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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37.4 (2007) 479-513

What the Liberal State Should Tolerate Within Its Borders1
Andrew Jason Cohen
Georgia State University
Atlanta GA 30302-4089
USA

I have previously argued that toleration is best understood as an agent's intentional and principled refraining from interfering with an opposed other (or their behavior, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent believes she has the power to interfere (see my 2004a). Though I think this is the best [End Page 479] available definition, it is only a definition and presents no normative claims about when toleration is warranted — i.e., about what is to be tolerated. As Peter Nicholson notes, 'Toleration as a moral ideal cannot be value-neutral, and for this reason too it must be distinguished from the descriptive concept of toleration which can and should be value-neutral' (1985, 161). Having previously offered a value-neutral account of the descriptive concept, I use that analysis here to discuss the moral ideal.

In this paper, I try to show what a full commitment to toleration requires within a state. I do so by offering two normative principles of toleration, one individual-regarding and the other group-regarding. My aim is to determine how liberals, who I assume are committed to toleration, should want toleration manifested within a state; I do not try to justify toleration.2

The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section I discuss John Stuart Mill's harm principle in order to place toleration in liberal moral theory; this leads to a discussion about the relationship between autonomy and toleration and the possibility of autonomous sacrifice of autonomy in section two. There I argue that the liberal state should tolerate autonomous sacrifices of autonomy, including instances where an individual chooses to become a slave, to be lobotomized, or to be killed. In section three, I discuss group toleration and finally, in section four, I discuss groups that do not promote autonomy by considering what Will Kymlicka calls 'internal restrictions' and 'external protections' as well as a series of objections from Susan Moller Okin. I argue that the liberal state should tolerate groups that may hinder autonomy and should not engage in any protections meant to preserve groups.

I Harm and Toleration's Place in Normative Thought

A useful place to begin an exploration of toleration's place and limits is John Stuart Mill's On Liberty — which, along with John Locke's 'A Letter Concerning Toleration,' is one of the two seminal texts on the subject. Mill's famous harm principle reads: 'the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection … the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others' (Mill, 1859, 9). This can be read as a principle of non-interference — indeed, [End Page 480] a principle of toleration. Warnock notes that 'Mill's contention is that the only limit to toleration, the only valid reason for not tolerating a kind of behavior, is that this behavior causes harm to people other than those who practise it' (1987, 123). So long as an agent does not harm a non-consenting other, the agent is not to be interfered with — her action is to be tolerated. That is to say, we (individually or collectively) are to intentionally refrain from interfering with the opposed other in this situation of diversity, although we have and believe we have the power to interfere — and this because of a principled commitment to toleration or the value of the other's autonomy. This does not mean that we can not try to dissuade the agent from her actions. It means only that power — taken as physical force or coercion — must not be used.

There are two limits built into the harm principle: (1) it forbids only physical force or coercion, not persuasive rational...

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