Verräter oder Widerstandskämpfer? Wehrmachtgeneral Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach (review)

“Tell the King that after the battle my head belongs to him. During the battle I still need it to serve him.” (Quoted in Walther von Seydlitz, Stalingrad, Konflikt und Konsequenz: Erinnerungen, Hamburg: Oldenburg, 1977, p. 16.) Those words, uttered by the famous cavalry leader Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach (1721–1773) under Prussian King Frederick II during the battle of Zorndorf in 1758, probably reveal a character trait of the von Seydlitz family. In addition to courage, bravery, and loyalty, they had a distinctive self-confidence and were able to take independent and responsible action. In the case of Zorndorf, the cavalry general delayed the time of his attack despite an urgent order from the king and thus contributed to the victory of the Prussian forces.

Not surprisingly, Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz-Kurzbach enjoys a glorious reputation in German history, but another famous son of that dynasty, the Wehrmacht commander General of the Artillery Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach is a controversial figure. His loyalty to the Wehrmacht as the commander of the 12th Infantry Division in the western campaign of 1940 and during the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union in 1941 is not what has subjected him to criticism. Seydlitz, the celebrated hero of Demjansk—who together with his “Group Seydlitz” liberated some 100,000 soldiers of the Sixteenth Army from encirclement in the spring of 1942—was at the same time involved in the implementation of the Commissar Order to kill Soviet political officers and in the brutal warfare against the civilian population. Until the encirclement of Stalingrad and his capture by Soviet forces, he was a loyally serving general to Adolf Hitler.

Yet Seydlitz was criticized even more for the determined struggle he waged against Hitler from captivity and under Soviet influence. Not only was Seydlitz the cofounder of the Bund Deutscher Offiziere (BDO—Federation of German Officers), he even developed plans to have a German army of some 40,000 prisoners of war (POWs) march against Germany. In light of these controversies, one might think that it would be difficult to examine both his life and his reception in history from a detached perspective.

Those who browse this book by the young historian Julia Warth will be pleased by the meticulousness, the critical yet benevolent distance, and the well-balanced judgment she displays on these complicated matters. She succeeds in understanding Seydlitz as a typical officer of his generation who had been raised with the engrained values of loyalty, obedience to orders, and hierarchical thinking. She explains that he, like many of his fellow soldiers, much preferred the authoritarian state to the Weimar Republic and its instability. As a soldier, Seydlitz was eager to reestablish the outstanding position of the military in society and to reintroduce Germany to the concert of the great powers. The thinking of a whole generation of officers is thus neatly embodied in Walther von Seydlitz, a way of thinking that accounted for the harmonization and partial identity of interests between the German military and National Socialism (NS).

Decorated with the “oak leaves” and as General of the Artillery commanding the LI Army Corps of the Sixth Army under Armor General (General der Panzertruppe) Friedrich Paulus, Seydlitz remained an obedient officer of the Führer for a long while, although—as Warth shows—after the Sponeck trial and the conduct of the relief offensive that went against the soldiers’ lives, Seydlitz entertained nagging doubts (p. 101).

The decisive turning point in his life came with his experience during the battle of encirclement at Stalingrad. When the entire Sixth Army was encircled by Soviet troops in late November 1942, Seydlitz immediately and more wholeheartedly than any other commanding general called for an independent breakout contrary to Hitler’s orders. Seydlitz’s memorandum was an unparalleled act of disobedience, but he felt obliged to do it in the interest not only of German warfare but also of his...