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BOOK REVIEWS ~49 'modern' anthropologies can be traced back to ancient ideas, often being nothing but more refined 'scientific' versions of traditional views" (12). Philosophers today recognize that one who argues for the existence of a mind or soul--substantial or otherwise---must also confront a host of attendant concepts as well, such things as the will, volitions, ideas--what Augustine would characterize as inner phenomena. H61scher ignores this requirement: "the question of what the soul is shall be approached by analyzing what is given in inner experience" (ao). An excellent approach if there is a soul. But this reader needs to be convinced that there is a soul. If the convincing is done with help from St. Augustine, all the better, but some reason for believing in souls and inner experience must be given. H61scher writes as though he were unaware of the problems attendant upon mind-talk----even when he encounters one. He notes that "consciouness... must, on the one hand, be seen as something distinct from the person.., but on the other hand.., identical with the person." He calls this a "peculiar relation of both identity and distinctness obtaining between the person and his conscious state of being" (189). Peculiar indeed. Such vagueness is acceptable in Augustine, who is notorious for writing about the same subject in different ways for different audiences. However, it is unacceptable in a contemporary writer, especially one who facilely dismisses (in a footnote) the identity theory as a "reductionist temptation." It is unfair to Augustine to use his antique arguments against a contemporary position. It is unfair to so simplify a contemporary position as to make it vulnerable to Augustine. But this is not the main difficulty here, for this book is not a explication of Augustine at all. It is, rather, an apology for spirituality. H61scher approvingly quotes (23o) the following from Martin Grabmann: "Is not the materialism and sensualism of modern philosophy and literature the theoretical echo of a one-sided material culture?" The answer to this question is, "No." Such writers always forget that Adolf Hitler and Ayatollah Khomeini are every bit as spiritual as St. Augustine and Mother Teresa. Augustine's comments were addressed to an audience that did not need convincing about the existence of the soul. Thus, his vague use of language, his question begging and his assumptions in arguing for the soul's substantiality are not troublesome. However , H61scher's book has different audiences, none of which is well served. BRUCE BUBACZ University of Missouri, Kansas City Steven P. Marrone. Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent. Speculum Anniversary Monographs, l 1. Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1985. Pp. x + x64. Cloth, $1 ~.5o. Paper, $6.5o. The name of Henry of Ghent, who died in 1293 after teaching for many years at the University of Paris, is familiar to all students of medieval philosophy because John Duns Scotus chose him as his chief opponent and interlocutor. His thought, however, is of great interest not merely in relation to Duns Scotus but also for its own depth and subtlety. A critical edition of Henry's works is now appearing in Belgium, and Professor Marrone's fine study adds to our understanding of this important scholastic doctor. 150 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:1 JANUARY 1989 The excellent chronological method used in this work (and not by, e.g., Gilson) makes it possible to follow the evolution of Henry's philosophy of truth from its more "Augustinian" form in his earlier writings to its more "Aristotelean" form in his later ones. All philosophies of this period exhibit these two great influences, and Henry interweaves them into his own original philosophy of knowledge in most fascinating ways. In the more "Augustinian" view, concepts in the human mind have a direct relation to God's mind, not merely an indirect relation via the created thing (39). Our concepts of course represent creatures, but they do so by first representing a divine exemplary cause. In the order of real beings, God's ideas are the cause of created things, and this order of creation is directly reflected by and present in our...


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