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Teleology, Chance, and Aristotle's Theory of Spontaneous Generation JAMES LENNOX I ARISTOTLE'S THEORY of sexual generation is recognized as an exemplary application of his theory of causality to a specific natural occurence (or alternatively, as the source from which the theory was generated).' Yet ArisAbbreviations APo. Poste'riorAnalytics Cael. De Caelo Cat. Categories De An. De Anima E.E. Eudemian Ethics EN Nicomachean Ethics FR. AristotleFragments GA Generationof Animals HA History of Animals 1A Progression of Animals ]VIA Movement of Animals Metaph. Metaphysics Mete. Meteorology PA Parts of Animals Ph. Physics ' There will not be space here to discuss the general issue of the logical and chronological relationships between Aristotle's Physics and his biological works. I shall assume that the Physics is earlier, and I will be arguing that the theories of explanation, teleology, and chance argued for in Physics 2.3-9 are used more or less systematically in Aristotle's study of living things. This view has been defended in a general way in G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); A. Preus, Science and Philosophy in Aristotle's Biological Works (New York: George Olms, 1975); and D. M. Balme, "Development of Biology in Aristotle and Theophrastus: Theory of Spontaneous Generation," Phronesis 7 (1962): 91-1o4 . [2 ~9] 9'20 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY totle readily admitted that many living things were not sexually generated, but arose "spontaneously"; ~ including all testacea, many insects, certain fish, and (analogously) certain plants. It has been claimed that, unlike his theory of sexual generation, Aristotle's account of spontaneous generation is inconsistent with his metaphysical doctrines of causation and chance? Briefly, the alleged inconsistency is this. Physics ~. 4-6 presents a theory of things generated by chance (T6 &J-t6 vbX~g) and spontaneity (z6 +~5 9cnbzo~ov). Such productions are argued to be nonteleological, contrary to what is both natural and comprehensible to man, unusual, and due to incidental causes. Yet in the Generation and History of Animals, Aristotle argues that entire genera are generated Ctr~6 za~)zo~t~ov--spontaneously. In GA 3. 11, in fact, we are treated to a theoretical, that is, causal, account of such productions. And in Parts of Animals, teleological explanations of the parts of such creatures--the testacea and insects, for example--abound. The question to be faced is this: Why does Aristotle call the working-up of creatures out of inanimate materials "spontaneous"? Assuming that the theoretical account of the Physics predates the concept's use in the biological works, 4 it is reasonable to expect its biological use to reflect that theoretical account. I shall argue that for the most part it does. A careful understanding of the interaction among Aristotle's concepts of teleology, chance, and spontaneity is, however, necessary before a general harmony between theory and practice can be established. I will argue that an observable causal pattern is at the core of Aristotle's doctrine of teleology and that certain kinds of events--even the nonbiological production of organisms--might occur quite regularly and yet fail to exemplify that pattern. This paper argues that it is When discussing Aristotle's theory of nonreproductive generation, I shall render ~3"tft.tct~ov "spontaneous." When Aristotle's theoretical account of xa3X~ q • "t6 acJx6~tc~xovin Physics 9. 4_6 is discussed, I will use the term "chance" for the general phenomena under discussion. The reader is here forwarned that the same Greek term (cta)x6~tctxov)is used in the one context and under philosophical scrutiny in the other. -~By Balme, "Spontaneous Generation," pp. 96-97; and David Hull, "The Conflict Between Spontaneous Generation and Aristotle's Metaphysics," Proceedingsof the Inter-AmericanCongress of Philosophy, 7 (1967-68), 2:245-5 o. 4 If there is such a thing as an uncontroversial claim with regard to the dating of"various parts of the corpus, this is one. Of course, given the various catalog references to different treatises composed of parts of our Physics, one cannot presume a dating for the Physicsper se. For our purposes it is enough to note the clear reference to Ph. 2 at Metaph. i. 3. 983bl...

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