Locke's Theory of Ideas

Locke's Theory of Ideas* STEPHEN L. NATHANSON 1. IT Is COMMONLYAGREED both that "idea" is the key term in Locke's Essay and that Locke uses the word in divergent and confusing ways. Thus, there is more than a slight chance that one will misunderstand what is meant by "idea" and hence not even know what Locke's "theory of ideas" is about. One option in this situation is to claim that, as there is no consistent use of "idea," so there is no consistent theory in the Essay. I shall make the opposite claim and try to show that by distinguishing a few basic senses of "idea", one can find a powerful and systematic theory in Locke. t I believe that the interpretation I provide both illuminates the text and makes comprehensible much of the subsequent development of the issues which Locke raised. My Locke is admittedly a reconstructed and idealized figure. He uses a different terminology from that of his original and is more concerned to mark distinctions, more worried about blurting them. Nonetheless, I think it will be found that my understanding of Locke is in many respects quite close to traditional views of his thought. I begin by distinguishing several senses of the word "idea" and the related phrase "have an idea" and then offer a general interpretive sketch of Locke's theory. This is followed by a fuller explanation of the interpretation, along with discussion of the evidence for it. 2. That "idea" has multiple senses for Locke is clear from his own explanation of the term. He uses it, he says, for "whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks," adding that it expresses what is meant by "phantasm. notion, species or whatever it is that the mind can be employed about in thinking . . .'" (Introduction, 8).2 This account fails to prevent confusion for several * I would like to thank Lawrence Davis, Maurice Mandelbaum, Morton Schagrin, and the readers for this Journal for criticisms and advice regarding this paper. 1 While other commentators have distinguished senses of "idea" in Locke's work, they have not made full use of these distinctions in expounding his theory. See, for example, R. I. Aaron, John Locke, second edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 99-101; D. J. O'Connor, John Locke (New York: Dover Publications, 1967), pp. 35-39; and Gilbert Ryle, "John Locke on the Human Understanding" in C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, editors, Locke and Berkeley (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1968), pp. 16-22. = All references are to the A. C. Fraser edition of the Essay (New York: Dover Publications , 1959). Citations arc given by book, chapter, and section. [29] 30 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY reasons, the most obvious being the excessive generality of the term and its employment for quite different concepts. In addition, the terms used in the explanation are themselves difficult ones. Each figured in various philosophical theories, and their meanings varied according to the philosophical context in which they were embedded, a The only available procedure for understanding "idea" is to turn to Locke's use of it in the text. I find that there are five distinct and important senses of "idea," the first three of which are prominent in the part of Locke's theory with which I am concerned. a. By "idea" Locke often means what I shall call a percept. A percept is a mental object, something which is in the mind and directly present to it. Having a percept is a mental event, the undergoing of some experience. Indeed, the word "experience" might be a satisfactory equivalent for "idea" in this sense. It is important to note that, although percepts are had in the course of sense perception, they are not limited to sense data but include as well such things as memory images, hallucinations, thoughts, and any other objects which are directly before the mind. To the extent that one's own mental operations and experiencings can be objects of awareness, there is also a sense in which one can speak of percepts of reflection (though there is an awkwardness about this which will be discussed...