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480 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Annus Mirabilis of Sir Isaac Newton: 1666-1966. Ed. by Robert Palter. (Cambridge , Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1970. Pp. viii+351. $15) This volume, containing articles by most of the prominent contemporary Newtonian scholars, is the product of a symposium held in honor of Newton's annus mirabilis at the University of Texas in November, 1966. Originally published in The Texas Quarterly (10, 3, 1967), the present volume makes this rich sampling of Newtonian studies available to a wider audience. The articles range in scope from Frank Manuel's psychoanalytic biographical study of Newton's personality to specialized studies of his scientific achievements by the deans of Newtonian studies-A . Rupert Hall, Marie Boas Hall, D. T. Whiteside, Richard S. Westfall, Pierre Costabel, John Herivel, I. Bernard Cohen, C. Truesdall, and E. C. SchiJcking--to philosophical analyses of Newton's achievements, to broad studies of Newton's historical context and influence in art, physiology, and religion. The volume is of value to both the specialist and to the student who seeks an introduction to the morass of Newtonian scholarship that has come into being during the past twenty years. Westfall's article, "Uneasily Fitful Reflections on Fits of Easy Transmission," places Newton's attempts to explain interference phenomena squarely in the context, not only of Newton's own intellectual development, but also in the larger context of the problems facing the science of optics as a whole in the seventeenth century . The articles by Herivel and Cohen summarize some of the important issues in Newton's mechanics. And D. T. Whiteside, the editor of Newton's Mathematical Papers, introduces the reader to Newton's achievements in mathematics. This volume should be of interest to anyone concerned with the historical development of science or the philosophical issues science raises. Newton was tremendously influential in science, philosophy, and in the intellectual world at large. If we are to appreciate adequately his impact in these realms, we must first understand his own achievement. This collection of essays is a fine introduction to the intricacies of his thought. MARGARET J. OSLER Harvey Mudd College Berkeley's Analysis of Perception. By George J. Stack. (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1970. 165 pp. 22 DG) This is a sober and earnest study of Berkeley's theory of perception and is intended to show "that Berkeley is not only a species of phenomenalist, but the prototype of the phenomenalist" (p. 11). Stack is uneasy with attempts to erase the Christian dimension of Berkeley's thought, or to present him as one who would banish metaphysics, or as a defender of common sense realism. In brief, Stack would have us examine the whole range of Berkeley's thought, all the texts relevant to perception, before opting for one or another interpretation. Having followed his own advice, he feels entitled to classify Berkeley. Stack contends that Berkeley provides a theistic phenomenalism. Where Mill invokes permanent possibilities of sensation, Berkeley relies on God (cf. p. 133). However, this produces a dichotomy between our ideas and God's and hence generates those very representation problems esse is percipi was intended to eliminate. Stack appreciates that the issue is both central and difficult. However, my impression is that he would have found Malebranche a more illuminating guide to the entire representation question than the numerous modern plienomenalists he cites. BOOK REVIEWS 481 Another advantage of relying more heavily on historical sources is that one can sometimes avoid outright mistakes. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop have made it clear how important Malebranche and Bayle are to Berkeley. It is an interpretive thesis one can test for oneself. One illustrative example must suffice: the Philosophical Commentaries and the New Theory of Vision can be studied in the light of Malebranche's Recherche and Bayle's article on Zeno. One can then discover that Berkeley's minima sensibilia were designed concretely to avoid the finite/infinite divisibility dialectic. A minimum visible is, as we might say, operationally defined. Although extended, it literally makes no sense to talk of subdividing it. Stack's mistaken attempt to subdivide a minimum visible is explicitly derived from D. M. Armstrong's Berkeley...


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