An Economic History of 20th Century Europe: Economic Regimes from Laissez-Faire to Globalization (review)

If economics is the dismal science, it should be no surprise that economic history—with its many statistics and tables—has few opportunities for lyrical flourishes to avoid becoming dismal reading. Ivan Berend's very competent economic history of Europe in the twentieth century makes a great effort to overcome this generic failing with lively analysis and interesting asides.

While providing a rich assortment of good comparative statistics and clear graphics, Berend does an excellent job of integrating his economic story into general and even intellectual history. Indeed, in addition to an overall chronological approach, much of the book is organized around economic–political systems, such as fascism and communism. Breaking down his narrative into the major macropolitical regimes that provided the regulatory and macroeconomic contexts for development, Berend provides a great deal of useful data about income, sector production, and population, much of which is presented in topical, rather than purely chronological, form. For example, the section on Europe after World War II is divided into subsections such as "Planning in Mixed Economies" followed then by "The Rise of the Welfare State," a practice that allows him to collect and compare data while making generalizations about overall trends.

Unlike some books, Berend defines Europe broadly. Tackling a lot of questions dealing with Central and Eastern Europe, he includes all of the twentieth-century Europe's very varied economic landscapes. He is conscious of how political events and philosophies shaped economic history. Berend even tries, but very sparingly, to integrate some institutional business history and some biographical material into his story.

Moreover, like many historians—economic or other—Berend has the twentieth century open with World War I. He spends a good deal of time contrasting the laissez faire liberalism of the nineteenth century (pre-August 1914) world with the near-universal weakening of old economic and political relationships during and shortly after World War I. Indeed, the ups and downs of limited government are a light motive of his whole narrative. He presents clear data about how increasing national competition led to higher tariffs and in general greater government involvement in economic activity, reducing both world trade and domestic production, and thereby dooming national efforts to promote growth and stability. As conditions grew more desperate, governments stepped up their efforts to control their economies. Although his post-World War II narrative has little about the intraperiod shifts in the economic fortunes of Europe, it does weave together the different regulatory paths taken by Europe as a whole or in specific regions and nations with some of the most important political and social transformations. The economic story is tied to many accompanying social stories of the century, such as the revolutions in education and employment during the second half of the period.

Berend is at his best when he describes the workings, successes, and failures of nonmarket economies. His explanation of the origins and stages of Soviet economic planning, its resemblance to war-time economic planning, goals, and dependencies, for example, is full of cogent insights, although one might question devoting nearly 30% of the book to both fascist and communist regimes in light of their ultimate collapse.

His failings are the failings of many economic histories. There is painfully little about finance, for example, especially in comparison to the United States. Whereas we find a lot of data on employment, public expenditures, and the advent of the service economy, as well as TV and internet usage, the resurgence of London as a financial capital, and the creation of the Eurocurrency and Eurodebt markets are striking in the their absence. Apart from some data about savings, there is virtually nothing on the size and structure of capital markets.

Moreover, like many economic historians, Berend has little to say about the institutional business developments without which Europe's economic resurgence in the "shortened twentieth century" would be...