Abstract

On the thirtieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, there were lengthy discussions about the war’s repercussions, on the element of surprise, operational failures, Israel’s intelligence blunders, and the poison darts that Israeli generals flung at one another. Terra incognita among the conferences, articles, and interviews was an analysis of the origins of Sadat’s strategic volte-face after he acceded to power in late September 1970, and his steps prior to and after the war. This article analyzes the origins this determining factor behind his decision to pursue limited objectives in the October 1973 War and to visit Jerusalem in November 1977. It has been assumed that Sadat’s peace initiative was the direct result of Egypt’s strategic victory in the 1973 war. However, the war’s initiative—and especially its results—only accelerated the political process that Sadat began in 1971.

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