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BOOK REVIEWS 505 cannot offer, however, a coherent alternative. Furthermore, despite Schopenhauer's opposition to simple materialism, the subject is empirically explained in terms of matter . This, of course, constitutes a dilemma when taken together with the claim that the subject cannot be part of the empirical world. Janaway's discussion of this problem and of subsequent ones in the following chapters in Part 2 is interesting, because he points out difficulties in Kant, and shows the problems in Schopenhauer's attempts to avoid those difficulties. Schopenhauer's moves, however, are frequently the most commonsensical one can think of within the context of his assumptions. How, then, should one assess those assumptions themselves? Here the puzzles Schopenhauer has to face and Janaway's discussions thereof become significant for the evaluation of transcendental epistemology in general. In Part 3, Janaway argues that many of the questions raised by Schopenhauer have contemporary relevance. An example would be the question of how the subjective and objective spheres are related. Schopenhauer tries to conjoin Kant's epistemology with a more materialist account of empirical reality in a way that resembles modern suggestions by T. Nagel and C. McGinn. Another example would be Schopenhauer's account of action, which is continuous with O'Shaughnessy's treatment of will and action. Schopenhauer's contemporary relevance concerns also his influence on Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Janaway's analysis of the influence on Wittgenstein offers some new and interesting insights, but his treatment of Nietzsche appears to be overly cautious. Janaway could have made, quite in accordance with his intention, a far stronger case for the philosophical impact Schopenhauer had on Nietzsche. But it would be wrong not to conclude on a positive note. It is fascinating how Janaway thinks through Schopenhauer's thoughts, and how he examines them within their context. This book is a good contribution to our understanding of Schopenhauer that can only be recommended. MARTIN SCHONFELD Indiana University, Bloomington Wilhelm Dilthey. Selected Works. Vol. i: Introduction to the Human Sciences. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Pp. xv + 524. $55.oo. The appearance of this translation of Dilthey's Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaflen is an important event in Dilthey research and Continental philosophy generally. This edition not only makes Dilthey's first major systematic work available in English, it is the first in any language to include both volumes of the Introduction to the Human Sciences. The first volume of the Introduction, containing an overview of the human sciences and a historical analysis of the development of their philosophical foundations, appeared initially in 1883 and subsequently as Gesammelte Schriften I. A projected second volume was to provide a nonmetaphysical grounding for the human sciences, but it did not appear during Dilthey's lifetime. Instead, under Dilthey'sown direction, his students collected a group of essays in his GS V and VI under the title of Die geistige Welt: Emteitung m die 506 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:3 JULY i99i Philosophie des Lebens, which became a substitute for the second half of the Introduction. These essays do not exhibit a clear unity, however. Thus, the importance of Dilthey's earlier work has been widely underestimated, and scholars have concentrated largely on his twentieth-century hermeneutical writings. But the systematic character of Dilthey's early work came to light with the appearance in 1982 of GS XIX, which contains two drafts toward Volume 2 ofthelntroduction. These drafts, as well as material from GS XX, are now translated together with GS I in the Princeton edition. Volume i of the Introduction consists of two books. The first is devoted to establishing that the human sciences constitute a system of sciences independent from the natural sciences, a system much in need of its own epistemological foundation. According to Dilthey, the human sciences fall into four kinds of studies which parallel the real structures of the human historical world: ethnography, the study of cultural systems, the study of the external organization of society, and psychology. The last of these is to provide the foundation for the human sciences generally, and Dilthey insists that it must be descriptive...


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