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150 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:1 JANUARY 1989 The excellent chronological method used in this work (and not by, e.g., Gilson) makes it possible to follow the evolution of Henry's philosophy of truth from its more "Augustinian" form in his earlier writings to its more "Aristotelean" form in his later ones. All philosophies of this period exhibit these two great influences, and Henry interweaves them into his own original philosophy of knowledge in most fascinating ways. In the more "Augustinian" view, concepts in the human mind have a direct relation to God's mind, not merely an indirect relation via the created thing (39). Our concepts of course represent creatures, but they do so by first representing a divine exemplary cause. In the order of real beings, God's ideas are the cause of created things, and this order of creation is directly reflected by and present in our knowledge of creatures. In his later works, however, Henry seems to come to a view which is somewhat like, but not identical with, that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Truth in the human mind is merely truth of a sign, not truth of a real thing. Conformance of the concepts in our mind to the essences of things outside our mind is sufficient for truth, so no direct reference to God or divine ideas or exemplary causes is needed (48, 58). In ancient and medieval philosophies, epistemology was intimately connected with metaphysics, and Marrone rightly points out that Henry's view--that the essence is the truth of each thing (129)---depends on Avicenna's distinction of essence from existence . In Avicenna, according to Henry, each creature has an esse essentiae and an esse existentiae. Even essence is constitutued by the God-relation, by the relation that created essences have to their divine exemplars. This will amuse admirers of St. Thomas, or of Kierkegaard, for whom existence is the God-relation. In Henry, since pure essence includes in itself the relation to God, our knowledge of that essence is already a participation in God's hidden art. By a route via Aristotle and Avicenna, Henry rejoins his earlier, more Augustinian, view that knowledge of creatures presupposes the presence of God's mind to our mind. Marrone's method and results are of the best scholarly quality, solidly based on original sources. A few minor points might raise an eyebrow, e.g., in Augustine it is not the content of our ideas so much as the necessity of the judgment which requires divine corroboration 04)- The English prose, alas, verges on the turgid and at times even on the ungrammatical (82). An excellent bibliography and index make the book even more useful. Marrone has given students of medieval thought an excellent, accurate, and subtle guide to some of the complexities of the philosophy of knowledge and of being of a neglected but significant thinker, Henry of Ghent. PAUL J.W. MILLER Rome, Italy Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine. From Humanism to the Humanities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. Pp. xvi + 224. $27.5 o. Although based on Roman models, the classical education we now know (or knew before our technocratic age) first took shape in fifteenth-century Italy, where its program was formulated and promoted by humanists such as Guarino of Verona. In From BOOK REVIEWS 151 Humanism to the Humanities Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, challenging what they consider to be the idealized vision of humanism found in standard accounts, claim that the primarily literary and grammatical education provided by these humanists was distinctly flabby in comparison with the rigorous training in logic inculcated by their scholastic predecessors and competitors. The authors assert, rather than argue (much less prove), that scholasticism, with its emphasis on disputation, produced scholars with finely-honed minds, geared to "active thinking" and intellectual dissent. By contrast, the relentless drilling, passive absorption of textual detail and rote-memorization characteristic of humanist schools turned out, so they tell us, well-read, well-spoken and well-behaved young aristocrats, whose docile frame of mind made them the sort of unquestioning yes-men both princes and republics were happy to employ. Unlike most historians of Renaissance...


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