Thomas Hobbes, Logica (Part First of De Corpore) (review)

402 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY according to the principles that govern Grosseteste's final position on the soul. A final chapter in this section is devoted to spelling out the place of man in the cosmos. The principal contributions of Grosseteste as a philosopher are summed up in an eight page conclusion, but McEvoy devotes more than an additional hundred pages to two useful appendices, the first a catalogue of manuscript discoveries, editions and translations of Grosseteste's works for the years 194o-198o; the second a chronology of his natural works. The bibliography is limited to those works expressly cited and the work concludes with indices of medieval and of modern authors, plus an extensive systematic index. These alone would make this a desirable addition to one's library despite its regrettable high price. I hope a paperback version will soon be available. ALLAN B. WOLTER The Catholic University of America Thomas Hobbes, Logica (Part First of De Corpore). Trans. and commentary by Aloysius Martinich with an introductory essay by Isabel C. Hungerland and George R. Vick. New York; Abaris Book: 1981, pp. 449. This new translation of Hobbes's Logic (Part one of De Corpore) represents a major step in revealing Hobbes not only as an important political philosopher but also as an original thinker in the philosophy of language. The book consists of a lengthy introduction by Isabel C. Hungerland and George R. Vick, and an excellent translation and commentary by Aloysius Martinich. The introduction is a full-blown analytic essay dealing with the various logical and linguistic issues posed by Hobbes and their implications for contemporary theory. The commentary is more textually and historically oriented although Martinich is not averse to relating Hobbes to contemporary authors. (He criticizes Ian Hacking's claim that Hobbes was unaware of the nature of proof or demonstration. Actually, "Hobbes shared Quine's contemporary notion of proof.") The translation is from the Latin text of the standard Molesworth edition of 1839. The Logica covers a multitude of logical and linguistic issues. Although Hobbes did not have the mathematical and logical ability of a Leibniz or a Frege, this did not bar him from presenting intuitive insights into important logical and linguistic subject matters. He has much to say about singular, common and proper names; negative, necessary, contingent and universal propositions; logical fallacies, category mistakes, and the nature of entailment. He examines the syllogism in detail and concludes--unfortunately, without warrant--that there are forty-two valid syllogistic forms although no contemporary logician of any consequence has discovered more than twenty-four. According to the authors and the translator, what is more remarkable about Hobbes's work is its anticipation of much that is found in the views of such contemporary philosophers of language as Carnap, Quine, Strawson, and Grice. Thus even though some recent commentators such as J.W.N. Watkins and R. M. Martin have maintained that Hobbes has a strictly denotative and, therefore, limited view of the BOOK REVIEWS 403 function of terms, the translation makes quite clear that Hobbes is well acquainted with the distinction between extensional and intensional meaning. In fact, Hungerland and Vick argue that Hobbes's view is less troublesome and more insightful than even that of Carnap who, at least on one interpretation, posits a domain of extensional and intensional entities. There are no intensional entities for Hobbes, and this, of course, is consistent with his physicalism. A term can denote a set of objects, i.e., it can have an extension, but it is also used to convey the reason these objects are grouped together. Intensions allude to reasons and not to entities. "Triangle" denotes a certain mathematical figure, but it is also intended, by a user of the term, to communicate the implicit definition that all triangles have three sides. Similarly, any term, in its use, is intended to supply an implicit conventional definition alluding to the resemblances that unite a given group. Perhaps there is much in this notion of intension that requires unpacking. In what sense, for example, is an intension conventional and how would Hobbes deal with the (Fregean) need for intensions in explicating identity statements? But even with these...