Legitimizing Military Rule: Indonesian Armed Forces Ideology, 1958-2000, and: Suharto's Armed Forces: Problems of Civil Military Relations in Indonesia (review)

Said is a well schooled journalist and observer of Indonesia's military and politics over the last forty years. He is exceptionally well trained, having studied and worked with some of the leading American scholars in the field, including Daniel S. Lev and William Liddle. Both volumes have been translated from Bahasa Indonesia by Toenggoel Siagian, one of the most accomplished teachers of the language in the United States and with whom this reviewer studied in the 1970s.

Legitimizing Military Rule is a very readable narrative of the rise of the army as a political force in Indonesia's post-revolutionary period from 1952. Said explains both the motives and methods of the officers in convincing the country's political leaders to return to the 1945 constitution, which legitimized the military as both defenders of the nation and social political participants. This dwifungsi (double function) concept placed the military in a preferred position of power during General Suharto's thirty-two year rule under the New Order (1966-1998). This was enhanced through the use of the military's own political vehicle, Golkar, and by the military's penetration into both public and private sector positions of importance in Indonesian society. The author plays down the responsibility of the Indonesian military for mismanagement and corruption under Suharto and points to the fact that General Wirinto proposed his "New Paradigm of the Political Role of the Military" in 1996. This new paradigm envisioned the military's withdrawal from politics.

Said argues that the Indonesian military became ascendant in politics in an orderly, planned, and gradual way. This was somewhat different from other militaries in the third world who stormed into the political arena by means of the coup d'état. Perhaps not so different from other militaries, Indonesian officers felt compelled to enter politics out of loyalty to the revolution which created the independent nation-state, out of loyalty to the people, and because of the perceived inability of the civilian political leadership and political parties to create a workable government. The author also argues that the military departed politics voluntarily, and not as a result of public pressure. He believes the military held on to the view that broader participation in Indonesian society remained legitimate if not practical or essential in the immediate post Suharto years.

Salim Said brings to light new information about civil-military relations in Indonesia through the use of memoirs, speeches, and numerous interviews with military officers who served during the days of the Republic of Indonesia, under Sukarno's Guided Democracy, and in Suharto's New Order. This volume could be strengthened by adding more analysis and interpretation. The text relies too heavily on lengthy quotes from established scholars in the field. Notes for the text actually consume more space than the narrative. Young scholars in need of a crash course on sources for the Indonesian army will find this aspect of the book very useful though the lack of an adequate Index will slow the serious reader down. In spite of these criticisms, those with an interest in the role of the military in third world fledgling democracies or with a special interest in Indonesia will find this book very accessible and informative.

Suharto's Armed Forces is a collection of Salim Said's work spanning several decades and including journal articles and speeches/lectures delivered in various academic and professional venues. As one might expect, there is some variation in the quality of the entries. There is also considerable overlap between some of the readings in this volume and certain chapters in Legitimizing Military Rule. The following entries are quite substantial, very well written...