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  • Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884
  • Jerry W. Cooney
Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884. By William F. Sater. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Pp. xi, 442. Maps. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $60.00 cloth.

In recent years traditional battle history has taken on a new life as military historians demonstrate how analysis of leadership, strategy, operations, and conduct of officers and men in battle reveal much about the societies that go to war. They also are correct in their assumption that the course of national history and power relationships among nations is often ratified on the battlefield. This is no less true of Latin America, and William F. Sater gives us an excellent example in his discussion of the War of the Pacific (1879‐1884).

That conflict can be considered an early “natural resource war.” As the demand for nitrates in the industrialization of the western world accelerated, control of the Atacama Desert—rich in nitrates—on the west coast of South America became an object of contention between Chile and Bolivia. Chilean companies had taken the lead in the exploitation of nitrate deposits in the Bolivian province of Antofagasta. An irregular Bolivian tax upon those companies, mistreatment of Chileans there, and a secret treaty between Bolivia and Peru prompted by a mutual fear of Chile’s growing power culminated in the Chilean seizure of Antofagasta, followed rapidly by Peru joining its ally Bolivia in the conflict.

While none of the belligerents were really prepared for this war, Chilean political stability and administrative capability contrasted greatly with its opponents. In the realm of strategy, Sater astutely analyzes the importance of sea power. In no other war in Latin America has command of the sea played such a dominant role. The difficulty—near impossibility in this era—of land communication from Chile’s Central Valley north to Bolivian and Peruvian targets in the Atacama demanded that Chile control the sea lanes of the west coast of South America in order to mount any effective offensive. The opening phase of the war, the successful Chilean amphibious [End Page 274] assault upon Antofagasta, set the pattern for future offensives, and for that matter, the Bolivian, and more importantly, the Peruvian response. After Antofagasta the Peruvian Navy had to be destroyed so that Chile might continue the northern offensive as well as protect Chile’s own coast line and preserve its access to foreign commerce. Although beset by command problems, Chile’s navy soon destroyed the Peruvian fleet in the Battle of Iquique. Chile simply had a navy superior in numbers and quality to that of Peru and one that was much better in the training and ability of officers and men. Not only did its fleet blockade Peruvian ports, preventing the import of foreign-made arms, but it landed troops at will as the relentless offensive north to Lima continued. In turn, it also signified that Peru encountered great difficulties in the reinforcement of southern garrisons as its army in the Atacama was defeated in detail.

The conquest of the Atacama was not easy, although the seizure of Antofogasta encountered no significant resistance from the Bolivians. Succeeding battles were bloody affairs, but with surprise, naval support, and superior officer corps and trained troops, Chile advanced northward inexorably. Not only did the seized ports provide staging areas for both the Chilean Army and Navy, but the rapid seizure of critical water points after landing placed defenders and the troops that were dispatched southward by Lima in a very awkward state. Bolivia, hampered by an incompetent president who was also its military commander, did not play a major role after the first stages of the war. Sater does contend, however, that Chilean commanders (as well as Peruvian counterparts) had not digested the lessons of the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War; too many good soldiers were wasted in bloody frontal assaults. By the time of the amphibious assault upon Lima in late 1880, wartime stress had left the political scene in Peru in disarray. Its army had lost too many trained officers and troops in the Atacama, and after hard fighting...

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