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  • Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe 1944–1945
  • Patrick H. Brennan
Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe 1944–1945. Terry Copp. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006. Pp. 392, $45

Incorporating much new research from Canadian, British, and American archives, as well as numerous interviews of veterans, Cinderella Army, the follow-on volume to the author’s acclaimed Fields of Fire, adds much to our appreciation of the Canadian role in the Northwest European campaign. In contrast to C.P. Stacey’s venerable official history, The Victory Campaign, Cinderella Army incorporates both a bottom-up and a top-down study. Copp spends a majority of the narrative very productively focusing on ‘meat and potatoes’ combat waged by the infantry battalion and armoured regiment, and his sources reflect this with their heavy emphasis on after-action reports, battle message logs, and operational research reports, as well as the author’s personal appreciation of the terrain over which Canadian soldiers fought and died in the major and lesser engagements during the last nine months of the war.

Cinderella Army is not cheerleading history. In keeping with the author’s previous work, his analysis is more in the nature of ‘understanding’ the Canadian army’s performance – from senior commanders to lowly riflemen, gunners, sappers, and tankers – than ‘forgiving’ it. Mistakes of judgment, the consequences of inadequate training and planning, and sheer incompetence are highlighted alongside individual (and collective) bravery, endurance, and military insight and innovation. Copp spends much of his analysis undermining the ‘learning curve’ paradigm, and he certainly strengthens the case that this interpretation is too entrenched in the writing of Canadian military history (in both world wars, one might add). Still, whether one can expect to see definitive evidence of its presence or absence in such a brief campaign is open to question.

While admirably attempting to ‘humanize’ the army’s experiences –there are moving accounts of fear, battle exhaustion, and the pressures of command at all levels – the author could have avoided the excessive employment of folksy unit nicknames – the endless repetition of ‘Rileys’ and ‘Canscots’ wears thin. Copp’s assessment of senior commanders – Vokes being the notable exception – will not stir controversy. His account of Simonds is balanced and there is little added to our understanding of Crerar, who remains the Canadian army’s phantom leader. While readers are given some titillating British assessments of Canadian generalship, one hungers for the reverse appraisals. Like most military historians, Copp periodically falls into the trap of talking about enemy forces without accounting for their [End Page 271] numbers of men and equipment – divisions, after all, are like dollars –not all of equal size. It’s fine to talk of infantry regiments and panzer divisions, but precisely how many German soldiers and tanks were we facing? Finally, like any book that tries to provide all perspectives –from senior staff officers at First Canadian Army Headquarters to the section leader hugging a muddy dyke under fire – some readers will no doubt complain that there’s not enough of either viewpoint. In fact the mix selected is one of the book’s strong points.

In conclusion, Cinderella Army offers a nuanced, insightful, and unvarnished – not to mention exceptionally well-written – account of the Canadian army’s performance from late August 1944 through ve-Day. Copp asserts that it performed well in the difficult and largely ignored battles to clear the Channel ports and the approaches to Antwerp, break through Germany’s Ruhr defences, and liberate Holland. Indeed, when they had the benefit of sufficient resources, and decent ground, and the lessons learned from that hardest of teachers – combat experience – his verdict is better than well. Copp roots the Canadian story in the larger context of Allied operations and performance, neither overrating nor understating them. Graduate students will find the book particularly helpful with its directions for future study. Engagingly written and based on solid research, Cinderella Army is more likely to be read by military history buffs and scholars alike than Victory Campaign, and one hopes will ensure that the British and American historians, in particular, have a firmer –and fairer – appreciation of the Canadian army’s performance than has...

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