The first imparted to them a ‘tory’ attitude towards change and reform, the second gave them an acute sense of leadership, loyalty to Britain and a strong anti-Americanism” (Saunders 1957, 173, 176, 178). Like Britain’s Tories, they denounced reformers as dangerously wild “Jacobins” and characterized the United States as a chaotic anarchic “mobocracy.”

A revisionist account of Canadian political history argues that the Loyalists’ toryism – their anti-American, anti-revolutionary, inegalitarian, and hierarchical dispositions – has been overdrawn, that the Loyalists were driven by the same liberal intellectual currents as those in the fledgling U.S. (Ajzenstat and Smith 1995). Certainly, the Loyalist masses, who were after all British North Americans, were in many ways liberal individualists, but their liberalism was infused with a tory touch in a way that liberalism was not south of the border (Horowitz 1966). Toryism inevitably melded with liberalism as industrial capitalism developed, and English Canada was always closely bound, economically and culturally, with the U.S. Nevertheless, terms used to identify the Loyalists’ conservatism – “elitism, ascription, hierarchy, continuity, stability, and social order” – came to be used to distinguish Canadian from American ideological outlooks (Dyck 1996, 304).

As with the first French wave, the Loyalist attitude to authority was conservative in that it saw authority coming, properly, from on high. The Loyalists, like the French, rejected having a powerful popularly elected assembly. They favoured a concentrated, robust, and non-representative executive government. As in Quebec and unlike in the United States, church and state were intertwined in Upper Canada. The *Constitutional Act, 1791*, creating the colony, mandated that a quarter of its territory be reserved for the Church of England. This came to be shared with the Church of Scotland. The tory structural configuration of government with privileged religions, however, encountered opposition. The onslaught against them came from the third wave, the early modern reform wave, of immigration in the first half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, group privilege was not completely eradicated. The *British North America Act* continued to provide for state funding of Ontario’s Catholic schools by entrenching the status quo at the time of Confederation. This privileged right, condemned as a discriminatory practice by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, is not extended to other religious denominations.

The Loyalist legacy lives on in Ontario, but there is not much public consciousness of it. The provincial motto, barely known and rarely cited, is *Ut incepit sic permanet*

fidelis ("Loyal she began, loyal she remains"). The provincial flag sports the Union Jack and Loyalist Upper Canada's residue is reflected in the crown on Ontario's automobile plates, the name of its legislature (Queen's Park), and in institutions such as the Law Society of Upper Canada and Upper Canada College. Today, twenty-seven UEL branches in eight provinces, with headquarters in Toronto, continue to operate (UELAC 2007). Many, if not most, Loyalist descendants are unlikely to know of or have pride in their forebears' status. Canada's once British character has frayed. Aristocratic status does not convey the glory it once did; the formerly vibrant Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire is a pale shadow of its former self. A distinct Canadian identity and citizenship were created in 1947, and, in 1977, Canadians ceased to be British subjects. The *Toronto Daily Star's* banner front-page headline of 1949, "Keep Canada British...God Save the King" (Penner 1978, 210) became inconceivable in later years. The "Loyalists" do not appear in *The Language of Canadian Politics*, but their "toryism" and "Red Tories" live on in contemporary political discourse (McMenemy 2006, 322, 389). This is evidenced in Ontario's political culture being characterized in the 1980s as the "Red Tory Province" (Wilson 1980).

The tory anti-Americanism of this second wave has reverberated throughout Canadian history, although there is an ambivalent and contradictory side to it. Although not a Loyalist, John A. Macdonald's tory ideological vision was expressed in his admiration for parliament's unlimited sovereignty, his friendship with Benjamin Disraeli, his celebration of the British imperial connection, and his animosity to free trade with the U.S. He described Canadians as Britain's faithful "subordinate" people (McInnis 1959, 7). A century later, the tory view of Canada was displayed in George Grant's screed against the universal liberal and homogenizing culture driven by American modernity (Grant 1970). In becoming a best seller, *Lament for a Nation* demonstrated Canadians' repressed toryism. Loyalist-anchored Ontario revealed its American antipathies in the free trade election of 1988, as it had in the one of 1891. Among Canadians, Ontarians were the most opposed to the free trade idea (Adams et al. 1988). Vehemently opposed, too, were its cultural industries and its government – the only one in the land taking that position (with the exception of miniscule Prince Edward Island).

Toryism, as articulated by luminary historians such as Donald Creighton, W. L. Morton, and Eugene Forsey, recognizes that Canada has steadily become a society of social equals. Morton's unusually intense version asserted that Canada's system of government, unlike the American governmental system, has an "objective" life of its own. In it, the state and the law are embodied in the succession of those designated by heredity and designated by parliament, rather than, as in the U.S., based on the principle that the state is a social compact of individuals. There, the state moves on popular impulse, rendering its government "subjective." The tory tradition sees

Canada's national unity as vested in its monarchical institutions; allegiance to the crown represents the permanent force against the centrifugal forces of the country's multiculturalism, its external dependence, and economic fragility (Morton 1961).

Tory ideas in Canada continue to be circulated. They were echoed in Conservative prime minister Joe Clark's description of Canada as "a community of communities" (Christian and Campbell 1983, 229). Conservative leader Robert Stanfield exhorted his caucus to remember that what differentiates Canada's true conservatives from liberals is that they are prepared to justify the restraint of individual conduct in the interests of the community as a whole; he proudly pointed to the pioneering labour laws introduced by British and Canadian Conservatives (Stanfield, 1995). The tory communitarian traces of the Loyalist wave, the concern for the community's public interest and deference to authority, is discernible, too, in Canadians' attitudes and behaviour compared to those of their American neighbours whose template is the rugged individual. "Canadians," concluded Seymour Martin Lipset on the basis of appraising literary works, opinion surveys, religious practices, crime statistics, union memberships, corporate concentration, public enterprises, and other social indicators, "are more elitist, law-abiding, statist, collectivity oriented and group oriented than Americans" (Lipset 1986, 113). More recent public opinion analyses, however, question whether these kinds of differences between Canadians and Americans still hold (Nevitte 1996; Adams 2003).

The first two immigrant waves, *canadiens* and Loyalists, were quite different. Relative to the subsequent waves, however, they embraced a more conservative ideology – quasi-feudal in the case of the former, a tory-tinged liberalism in the case of the latter. The later waves reflected the ideological evolution of mother Europe as state absolutism gave way to an evolving liberal spirit. That spirit became less elitist and more democratically inclusive and more socialist as the nineteenth century wore on. Both the *canadien* and Loyalist waves were more deferential to established authority, more corporatist, state-oriented, ascriptive, and tied to privileged established churches than their successor waves. The ideological imprints of the first two waves are fading, but continue to be reflected in Canada's institutions such as Westminster-style parliamentary government and in the flags of Quebec and Ontario with their symbols of the French and British monarchies. They are a reminder of Canada's *internal* divisions which have parallels in the United States between its North and South (Grabb and Curtis 2005).

THE EARLY MODERN WAVE

This third wave arrived as Europe's twin revolutions, political in France and economic in Britain, were in full swing (Hobsbawm 1962). The coming to power of Britain's

Whigs in the 1830s accompanied the growth of *laissez faire* sentiments and notions of the self-made man. The liberal ideology underpinning the Industrial Revolution threw open careers to men of skill and talent. The new order's ascendant entrepreneurial classes challenged the established order's landed aristocratic classes. The spirit of "progress" held out the prospect that man could rise by virtue of his wits and ingenuity, rather than be bounded by his lineage and the station in life into which he was born. The French Revolution spoke to liberty, secularization, and national self-determination. These rationalist, egalitarian, and radical outlooks were even more apt in the New World's frontier environment where cheap land was plentiful, opportunities for self-promotion beckoned, and the political, economic and social orders were skeletal.

Notwithstanding the charter status of Loyalists, one cannot underestimate the impact of the largely British immigrant wave that swamped Upper Canada. It contributed to remaking Canada politically because of its size and the high status of its immigrant Britons in "British" North America. In the 40 years between 1811 and 1851, Upper Canada exploded from 77,000 to 952,000 (Armstrong 1985, 272). Just as the Loyalist wave provided the core for what became the Conservative party, this early modern British wave threw up their opponents, the Reformers, who became the Liberal party. This wave, however, was not cut from a single piece of undifferentiated national or ideological cloth. It had diverse components. About 60 per cent of it was Irish. The Catholics among them had particularly low status and provided the raw labour essential for the construction of the colony's canals and railroads. They and a sprinkling of French Canadians and blacks – Loyalist slaves and fugitive American ones – were marginalized socially, judged troublesome and ill adjusted for frontier conditions, and lacked the Protestant work ethic of the Loyalists (Burnet 1972, 23). Particularly influential was an Anglo-Irish gentry. The strength of the Orange Order that arose in the 1830s was such that it induced John A. Macdonald to become an Orangeman. As one measure of Orange force in Victorian Canada, the Order organized more urban parades than any other national-religious community (Goheen 1990). Toronto's mayoralty between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries appeared to pass from one Orange Masonic Protestant to another. The balance of the British wave was of roughly equal numbers of Scots and English.

Carried on this third wave were many of Canada's future political figures such as Macdonald, the *Globe's* founder, George Brown, and William Lyon Mackenzie, the 1837 rebel leader. All three arrived in 1819-20. Mackenzie's *Colonial Advocate* became the leading voice of the new Reform political movement. Both his political organization and that of Robert Baldwin – the latter the son of an old country Irish Whig – tapped the resources of Britain's Reformers even though their programs differed in Canada. A damper on the radical democratic ideas of this early modern British tide was that, once many former English radicals became landowners, they

became Upper Canadian Tories. They proved critical to the establishment of the colony's first responsible government – one accountable to the popularly-elected representative legislature – in the 1840s. John Ralston Saul hails Baldwin's handshake with Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine, establishing their dual ministry, as the defining pivot of Canadian politics (Saul 1997). Government departments operated with two ministers – one from British Canada West (Ontario), the other from French Canada East (Quebec) – with a double majority required of legislators from both the Canadas to make laws. It is a comment on the depth of the Loyalist legacy in the Maritimes and its eclipse in Upper Canada that those carried on the third wave became the leading protagonists in Ontario politics, while Loyalist descendants continued running New Brunswick's government in the 1880s (Ryerson 1880, 277).

A significant ripple in this early largely British nineteenth-century wave was post-revolutionary Americans. Indeed, it appears that more of them appeared in the 1790s than had Loyalists in the previous decade (*ibid.*, 309, 312). Land speculators and merchants clamoured for the entry of Yankee frontiersmen, largely British in ethnic origins, but temporarily prohibited during the War of 1812 from settling in Canada. They were judged energetic, adept North American farmers well adjusted to life on the fringe of settlement, and preferred over British paupers who would not add much to the colony's trade. Mackenzie and his radical allies drew heavily on American examples – whether the subject was education, primogeniture, or the structure of government – and on the voting support of the American farmers who settled in the western reaches of the province. The bogey of American influence in the region even led some British authorities to ponder dividing the province and flooding western Ontario with British settlers to counteract “Yankeeism” (Landon 1967, ch. 4). The Clear Grits, the left-wing faction among the Reformers, and the Canadian equivalent of America's Jacksonians, favoured American-style democracy with a radically expanded franchise. Testimony to these roots is that Canada's present day Liberals are popularly known as “Grits” – a distinctly Canadian political appellation.

The British old-country influence was reflected in press titles such as Kingston's *British Whig*. The more radically liberal, American-influenced, western regions of Upper Canada had the *Galt Reformer*, *St. Thomas Liberal*, *Chatham Freeman*, and the *London Free Press*. In Baldwin's less radical Reform cosmology, American republican or ultra-democratic ideas were to be minimized. Overall, it appears that the British-American Reformers moderated the Loyalists' conservatism while the Loyalists tempered the Reformers' radicalism (Craig 1948, 334; Jackson 1961, 104; Wise 1967). The agrarian influence from south of the border continued to be evident with the Patrons of Industry and the Grange, branches of American organizations, surfacing in Ontario after the 1870s. Some have depicted Ontario's late nineteenth-century farmers as spouting classical economic liberalism, but others have pointed to groups like the Patrons as heralds of collectivist alternatives to capitalism's ailments (Shortt 1972;

Cook 1984). What the British Canadian and American agrarian movements had in common was their overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon and now nativist composition.

When we look at mid-nineteenth-century Canada from the perspective of ideological evolution, a striking difference is the gulf between the French and English solitudes. Another is the difference between Canada as a whole and the European and American experiences. French Canada's values were rooted in the authoritarian corporate ethos of the seventeenth century, while English Canada's, particularly in Ontario, were shaped more by the pragmatic organic Victorian liberalism of the nineteenth century than by the Loyalists. Neither society experienced the rationalist democratic fervour of the eighteenth century, as did the U.S. (Careless 1960). By the 1850s and 1860s, Canada's political institutional culture appeared congealed, with the dualism of French and English expressed in the operation of government and the creation of a separate province for a French majority, but the broader partisan political culture was still evolving. Newer British immigrants and their ideas could not be dismissed as alien because of Canada's continuing ties of affinity to Britain. Canada still had no clear sense of identity separate from the empire it belonged to.

The scale of immigration tapered off in the second half of the nineteenth century, but those that came introduced a third, minoritarian, subculture: artisan and working class Britons, now largely English. They had witnessed the rise of the Chartists in the 1830s and then other labourist political formations such as H. M. Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation in the 1880s. These Britons gravitated to Ontario's rising industrial centres such as Toronto, Hamilton, and Ottawa as most of the province's arable land was by now occupied. Their impact was such that the percentage of British-born Torontonians increased as those of the native born declined. Well more than half of the city's most prominent labour leaders arrived from Britain between the 1860s and the 1890s (Kealey 1980, 323-9). This ripple in the early modern wave was not a foundational influence as were the Loyalists. Nor was it as profound in numbers as the earlier arriving Britons, but its labour-socialist orientation had cultural legitimacy and took root on account of its British pedigree. A flavour of this subculture's sensibility appears in the newspapers it spawned. They included the *Labour Advocate*, *Ontario Workman*, *Industrial Banner*, and the *Palladiums of Labour*. Eventually, this outlook found partisan expression in the election of a dozen Labour MPPs to Queen's Park in 1919. Another manifestation of it came with the election of British-born trade union leader and CCFer Jimmie Simpson as Toronto's mayor in the 1930s.

THE MODERN WAVE

It is difficult to underestimate the demographic impact and ideological orientations of those in the fourth, modern, immigrant wave because of their numbers and their western regional concentration. With a population of just over five million in 1901,

Canada recorded over three million immigrant arrivals between then and 1914 (Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1951, 175). In many of those years, Americans exceeded the number of arrivals from Britain (Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1923, 126). The populations of Saskatchewan and Alberta exploded by 440 and 412 per cent respectively in the century's first decade. The high status of immigrant Britons and Americans meant that this wave's political ideas modified Canada's ideological and political landscape. In previously unsettled western Canada, it defined it. A large and ethnically diverse ripple in this wave was the large number of continental Europeans, many previously shunned – Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and others. Ironically, Wilfrid Laurier's notion of his Canadianness – “a British subject I was born, a British subject I shall die” – was eventually to be undone by his government's aggressive immigration regime.

In the late nineteenth century, Britain's industrialization entered an advanced capitalist phase while Canada's was nascent. A cyclical downturn in Britain generated static real incomes. Simultaneously, Canada was eager to settle the prairie provinces it created between 1870 and 1905. Working-class Britons, now much more English and Scottish than Irish, were pushed out of Britain by its stagnant economy and pulled into Canada by the promise of opportunity, upward mobility, and, again, plentiful land – a free section (640 acres) to anyone who homesteaded for a year. Some Britons settled in Ontario's rising industrial centres, others in Cape Breton's coal mining towns, but most headed west. Between 1901 and 1921, British Columbia's population grew from 178,000 to 525,000. Most of the newcomers hailed from Britain's cities and settled in British Columbia's cities, but many worked in the province's corporate frontier industries – hardrock mining and lumber. The ideological orientation of this group was heavily shaped by Britain's then ascendant labour-socialist politics. Every Winnipeg General Strike leader but one emigrated from Britain between 1892 and the 1919 Strike. Tommy Douglas, arriving a century after Macdonald, exemplified this labour-socialist outlook and became North America's first socialist head of government. These Britons were prominent in positions of union leadership and launched a multitude of labour parties and socialist factions. By 1899, twenty-seven separate unions could be counted in Winnipeg's Labour Day parade (Wiseman 1983, 5) and a year later, the editor of the city's labour newspaper, *The Voice*, was elected an MP. Ramsay MacDonald, Britain's first Labour prime minister, and Kier Hardie, Labour's founder, toured Canada in 1906 and 1907, respectively, in support of the country's fledgling labour-socialist parties.

British farmers were preferred by officialdom for the prairies, but many from Britain's cities failed or proved unsuitable (Government of Saskatchewan 1930, 23). Americans were also avidly pursued. The evaporation in the U. S. of its “last best west” – good cheap agricultural land – in the 1890s led to Americans migrating to the western prairies, especially Alberta where, by 1911, they constituted 22 per cent

of the population (Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1929, 99). The ideological orientation of this group was populist-liberal, a liberalism unlike that of the modern British wave for it was unalloyed by any traces of British toryism and wholly unfamiliar with Old World socialism. Henry Wise Wood, the “Uncrowned King of Alberta” who declined the premiership and a knighthood on the grounds of his American background, reflected this outlook (Rolph 1950). Wood was a veteran Missouri populist and the leader of the powerful United Farmers of Alberta, the province’s most influential organization. Its executive had more American-born than either Canadian- or British-born farmers (Morton 1967, 39), and they swept to power in 1921. The Americans’ outlook was shaped by the agrarian politics of America’s Great Plains in the late nineteenth century: Greenbackism, the Free Silver movement, and the Non-Partisan League. The latter debuted in Alberta in 1916 amid cries for citizen-initiated referenda and the right to recall MPs. These were democratic lodestars of America’s Progressives.

Americans outnumbered the British-born by a ratio of two-to-one in all fifteen of Alberta’s rural census divisions. One of them was J. W. Leedy, who had been elected the Populist governor of Kansas in 1896. Another was George Bevington, a noted credit expert. Americans were the electoral base for the UFA government (1921-1935) and then for the “funny money” Social Credit regime that followed. It is noteworthy that the three census divisions where continental Europeans outnumbered Americans came to provide the strongest opposition that both the UFA and Social Credit were to encounter (Flanagan 1971). These areas were more sympathetic to Liberals and the social democratic CCF.

Officialdom’s attitude toward Americans and its distaste for eastern Europeans was expressed by the Minister of Immigration, Albertan Frank Oliver. Americans, he opined were “desirable in every way. They are people of intelligence, of energy, of enterprise, of the highest aspirations” (Canada 1901, 2939). In contrast, “we resent the idea of having the millstone of this Slav population hung around our necks” (Canada 1903, 6566). Nevertheless, Canada pursued eastern Europeans as the need for cheap labour to stoke the burgeoning wheat economy trumped the bias of ethnic, if not racial, exclusivity. (“White Canada Forever” was the most popular Canadian bar song in 1914 [Kazimi]). In Alberta, parties accused each other of using foreign-born voters, and it became “an article of faith” that the foreign-born were prone to criminality (Thomas 1959, 66). Northern Europeans had higher status and assimilated politically and socially more easily than the eastern Europeans. Manitoba’s Icelandic community, for example, which assimilated relatively quickly, launched two weeklies in the 1880s. One endorsed the Conservatives and the other, the Liberals. This accurately reflected the ideological divisions in the community (Matthiasson 1979, 197-8).

The relative status of the ethnic minorities was expressed in Manitoba's election law at the turn of the century. It required, as a condition of the right to vote, literacy in one of seven languages: English, French, German, Icelandic, Swedish, Norwegian, or Danish. Ukrainians were a particularly large group – by 1941 they made up more than 12 per cent of the province (Darcovich and Yuzyk 1980, 64) – but their language was excluded. They were also a radically mixed lot ideologically. The anti-communists among them gravitated to fraternal organizations and generally embraced the Liberals. Ukrainian communist sympathizers, however, were of sufficient numbers to become a pillar of support for the Communist party after its formation in 1921. They came to make up an estimated 40 per cent of its membership according to one account (Kolasky 1979, 17). Another account fixed the CP's membership as 90 per cent Ukrainian, Finnish, and Jewish (Angus 1981, 291). By the late 1920s, the communist-affiliated Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association was publishing 10,000 copies of its thrice weekly *Ukrayinski robotnychi visty* [Ukrainian labour news] (Wiseman 1987, 107). Until the 1940s, neither Ukrainian side cared much for the British-led labour-socialist parties. One side saw them as communist fellow-travellers and the other side dismissed them as a hopelessly reformist, naïve, social democratic gang.

The continental Europeans had their greatest impact in Saskatchewan, the most rural and third largest province. It was the only English Canadian province where those of British ethnic origins were not the majority. This produced a reaction so that, in the 1920s, the province simultaneously boasted English-speaking Canada's highest percentage of Catholics (mostly Europeans) and an estimated 15,000 – 20,000 members of the anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant Ku Klux Klan (Kyba 1968, 108; McLeod 1968, 143). Anti-Slavic sentiment was pronounced and played a pivotal role in the provincial elections of 1925 and 1929. In the prairies' rural areas, the Europeans practiced the politics of ideological and partisan deference out of fear of incurring the wrath of the race-proud Anglo-Saxons. Two leading Ukrainian newspapers expressed this deferential attitude in the 1930s. One opined:

Canadian Ukrainians do not have any influence. We are poor and need political help. Ukrainian farmers and workers depend for their livelihood on the more powerful. This forces us to support a politically influential party. Affiliation with small radical parties brings us Ukrainians only discredit and ruin.

Another weighed in that “candidates from parties making strange and impossible promises [veiled references to the CCF and CP] will bring us no advantage, only national dishonour.”¹

Continental Europeans proved a potent force in Winnipeg, the dominion's then third largest city, because of their concentration. During the Winnipeg General

Strike, the Anglo-Canadians opposing it interpreted it as a conflict between British subjects and subversive Europeans in their midst (Grenke 1988). A few Slavs, foot soldiers in the Strike, were rounded up and deported, while the imprisoned British-born Strike leaders became working-class heroes and went on to gain public office. John Queen, first elected from his jail cell, became the leader of the Manitoba Independent Labour Party – the CCF-NDP’s forerunner – and the mayor of Winnipeg. Clifford Sifton, Laurier’s one-time immigration minister, was almost certainly referring to Queen when he wrote of “Scotch mechanics from the Clyde – turbulent, riotous, spoiling for trouble” (Sifton 1922, 11).

It was only by the mid-1940s that second and third generation Europeans were sufficiently integrated, assimilated, and self-confident to combine with Saskatchewan’s British-anchored labour-socialists to catapult the social democratic CCF to power. Political power resided in the overrepresented rural areas, and, although Saskatchewan had no more Britons than either Manitoba or Alberta, it had as many British-born farmers as those provinces combined. The CCF was more open to the participation of the Europeans in its affairs than the Liberals and Conservatives, and its vote went up by 218 per cent, for example, in Regina’s most European district (Lipset 1968, 206). The same phenomenon – those of European ethnic backgrounds swinging behind the British-sired NDP – was described as the “ethnic revolt” (Swainson 1969) that brought the Manitoba NDP into office in the 1960s under Ed Schreyer, whose ancestors came from what is now western Ukraine. He became the province’s first premier in the twentieth century who was neither an Ontario-born Anglo nor the son of one. By the early 1990s all three prairie provinces had premiers whose ancestry was European, a development that would have been inconceivable in earlier generations. That they led ideologically distinct parties (Ralph Klein’s neo-conservative Conservatives in Alberta, Roy Romanow’s social democratic NDP in Saskatchewan, and Gary Filmon’s centre-right Conservatives in Manitoba) revealed that the “ethnic” label, at least insofar as those of continental European backgrounds were concerned, no longer carried a stigma.

THE GLOBAL WAVE

The post-World War wave of immigrants had two broad ripples, both “poly-ethnic,” but each quite different in its Old World origins. The first wave of one-and-a-half million, coming between 1946 and 1961, was largely European. Its four largest national groups were Britons, Italians, Germans, and Dutch. About a third of this wave settled in greater Toronto. Simultaneously the previously burgeoning prairies suffered absolute population decline (Kerr and Hodworth 1990, 59). Rural out-migration after 1921, as well as constant Atlantic decline, shifted political weight to

southern, especially metropolitan, Ontario where the global wave imprinted itself. Some Italians arrived before the Second World War, but many more came after it. They served as the vanguard for other southern Europeans, especially Greeks and Portuguese. The second ripple in the wave began to arrive at the turn of the 1970s, after the elimination of the last vestiges of racial criteria in Canadian immigration policy in 1967. Europe and Britain were overtaken as the principal continent and country of immigrants' origins. In 1971, more Americans emigrated to Canada than citizens of any other country, but this was an anomalous function of the increasingly unpopular Vietnam war. Americans, unlike the non-English-speaking continental Europeans before the 1970s and the visible minorities after, did not stand out as a distinctive cultural group.

A concomitant feature of the post-1960s ripple, in addition to its national and ethnic diversity, was its religious diversity. By 2001, only 72 percent of Canadians classified themselves as Christians in contrast to the 95 percent who did so in 1871. In the same period, the percentage reporting non-Christian faiths more than tripled from 5 to 16 percent. Much of the decline is related to the steadily increasing numbers of the non-religious. Historically, religious affiliation was important in Canadian politics because it was the single strongest determinant of voting behaviour (Meisel 1967, 152; McDonald 1971, 179). Religious cleavage between Catholics and Protestants no longer charges political discourse as it once did, however, because religiosity among them is fading. Moreover, the traditional major denominations are drooping in the country's growth centres, the large cities. In greater Toronto – once a bastion of Anglican toryism, for example, the 2001 census revealed that Anglicans and United Church followers had shrunk to a mere 7 percent each of the population. Muslims and Sikhs combined outnumbered each group.

It is challenging to generalize about the ideological orientations of the global wave because of the geographic diversity of its origins. This wave, unlike the earlier ones, comes not from one or a few distinct Old Worlds, but from many. The variations among its components, flowing from its multiple sources, render it post-modern: they include older societies that are rural, largely pre-industrial, and organized around religious and tribal kinship as well as modern, urban, industrial, post-industrial, and secular societies. It is truly a global wave: from Asia, Europe, the Caribbean, the Middle East, the U.S., Africa, and, more recently, Latin America. In the 1990s, eight of the ten largest immigrant source countries were Asian. The only European country in the top ten, at tenth, was Poland. The other non-Asian source was the U.S. The latter two countries represented only 5 percent of the total. In contrast, of Canadian immigrants in 2001 who had arrived before 1961, about 95 percent were from the traditional sources, Europe and the U.S., with Britons alone accounting for a quarter of them (Statistics Canada 2003a, 39).

In all eras and all regions, ethnic groups have been important to electoral outcomes, although historically there were barriers to the participation of some groups, especially visible minorities (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 11-13). By the latter half of the twentieth century Canada was settled, too well-established and populated for its politics to be ideologically reoriented away from the conservative-liberal-socialist paradigm that informed political debate and the character of the Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic parties respectively. There was no region in the country where an ideologically distinctive immigrant political orientation could be sufficiently potent, as had been the case with the early modern Britons in Upper Canada or the modern Britons and Americans on the prairies in the early years of the twentieth century. Old World diasporas have engaged (and not engaged) in Canadian politics in variable ways (Satzewich and Wong 2006).

Unlike the Progressives of the 1920s who became the second largest parliamentary party by virtue of their sectional economic base or the labour parties sustained by the British labour-socialist ripple in the modern wave, the new and largely visible immigrant minorities are nothing like a coherent singular ideological force. They have nothing much in common beyond their “otherness,” a trait of the continental Europeans earlier in the twentieth century. As was the case with those immigrants, countervailing tendencies tug at their political orientations: one is to assimilate to Canadian ways and norms and the other is to maintain and build links among themselves through fraternal associations. Today the latter tendency can draw on an institutional resource: official multicultural policy. The first pull implies engagement in the established parties and domestic policy debates. The second pull is the residual influence of Old World issues and identities. A debate over the virtues of embracing or rejecting Ottawa’s multicultural policy of 1971 (the world’s first) – one that initially merely fostered national cultural groups maintaining their traditions and has since been broadened to expand visible minorities’ representation in government institutions – has proven lively among both established and new Canadians (Bibby 1990; Bissoondath 2002).

As in the past, political parties in the post-War period pursued immigrant leaders and groups for electoral gain. A difference is that, in the past, unwritten political conventions barred specific groups from leadership positions. Canada’s first Chinese Canadian MP was only elected in 1957 and its first Slavic federal cabinet minister was appointed only in that year. No Jew was admitted to the federal cabinet until 1969 and the first Indo-Canadian was not elected to a legislature until 1986. By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, one (Ujjal Dosanjh) became a premier. Canada’s multicultural transformation, reinforced by its entrenchment in the *Constitution Act, 1982*, has produced the convention that ethnic/visible minorities now *must* be included in cabinet. This representational imperative is expressed in other public institutions, including the government’s multifarious agencies, boards, commissions, and corporations.

Judith Nagata observed differences in the 1970s within the first ripple of the global wave, the southern Europeans, in their patterns of political association. Most Greek candidates for office entered the political arena as “ethnically neutral,” shunned appeals to ethnic interests, and often anglicized their names. In contrast, many Italian candidates claimed ethnic background as their primary source of status, although once elected, their “Italian-ness” became a secondary consideration in their behaviour (Nagata 1979, 178). Party officials pursued ethnic leaders in the 1960s based on the belief, probably exaggerated, that these leaders’ influence was great among their ethnic supporters (Schwartz 1964). They have continued to do so. Federal Liberal organizers assiduously courted the Greek, Sikh, Chinese, and Portuguese communities in recruiting support for delegate slates to their 1984 leadership convention (Courtney 1995, 92). Many of the 81 percent of “instant members” recruited for the 1990 Liberal convention were similarly drawn from what were considered “close-knit and often intensely loyal ethnic communities,” including the Italians, Portuguese, Greeks, Chinese, Croatians, and Sikhs, who were specifically targeted (Courtney 1995, 112). In the 2003 Liberal leadership race, two-thirds of the party’s British Columbia members were Indo-Canadians and Chinese Canadians, while Caucasians – making up over three-quarters of the provincial population – were less than a fifth (Fong 2003, A1).

The overrepresentation of rural (largely white) constituencies at the expense of the largest cities, where the visible minorities are concentrated, dilutes the impact of their votes (Pal and Choudhry 2007). Nevertheless, visible minorities have been a partisan, if not a distinctive ideological, force. Visible minorities made up 37 percent of both Toronto and Vancouver in 2001 and were projected to be the majority there by 2017 (Statistics Canada 2003b; Drummond and Lacey 2007). A statistical analysis of ethnicity and party support in English Canada in the twelve federal elections between 1965 and 2004 revealed that the preferences of those of eastern and southern European origins correlated most positively with voting Liberal and, secondarily, with voting NDP. These groups, conversely, correlated negatively with voting for conservative parties (the Progressive Conservatives, Reform, Canadian Alliance, and Conservative parties). Even stronger correlations, in these same directions, were found among those of Asian, Latin American, and African origins. Indeed, the links between the Liberals and the voting support of visible minority groups was stronger than the links of region and religion. Moreover, those links grew over time. “Everything else being equal,” noted André Blais, “the propensity to vote Liberal increased by 19 points in the earlier period [pre-1990] when one was of African, Asian or Latin American origin; the gap is 28 points in the post-1990 period” (2005, 830-1).

Data drawn specifically from the 2004 Canadian Election Study reveal the challenge that the second ripple of the global wave presents to the federal Conservative party. The ratio of Liberal-to-Conservative supporters was more than three-to-one

among the steadily growing numbers of visible minorities. The Conservatives even trailed the much smaller NDP among this group. Where the Conservatives led solidly, with the support of over one-half of them, was with self-described religious Christian fundamentalists (Gidengel and Nevitte 2004). Conservative weakness among visible minorities helped to explain Conservative weakness in large cities. In the election, the Conservatives led the popular vote in only three (Calgary, Edmonton, and St. John's) and were beaten by the NDP in four (Halifax, Montreal, Vancouver, and Victoria). In the largest city, Toronto, they won no seats in either the 2004 and 2006 elections and drew no more votes in 2004 than the NDP. The Conservatives were shut out as well in the second largest city, Montreal. In 2004, Canadians of non-European origins were more likely than others to favour privately funded health care, tougher criminal sentences, and more likely to oppose same-sex marriage and facilitating abortions (Blais 2005, 828) – all positions more associated with Conservatives than the Liberals. Nevertheless, the voting links between these groups and the Liberals prevailed.

There are interesting differences within the global wave in their appetite for political participation. Although naturalized citizens and native-born Canadians report identical voter turnout rates in elections (White et al. 2006, 11), there are dramatic differences between the global wave's first and second ripples (Jedwab 2006). Those born in Europe are much more likely than the Canadian-born to vote, while those born in Asia (with the exception of Indians) and the Middle East are much less likely to vote. The Chinese, and especially those born in Hong Kong, report turnout rates up to thirty percent below the Italian-born. Filipinos lag far behind as well. In contrast, the Dutch, British, German, Polish, and Portuguese-born are more likely to vote than native Canadians do. The voter turnout rates in the fifteen federal constituencies in 2004 and 2006 with the largest immigrant populations (eleven in greater Toronto, four in Vancouver, and one in Montreal), where the visible minorities in the global wave have tended to settle, provides evidence of this pattern. In every case, voter turnout was below the national average. Oddly and unexpectedly, the turnout rate for visible minorities born in Canada lags well behind the rate for the foreign-born visible minorities. Why? A reasonable explanation for this is that Canadian-born visible minorities are younger than their foreign-born counterparts. It is well established that youth turnout rates are substantially lower than they are for older cohorts (Pammett and Leduc 2003).

CONCLUSION

This article has presented a pan-Canadian overview of the country's five immigrant waves. It identified their dominant ideological orientations and pointed to their parti-

san expressions. Ideological currents had greater circulation in some regions than others because of immigrant settlement patterns and social structures. As well, the Old and New World ideological milieux of each wave differed. Immigrants proved to be more than simple standard-bearers for their native cultures; their ideological postures were also shaped by Canada's environment. Immigrants contributed to launching and sustaining specific partisan forces. In addition to transforming Canadians' perception of who they are and what Canada represents, these regionally contextualized immigrant waves help to explain Canada's differing political traditions.

NOTES

1. *Kanadyis'kiy ukrainets'* [Canadian Ukrainian] (Winnipeg), 8 June 1932 and *Ukrains'kyi holos* [Ukrainian voice] (Winnipeg), 22 July 1936. Cited in Peterson 1978, 84.

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