Thought and Nature. Studies in Rationalist Philosophy (review)

482 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:3JULY 1988 Arthur W. Collins. Thought and Nature. Studiesin RationalistPhilosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985. Pp. xi + 248. $24-95. "If the revolution in philosophy that Descartes introduced must be set aside... ; if dualism is an irrevocably mysterious metaphysics; and if the idealist epistemology that follows the internalization of all objects of consciousness is inherendy barren, then the roots of Cartesian thinking have to be very much more fully understood than they are understood in current discussions" (23). Thus Collins' rationale for this collection of essays focussing on the metaphysics and epistemology of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Collins is a realist in the two-fold sense of holding that an independent physical world exists and that we perceive that world. He believes that careful study of the history of philosophy should aim at the illumination of this commonsense, realistic metaphysics by, presumably, locating and understanding the mistakes which lead away from this realism. Accordingly, having identified one such mistake in the Cartesian "internalization thesis," Collins devotes some space (17-24) to explaining his provocative charge that contemporary behaviorists and materialists, indeed, even some of their most illustrious opponents (e.g., Saul Kripke) share that thesis with Descartes. In addition, he suggests that one way to avoid dualism (as well as behaviorism and mindbrain materialism) might be to abandon the notion "that believing and desiring are things that are present in men, or go on in men" (55). Now this is indeed a way of avoiding dualism, particularly if the analysis is extended to include perception. But it is worth noting that in this latter case it will also allow Collins to avoid the objectionable consequence of the internalization thesis: If perceivings are not "things that are present in men," then perceptual objects, despite their causal origins, will not be such things either. Ironically, this curious view may be a consequence of Collins' own commitment to the internalization thesis, a commitment so deep that, like Thomas Reid whom he quotes with approval (18), Collins is prevented from seeing any alternative to a representationalist interpretation of Descartes' perceptual idea. What Collins misses is that Arnauld sawjust such an alternative when, arguing that he was the true Cartesian, he advanced an "act" interpretation of Descartes ' perceptual idea in the face of Malebranche's "object" account. Although Malebranche's (and Reid's) reading of Descartes has been the overwhelmingly popular one, the failure to discuss Arnauld's other alternative is a serious omission in Thought and Nature, particularly given recent literature on the issue and the avowals expressed in the passage with which I opened this review. Moreover, given Collins' two-fold realism, it is arguable that the omission is self-defeating: without acts a realistic ontology of perception is impossible. Be this as it may, Collins' aim here is not to reap the benefits of historical analysis but, less ambitiously, to do that analysis. And in this, the results are far more satisfying. The essays on Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz are excellent--the Leibniz by itself being worth the price of admission. The two essays on Kant are as full of illuminating details as the earlier essays, but they are less satisfying, mainly because Collins insists on reading Kant as a realist while downplaying all that is inconsistent with realism (196-97; 936-42 ). As good as the Spinoza and Leibniz essays are, however, one omission flaws both of BOOK REVIEWS 483 them, and for this reason is worth especial attention. It occurs first in connection with Spinoza's proof of Proposition I:v (there cannot be two substances with the same attribute). Here Collins deftly discusses the interesting question of why Spinoza "does not try to rule out the possibility that two substances might have one attribute in common but differ nonetheless, not in virtue of the shared attribute, but in virtue of two other attributes, one possessed exclusively by one of the substances and the other possessed exclusively by the other substance" (82-83); indeed, Collins' discussion illuminates the central ambiguity in Spinoza's notorious definition of 'attribute'. But he does not make clear--in fact he is entirely...