This is the second of three papers exploring the philosophical influences on Jaspers' psychopathology. It examines Jaspers' work in the light of five themes from Husserl's early phenomenology in his Logical Investigations. The five themes are:

  1. 1.   

    Phenomenology must begin with experience.

  2. 2.   

    Consciousness is intrinsically intentional, i.e., it is necessarily directed toward an object.

  3. 3.   

    Phenomenology is concerned with real meanings; only Husserl's later phenomenology is concerned with meaning as ideal, a priori essence.

  4. 4.   

    Phenomenology is a scientific methodology for the investigation of subjective experience but not a scientific philosophy; only Husserl's later phenomenology claimed to be such a scientific philosophy.

  5. 5.   

    Phenomenology is descriptive psychology. The paper finds that Jaspers radically misconstrued Husserl's phenomenology. Jaspers saw a change in Husserl between the "descriptive psychology" of Logical Investigations (1900 and 1901) and the "essence investigation" in the "scientific" philosophy of "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1965 [1911]). The reality was that there was no such change in Husserl's phenomenology. The latter always was intended to be a scientific investigation of ideal a priori meanings or essences, and never a descriptive psychology of real experience. The Husserl of Logical Investigations was not the descriptive psychologist seen by Jaspers. This paper examines the reasons for Jaspers' misunderstandings. The third paper in the series will place Jaspers' phenomenology within a Kantian perspective.


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pp. 245-265
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