Abstract

The role that Admiralty communications intelligence played in the Battle of Jutland has been given mixed reviews in histories of the battle. Historians acknowledge the superb performance of the Admiralty’s cryptographic organization in efficiently decrypting German naval communications before and during the battle, yet the fact that communications intelligence did not reach Admiral Jellicoe in usable or recognizable form had led historians to judge this a failure. This article argues that contrary to the accepted history, the dissemination system performed as planned, since the Admiralty placed a higher premium on the security of the intelligence source over its operational use by the fleet at sea.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1543-7795
Print ISSN
0899-3718
Pages
pp. 1117-1154
Launched on MUSE
2008-10-26
Open Access
No
Archive Status
Archived 2010
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