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  • “The Artillery never gained more Honour”. The British Artillery in the 1776 Valcour Island and 1777 Saratoga Campaigns
  • Thomas M. Barker
“The Artillery never gained more Honour”. The British Artillery in the 1776 Valcour Island and 1777 Saratoga Campaigns. By Douglas R. Cubbison. Fleischmanns, N.Y.: Purple Mountain Press, 2007. ISBN 978-1-930098-83-1. Photographs. Charts. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 198. $19.00.

Cubbison, a retired U.S. Army field artillery major and enthusiastic reenactor, has most of the skills needed to produce a superb narrative account and military-technical analysis of the 1776–1777 combat in the Provinces of Québec and New York. His expertise is reflected not only in his intimate knowledge of every aspect of eighteenth century gunnery but in his ability to make sound judgments about operational matters on the basis of his professional background. The volume covers virtually every engagement, large and small, of the forces led by Sir Guy Carleton (the later Lord Dorchester), John Burgoyne, Reichsfreiherr Friedrich Riedesel and their sub-commanders. The main thesis is that the employment of British artillery was not the cause of Burgoyne’s – Cubbison sagely avoids using the non historical sobriquet of “Gentleman Johnny” - ultimate defeat at Saratoga but made excellent sense under the circumstances.

The author commences (Chapter One) with Richard Montgomery’s and Benedict Arnold’s abortive 1775 lunge against fortified Québec City and the subsequent also vain blockade of the place. Chapter Two is devoted to the fascinating nitty-gritty of cannonry. Chapter Three treats the 1776 fighting up the Saint Lawrence including the whig defeat at Trois Rivières and the British-German advance into the Richelieu or Sorel Valley - the Rivière des Iroquois - as far as the Île aux Noix, i.e., before the initial assault upon refractory New York. Chapter Four deals with the Valcour naval donnybrook of 11–13 October 1776 on Lake Champlain and the destruction of Arnold’s valiant little fleet. Chapter Five puts the Britons and their German auxiliaries into Canadien winter billets while Chapter Six describes the capture of Ticonderoga-Carillon on 5–6 July 1777. Chapter Seven focuses upon Burgoyne’s misguided advance to Skenesborough (now Whitehall, New York), and Chapter Eight explains how the artillery was brought forward during the remainder of July. Chapter Nine is devoted exclusively to the Battle of Bennington (16 August). Chapters Ten through Fourteen relate the events associated with the twin Battles of Saratoga (19 September and 7 October) along with Burgoyne’s retreat to and surrender at Old Saratoga (now Schuylerville) on 16 October. [Chapter Thirteen relates the course of the insurgents’ assault upon the British-German garrison left behind at Ticonderoga.] Chapter Fifteen treats the early November withdrawal from Ticonderoga. Concluding Chapter Sixteen is centered upon the nature of the artillery train altogether and pinpoints as far as possible the current location of captured British pieces.

The book’s special strong points deserve to be stressed. Regarding the rebel defeat at Hubbardton (Vermont) on 7 July 1776 at the hands of Simon Fraser and Riedesel, Cubbison notes that absent cannon were a striking factor and that the Britons were saved at the last moment by the disciplined musketry of German light foot, something often overlooked. The Fort Ann imbroglio, also “a close run thing” for Burgoyne’s host, likewise gets fresh attention. Equally illuminating is the discussion of the naval action at Skenesborough which gave the coup de grâce to the so-called “First American Navy”. The treatment of the two-stage Bennington battle also sheds valuable new light and hence is a significant contribution to military history. Cubbinson’s prose is no less exemplary. [End Page 1288]

The volume could well experience a second edition if it sells as briskly as it probably will. In this context the reviewer wishes to make constructively intended suggestions for improvements and corrections based upon what he regards as its flaws – inevitable as they are in any scholarly enterprise! Cubbison draws almost entirely upon printed references and online data. He does utilize one crucial, unpublished primary source, the Haldimand Papers, but fails to indicate the exact archival class marks. Note 135 states...

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