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BOOK REVIEWS 119 difficulty in relating history and nature, and a brief discussion of Dewey's position at this point might have been quite illuminating. On a more fundamental level, one is troubled by the dichotomy between nature and history. Perhaps the difficulty lies in Cole's failure to distinguish between the various uses of the words "nature" and "naturalistic." The distinctions are, to say the least, significant, and Cole's failure to clarify this point creates a vague feeling of unease as one tries to follow his discussion. Naturally, it is more to the point to consider the adequacy of Cole's treatment of Kierkegaard and Freud on the problem of the self. The author has examined the relevant works of the two thinkers, at least in English translations, and has given us a fairly complete and logically organized treatment of their positions, together with his own clearly identified "interpolations." But while Cole struggles courageously with the labyrynthine terminology which Kierkegaard sometimes employed, it is doubtful that he has succeeded in making much sense out of it. He has, on the whole, much better results with Freud. At the end of his Introduction, the author asserts: "It is hoped that.., new light has been thrown on both Freud and Kierkegaard, or that at least Kierkegaard will have been made intelligible to Freudians, and Freud to Kierkegaardiaus, who seem eternally at war" (p. 7). Unfortunately, that hope has not been fulfilled. No new light on either thinker was visible to this reviewer, and it is highly doubtful that Kierkegaard has been made intelligible to Freudians (or even to Kierkegaardians). It must be conceded, however, that Freud has been presented very dearly and no doubt Kierkegaardians will find Cole's treatment of Freud and the "interpolations" interesting, illuminating, and challenging. Whether this will bring an end to what Cole sees as eternal warfare between the partisans of each thinker, or whether there even is conscious hostility between them cannot be determined here. This reviewer has the impression that Freudians and Kierkegaardians generally ignore each other. It may well be that the real value of Cole's book will be to call the attention of each side to the value of the other, and thereby stimulate more satisfactory treatments of this issue in the light of the insights of both Freud and Kierkegaard. In fine, despite Cole's efforts, the self remains problematic in Kierkegaard and Freud. GEORGE L. STENGREN Central Michigan University The Philosophy of C. L Lewis. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court; London: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. xiv + 709. $15) Collected Papersof ClarenceIrving Lewis. Edited by John D. Goheen and John L. Mothershead , Jr. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970. Pp. vii + 444. $15) The Schilpp volume is more valuable as a collection of articles related to Lewis's work than as a body of exegetical studies eliciting a clarification of position by Lewis. Most of the papers in the Goheen and Mothershead volume have been published previously, hut the book brings together in one place articles strewn through journals over a period of forty-five years. The Schilpp volume contains thirty-four essays by colleagues and critics of Lewis, a twenty-one page autobiography, replies by Lewis to the articles (unfortunately brief, due to Lewis's impaired health at the time of their being written), and a bibliography of Lewis's writings. Collected Papers contains thirty-five essays, twenty-six of which have been published previously. Perhaps the first thing in which Lewis scholars would be interested is criticisms and developments of his theory of empirical knowledge. Here is a sketch of three critical essays from the Schilpp volume on this subject, followed by a look at Lewis's replies and at a relevant article from Collected Papers. 120 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Articles by Henle, Chisholm, and Burks deal with different aspects of Lewis's theory of knowledge--verification and meaning, justification of belief, and probability, respectively --but all are concerned, in different ways, with Lewis's phenomenalism. A fundamental principle of Lewis's theory of meaning and verification, which Henle calls Lewis's pragmatic principle, is that each statement about objective matters...


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