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128 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 22"1 JAN 198 4 the stage well for Marx. Still, reservations must be expressed about Kain's interpretations of both Hegel and Marx. Hegel, for example, is said to have individuals "find their objectivity only as parts of the state" (72), although Hegel, in the text cited (Phil. of Right, Par. 258 and Remark), speaks not of "parts," but of "members," i.e., of individuals whose recognition of themselves as having common needs, values, and ends, and whose actions in accord with that recognition, constitute the state's "actuality ." Thus, to be true to Hegel it is not enough to say, as Kain does (74), that "Even in a state based upon the free acceptance of rational laws, individuals have no real substantiality in themselves apart from the state." One should add immediately that neither does the state have "real substantiality" in itself apart from its members, for its substantiality is precisely its members' individual self-consciousness of their universality together with their "self-determining action on laws and principles" (Remark to Par. 258 ). As for Marx, Kain's thesis that Marx abandoned the notion of"species-being " remains unconvincing, mainly because the core of the notion in Marx's first formulations was that the human being is a being with rational faculties (geistige Gattungsverm6gen) and thus capable of science, technology, art, friendship and love. That Marx retained this notion of the human being in later life is evidenced in his writings, as is the fact that he retained the conviction that history's fundamental meaning lies in the possibility of an ever greater flowering of those capabilities. Neither early nor late did this concept imply for Marx "an essence that must be fulfilled" (149) or a "norm or end.., that the human species must realize" (111). Further, Kain blurs Marx's consistent distinction between the Wesen and the Natur of man, which is relevant to the question whether Marx dropped the concept or merely the language--as a passage in the third part of The German Ideology suggests---of "species-being." Other reservations bear on issues less central to the book, which is, overall, a serious and thought-provoking contribution to Marxology. JOSEPH J. O'MALLEY Marquette University Wilhelm Dilthey. Gesammelte Schriften. Volume 19. Grundlegung der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte. Ausarbeitungen und Entwiirfe zum zweiten Band der Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (ca. z87o-1895 ). Edited by Helmut Johach & Frithjof Rodi. G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982. Pp. lvii + 457. DM 158,--. In 1883, Wilhelm Diithey published the first of two proposed volumes of his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Sciences),' the overall plan of which entailed a combination of historical and systematic methods to provide a Cr/- ' Wilhelm Dilthey, GesammelteSchriften. Volume I: Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften:Versuch einer Grundlegung fiir das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte, ed. Bernard Groethuysen . First published in 192a. 4th ed., (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ~959)' I shall refer to volumes one and two of the Einleitung as Einleitung i and Einleitung 2, respectively. BOOK REVIEWS 129 tique of Historical Reason. The second volume of the Einleitung never appeared, leaving scholars to indirectly construct Dilthey's proposed epistemology for the human sciences primarily from later essays in volumes 5 and 7 of the Gesammelte Schriften. This predominant reliance on the later works is no longer necessary. Working with Dilthey's notes for the overall plan of Einleitung 2, Helmut Johach and Frithjof Rodi have painstakingly reconstructed two versions (dating 188o-9o and circa 1893, respectively) of his Critique of Historical Reason as intended in the Einleitung. Volume a9 is composed of an Editor's Introduction and five sections (A-E). Lucidly written, the Editor's Introduction provides a detailed account of the reconstruction , cross references which locate essays in preceding volumes of the Gesammelte Schriften in the overall plan of Einleitung 2, and an overview of Dilthey's critical project. The editors show the broad scope of Dilthey's project and the manner in which it follows the Kantian tradition as well as its important differences from the critical method as conceived by Kant. The first section...


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