Scientific Pluralism (review)

Scientific Pluralism, edited by Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino and C. Kenneth Waters, tackles a topic now at the forefront of studies in the history and philosophy of science. Drawing upon the research of 10 leading scholars, the essays largely answer yes to the book’s primary question: Can pluralism be advanced as a general interpretation of science? In coming to this conclusion, the contributors demonstrate that they support the idea that the world is too complicated (or too indeterminate) and our cognitive interests too diverse to validate the monist ideas that predominated in scientific discussions historically. As the editors tell us, it is because the scientific enterprise is itself a complicated phenomenon that no single disciplinary approach can provide a fully adequate account of its conceptual phenomena. Thus, in their view, only a pluralistic approach can provide a comprehensive explanation of its conceptual, technical, cognitive, psychological, social, historical and normative aspects.

Overall, Scientific Pluralism firmly grapples with why it is unreasonable to aim to achieve a single all-encompassing conclusion adopting an epistemological thesis. Essays provide case studies generally advancing local rather than universal schemata. As a whole, the case studies reject a priori commitments to either unity or multiplicity, allowing the scientific evidence to decide the particulars. The willingness of the contributors to suggest that there are serious limits to metaphysical conclusions

from science, even within the pluralist approach, is a strong point of the book. Equally impressive is the way the pluralists observe that scientists present various—sometimes even incompatible—models of the world. In addition, the book benefits from the historical context offered in the introduction and several of the essays. Key players in the move toward pluralism (e.g. Patrick Suppes and Nancy Cartwright) are introduced and credited for opening evaluation within the history and philosophy of science field. The varied historical references also encourage the reader to appreciate the need for (and value of) interdisciplinary approaches within science studies.

Given that Scientific Pluralism effectively demonstrates the viability of the view that some phenomena require multiple accounts, it is perhaps ironic that this volume fails to include any voices critical of the pluralistic thesis. The authors address the view that some think that pluralism could arise from slicing the same unitary but complex pie through different axes, but there is no essay in the volume that promotes a unitary framework over the pluralistic vantage point. This skews the arguments somewhat, since no thinkers express why some continue to favor and pursue unification models. Albert Einstein’s legendary commitment to unity was demonstrated by his refusal to accept quantum inconsistencies. His bedevilment by the situation, as he held fast in his search for a Unified Field Theory, is a primary part of his biography. In this case, Einstein aspired to describe all fundamental forces and the relationships between elementary particles in terms of a single theoretical framework, one in which electromagnetism and gravity would emerge as different aspects of a single fundamental field. Although he never accomplished this feat, the search continues. Contemporary thinkers such as Stephen Hawking continue to hold to a unitary ideal as they search for a Theory of Everything. Indeed, to some it is hard to argue that there is not an underlying reality governing all phenomena, especially when the laws of physics operate over 60 orders of magnitude, only (supposedly) breaking down at the Planck scale.

What the book does make clear is that the monistic assumption holds that all different accounts can be reconciled into a single, unified explanation or that there is a single perspicuous representation system within which all correct accounts can be expressed. The authors represented in Scientific Pluralism convey that this type of position is philosophically related to fundamentalism (which holds there is one...