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422 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ideas are interrelated in Russell's philosophy. His choice of the term "freedom" to tie together various areas of Russell's thought appears appropriate, but the idea of freedom seems undeveloped--perhaps as much by Russell as by Jager. The treatment of Russell's five postulates of scientific inference is so brief as to rule out any hope of giving arguments one way or the other, Jager's "excuse for brevity" notwithstanding. In other places it is difficult to see just what argument Jager could provide. He places pragmatism alongside idealism and regards both as philosophical losers in the debate with Russell. The campaign against idealism (i.e., Bradley) is given in some detail in chapter 2, but the one against pragmatism appears nowhere in the book. Dewey's name (but nothing else about him) occurs twice, while the few references to James in connection with Russell's neutral monism are of little consequence. Jager does argue that Russell's realism was a phase which he outgrew, for the most part, when he made the transition to logical atomism. The arguments, however, are usually in the context of Russell's theory of language in place of his views in metaphysics and epistemology . It is shown, for example, how Russell gave up on what Jager calls "meaning realism." Indeed, Russell's theory of descriptions enabled him to remove the bizarre clutter (e.g., subsistents) of his earlier realism. But Russell's change in a theory of meaning and his later disinterest in talking about external relations would seem to have but very little bearing on his more basic metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. In short, it would still appear to be an open question whether Russell remained a realist throughout his philosophical career. The remarkably clear exposition, careful reconstruction, and relative completeness of the book make it the finest historical study of Russell's philosophy. However, it is the book's many and extended arguments that make it the most important philosophical guide to Russell. CONRADJ. KOEHLER Thiel College ERRATA The Journal wishes to call to the reader's attention several errors in Professor Lawrence Moonan's note "Hume on Is and Ought" in our January 1975 issue (XIII, 1, 83-98). Line 24, page 84 should read "for Hume, at least false." Lines 8-9, page 88 should read "indeed the 'common meaning' of such words as for Hume were systematically.... " In footnote 8, page 87, the reference to The Collected Works o] Dugald Stewart should be to vol. VII, pp. 359-360. Finally, Professor Moonan's affiliation should be the Bolton Institute of Technology, Bolton, England. The Editors regret these errors and apologize for any inconvenience they have caused Professor Moonan. ...


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