Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (review)

Simo Knuuttila describes ancient and medieval theories of emotions and highlights the intimate links between them. The book divides into four main chapters, one discussing the ancient theories, including those found in Nemesius of Emesa, another about the treatment of emotions in early Christianity, a third on early medieval views up to Aquinas, whereas the last chapter examines doctrines of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, ending up with authors such as Jodocus Trutfetter and Gregor Reisch, who were Luther’s teachers.

Knuuttila is sensitive to important issues. Plato’s notion of the tripartite soul confronts the problem of where emotions are to be located. To be sure, shame is in the spirited part, as the story about Leontius and the corpses makes clear (Resp. 439e), but what about other, quite different emotions such as hatred? In any case, there is a dispute over exactly when ancient authors became aware that emotions are distinct phenomena in the soul, not to be mistaken for mere feelings. Knuuttila thinks the Philebus is a likely candidate. Aristotle’s definition of in Rhet. 2.1, 1378a19–22 is termed a “compositional account” (24 f.), as it refers both to judgments (or beliefs) and to sensations (of pleasure and pain; see also Top. 4.6, 127b30–32 with reference to anger). Thus, in order to have an emotion we must be subjected to an affection that is “the felt aspect of evaluation” (37). By contrast, the Stoic theory was not compositional since it accounted for the emotions strictly in terms of evaluative judgments. Church fathers relied heavily on these theories, although their notion of original sin made them suspicious about emotions in general, thinking that they distract the believer from the love of God. This is all the more interesting because the Apostles laid great emphasis on neighborly love. In light of this, Cassian’s story of a certain Patermutus taking his eight-year-old son into the monastery and, for the most part passively, assisting in his abuse, is bizarre indeed. It is important to bear in mind that Adam Wodeham’s question whether love is cognition (275–82) owes much not only to Augustine (De Trinitate 9.12.18), but to Stoic theories as well. There is also much of interest in the survey of the emotions in medical theories, primarily in the Pantegni, put together from various Arabic texts in the twelfth century (212–18).

Of the many important findings in the book, I will discuss only three. Even if Plato’s view may not be so elaborate as Aristotle’s, a precursor of the compositional account is to be found in Leontius’ story in the Republic. Emotions arising in the spirited part of the soul contain both judgment and evaluation. Leontius’ shame is based on a judgment (“it is better not to stare at corpses”) and accompanied by a sensation (and contradicts his, perhaps erotic, desire towards corpses). In Aristotle’s Rhetoric we read that the ingredient in most of the emotions is . Knuuttila is well aware of this, and it would be interesting to see how to understand the concept here. Is this a feeble sort of sense-perception (Rhet. 1.11, 1370a28–29) or a quite distinct capacity (De an. 3.3, 427b14–15)? Seneca’s account in De ira may modify the Old Stoic doctrine not only by drawing attention to the first, unintentional movements in developing emotions, but also by making a distinction between assent as the cognitive basis of emotion and the outburst of emotion, which is not a cognitive element. This doctrine might have some counterpart in Chrysippus as well. To have emotions in the full sense, we need not only evaluative judgment but also the accompanying phenomenal character of the emotion in question, which may not be just an aspect of judgment.

The book is equipped with an extensive bibliography and two indices, of names and subjects. It will be a very useful tool for all who want to...