Heidegger on Logic: A Genetic Study of His Thought on Logic

Heidegger on Logic: A Genetic Study of His Thought on Logic THOMAS A. FAY FROM THE VERYBEGINNINGof his career, Heidegger has written and said much on logic. Since his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 in which he delivered his most celebrated salvo against logic, he has frequently been portrayed as an anti-logician, a classic example of the obscurity resultant upon a rejection of the discipline of logic, a champion of the irrational, and a variety of similar things. Because many of Heidegger's statements on logic are polemical in tone, there has been no little misunderstanding of his position and a great deal of distortion of it. All too frequently the position which is attacked as Heidegger's is a barely recognizable caricature of it. Our purpose in this study will, therefore, be twofold. First, we shall attempt to determine precisely what Heidegger's position is by tracing the development of his thought from his first article of 1912 on logic through to his latest works. In this way, it is to be hoped, perhaps some of the rather massive confusion which presently surrounds this very important aspect of his thought will be cleared away. Secondly, we shall attempt to see what role, if any, logic would play in what Heidegger calls "authentic thought." I. THE TREATMENTOF LOGICIN THE EARLYWRITINGS That Heidegger has manifested a considerable interest in logic from the very beginning of his philosophic activity becomes evident when one studies the catalogue of his published works and university lectures: As early as 1912, the year which marked the beginning of his literary output, a work appeared in the Literarische Rundschau fiir das katholische Deutschland bearing the title, "Neuere Forschungen fiber Logik.''2 In this article Heidegger already shows a deep interest in logic and especially the problems con1 Already in 1916, in the second semester of his career as a university professor, we find a seminar offered by Heidegger at Freiburg entitled "Obungen fiber Texte aus den logischen Schriften des Aristoteles." In 1922 a lecture course, "Ph~inomenologische Interpretation ausgew ~hlter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik"; 1925-1926, a lecture course, "Logik," and a seminar on Hegel's Logik; 1926-1927, a seminar, "Ausgew~ihlte Probleme der Logik (Begriff und Begriffsbildung)"; 1927, a seminar, "Die Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik"; 1928, a lecture course, "Logik"; 1928-1929, a seminar, "Die ontologischen Grunds[itze und das Kategorienproblem"; 1933, a seminar, "der Satz yon Widerspruch"; and in 1934 a course, unpublished, on logic. Here we have limited ourselves to those titles only which deal explicitly with logical questions. 2 "Neuere Forscbungen fiber Logik," Literarische Rundschau/iir das katholische Deutschland , XXXVIH (1912), cols. 465-472, 517-524, 567-570. Hereafter, NF. [771 78 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY eerning its foundation,s Thus he asks: "What is logic? Here we are already confronted with a problem whose solution is reserved to the future. ''4 In both this article and the dissertation of 1914, Die Lehre vom Urteil irn Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik, Heidegger shows both an awareness of current developments in logic as well as competence in this field.5 He was acquainted with the monumental work of Russell and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, 6 as is clear from both the article and the dissertation, and highly interested in the problems underlying symbolic logic.7 In his view, however, symbolic logic does not get to the ultimate ground of logical problems. It remains on the level of mathematics ,s while for Heidegger the deeper questions concern the foundation. This is not at all to say that Heidegger views the work of symbolic logic with hostility or disdain. This is clearly not the ease, as is evident from his own obvious interest in it. But the concepts and methods of symbolic logic are not of such a sort that they can come to grips with the problems of logic on their deepest level. On these points Heidegger remarks: As I see it, the barrier lies in the employment of mathematical symbols and concepts (and especially of the function-concept) through which the meanings and shifts in meaning of the judgment are obscured. The deeper sense of the...