Truth in Virtue of Meaning

I Introduction

In recent work on a priori justification, one thing about which there is considerable agreement is that the notion of truth in virtue of meaning is bankrupt and infertile. (For the sake of more readable prose, I will use ‘TVM’ as an abbreviation for ‘the notion of truth in virtue of meaning.’) Arguments against the worth of TVM can be found across the entire spectrum of views on the a priori, in the work of uncompromising rationalists (such as BonJour (1998)), of centrist moderates (such as Boghossian (1997)), and of uncompromising empiricists (such as Devitt (2004)). My aim is to dispute this widespread opinion.

The outline is as follows: first, §§II-III consist of preliminary stage-setting. Then, in §IV I will argue that some of the most prevalent arguments against the worth of TVM — in particular, one which is given clear expression by Quine (1970), and is recently reinforced by Boghossian (1997) — do not engage with the core idea motivating TVM. After deflecting this charge of incoherence, the aim of §§V–VIII is to work toward developing a useful conception of TVM.

A preliminary note on terminology: what, exactly, is TVM a property of? Sentences are not the best candidates, because sentences per se are not true or false (a fortiori not true or false in virtue of anything). Rather, a use of a sentence in a context can express something, and the question of truth of falsity arises with respect to what is expressed. So, is TVM then a property of what is expressed — i.e., a content, or proposition? One problem with the notion of propositions as TVM is that relevantly different sentences can be used to express the same proposition. For example, if a Millian view of names is compatible with the idea that ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ might differ with respect to TVM-status,¹ then it is not simply propositions for which the question of TVM-status arises. More generally, if the question of TVM-status is to be distinct from the metaphysical question of necessity (if it is even intelligible that ‘Water is H₂O’ is necessary but not TVM, say, or that ‘I am here now’ is TVM but not necessary), then the question of TVM-status does not solely concern propositions.

So, the question of truth brings propositions into the picture, for this question does not arise at the level of sentences. However, given that there can be relevant differences between distinct sentences that express the same proposition, then propositions are not the only thing in the picture. Thus the bearer of TVM will have to encompass both a proposition (in order to accommodate the question of truth) and the means of expressing that proposition (in order to accommodate the non-truth-conditional element in TVM-status). Hence, I will follow Boghossian (1997) and take the bearers of TVM to be statements, where a statement is a particular, dated use of a sentence that expresses a proposition. So, TVM is a property not of symbols, or of contents, but of specific uses of symbols to express specific contents.

II Situating the Issues: Quine’s Dictum and TVM

Quine is a seminal source of the widespread opinion that TVM has no place in serious, rigorous philosophy. Boghossian and Peacocke (2000, 4) give a crisp statement of this prevalent view: ‘Our own view is that Quine decisively refuted the idea that anything could be true purely in virtue of meaning.’ This consensus stems not so much from Quine’s (1951) arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction; for even though those arguments have played a major role in shaping the contemporary terrain, there is less and less agreement all the time about their cogency, or upshot.² Rather, many philosophers are careful to line up onside with Quine’s flat-footed insistence that ‘no [statement] is true but reality makes it so’ (1970, 10).³ Vague though Quine’s dictum is, it does have an unassailable air, and it seems to be in tension with TVM.

However, there is an understanding of TVM to...