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552 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 21:4 OCT 198 3 appeal effectively to what each of the other parts loves. Its instrument of control is persuasion. Hence the importance Plato assigns to rhetoric. Moline even suggests that the myths in Plato's own dialogues are addressed to the reader's spirit and appetite, not to his reason: "[Plato] may be trying not merely to inform but to reform the reader" (pp. 68-7o, 2o6n41). The most controversial chapter is the one on Plato's theory of forms. According to Moline, Plato has two models for explaining the relation between forms and particulars: the power/mixture model and the paradigm/copy model. By the former, which has its origin in Hippocratic medicine, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras (pp. 8388 , 115, 117), a Platonic form is a ~va~tg, or power; and such a 6~va~ttg "is not [as in Aristotle] a mere ability, but is rather a substance which is a power and can assert itself" (p. 94). A Platonic form is thus a "quality-thing" or "character-power" (p. 88) and is both the bearer and imparter of a quality (p. 9o). A particular is a mixture, or • of portions of such forms (p. 1 16). It is wholly constituted by such portions and has "no stable subject or substratum" (p. 1 13). Consequently, a Platonic form is not a property or quality, for there is no subject or substance for it to be a property or quality of (p. 115). Moline holds, contrary to Aristotle (Met. M.4.1o78b3o-32, 9.1~ l-b13), that Plato did not posit two ontological realms: a sensible realm of particulars and an intelligible realm of forms (pp. lO3, 119). The objects of sensory experience (et~o0rl~ft) and the objects of mental experience (vo'q~t), though qualitatively distinct, are numerically identical (p. lO3). "On the mixture model the form is like a pure chemical substance a portion, or ~to~Qct, of which may be mixed in a confusing way with other substances..." (p. i 1~; my stress). "Like" seems too weak here. On Moline's interpretation the form of gold would seem to be a scattered particular' consisting of all the particles of gold--all the gold icosahedra (Tim. 55A8 B3 , 56A6-B6, 59A8-B4)--in the world. That this is indeed Moline's idea is indicated by such comments as the following: "[A power or form] can be in a location but not confined to that location, as an army can have a detachment at one spot and also another detachment elsewhere and still be the same army" (p. lO9). On Moline's interpretation, then, Platonic forms are spatiotemporal objects. As such they are ytyv6Bevct, things which become, and thus are capable of coming into existence and passing away. If the form of gold consists of all the gold icosahedra in the world, the form would be destroyed if all the gold in the world were transmuted into another substance--a theoretical possibility on Plato's physical theory. But Plato is always intent to maintain that forms do not come into existence or pass away (Tim. ~7D5-28A4, 52A 1-2). Furthermore, according to the Timaeus, forms are not merely indestructible; they are outside of space and time altogether (37C6-38C3, 51E6-52Bz). I have only touched a few of the many intriguing ideas in this important contribution to Platonic studies. David Keyt University of Washington ' For the concept of a scattered particular see, for example, W.V.O. Quine, Wordand Object(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 196o), pp. 98 ff. BOO~: Rrvlrws 553 Julia Annas An Introduction to Plato's "Republic." Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Pp. viii + 36~. s This is an interpretation of the Republic which builds upon the considerable body of commentary from the analytic tradition. However, Annas does more than merely synthesize the work of the past twenty or so years; she puts forth her own valuable insights and interpretations. In fact, one of the strengths of this book is its sustained pursuit of themes in moral philosophy throughout the Republic. For Annas the Republic is a work in moral philosophy. Its treatises on metaphysics, epistemology, and politics...

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