The Idealism of Charles S. Peirce

The Idealism of Charles S. Peirce* ROBERT ALMEDER ELSEWHEREWE HAVEARGUEDthat Peirce's later thought manifests a commitment to the thesis that there is a world of physical objects whose existence and properties are neither logically nor causally dependent upon the noetic act of any number of finite minds. 1 In other words, we have argued that Peirce's later thought satisfies the definition of metaphysical realism as classically defined.2 There are, however, a number of texts which might be cited to support the claim that, for Peirce, the existence and properties of physical objects are causally, and therefore logically, dependent upon the noetic act of the sum of finite minds identified as the community of scientific inquirers. If this latter claim can be substantiated it would seem to follow that either (a) Peirce was fundamentally inconsistent in simultaneously espousing two mutually exclusive doctrines or (b) in his later writings Peirce was not a metaphysical realist at all and that the doctrine on externality can be subsumed into a metaphysical idealism in which the notion of 'external object' does not imply causal or logical independence of the noetic act but rather the experience of duality or otherness. In other words, if the claim that the later Peirce was a metaphysical idealist can be supported, then Peirce was either hopelessly inconsistent or merely trying to account for realistic distinctions within an idealistic framework such as to imply that the doctrine on externality does not satisfy the classical definition of metaphysical realism. In the following few pages I would like to show that (a) in spite of many indications to the contrary, the later Peirce did not endorse the thesis of metaphysical idealism and hence the claim that the later Peirce was hopelessly in- * I would like to thank Professor Murray Murphey of the University of Pennsylvania for his scholarly insights and criticisms without which this paper could not have been written. For the same reason I am also indebted to Professors Flower and Fitzgerald of the same University. Moreover, I am sincerely grateful to the Research Foundation of the State University of New York for its tangible support of this project and to Professors Richard Bernstein, Max Fisch, John Smith and Warren Steinkraus for their helpful criticisms and observations. 1 See my "Charles Peirce and the Existence of the External World" in Transactions o/ the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Journal in American Philosophy, IV, No. 2 (Spring, 1968). 2 It should be noted that the doctrine which I have defined as metaphysical realism is more frequently called epistemological realism, just as the doctrine which I have defined as metaphysical idealism is more frequently called epistemological idealism. The point is worth noting for the sake of avoiding confusion. [477] 478 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY consistent or merely trying to account for realistic distinctions within a metaphysically idealistic framework is false, (b) while it is quite clear that the later Peirce did not espouse the thesis of metaphysical idealism, nevertheless he did espouse the thesis of objective idealism which he considered to be quite consistent with his final commitment to metaphysical realism--which is to say that Peirce's final thought represents an attempted synthesis of metaphysical realism and objective idealism, and finally (c) the co-tenability of metaphysical realism and objective idealism demands that a clear distinction be made between finite minds and the mind of the Absolute. While not wishing to suggest that such a distinction can not be maintained, it seems evident that the delineation of such a distinction involves classical difficulties which must be met if the distinction is to be maintained. There are a number of texts in which Peirce defines the real as that which is dependent upon the mind of the community for its existence and which is incapable of existing independently of mind. These are typical texts which might be cited to show that Peirce was a metaphysical idealist: The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of...