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502 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:3 JULY 199~ developed in the third Critique 027). Therefore he turns to Kant's ethical writings. This surely ignores large sections of the text, including the Introduction (Section ~, for example) and Sections 64-85 . Despite these misgivings, I think the book deserves to be read. I think that in important respects its "reconstruction" is really a rediscovery of parts of Kant's aesthetic theory. These parts were neglected because people had previously tried to find the theory relevant for a highly formalist aesthetics which is now mostly redundant. Crowther's account of the Kantian sublime reemphasizes the relation between aesthetics and morality. He argues that our pleasure in the sublime results from realizing that we can disinterestedly yet rationally conceptualize those large and overwhelming objects that we cannot grasp and link to the "human frame" in "imaginative or perceptual terms." In "such an experience, we feel ourselves as transcending the limits imposed by embodiment" (147). This leads in the last chapter to a multilayered discussion of sublimity in art that is valuable in itself and also for reworking the relation between aesthetic judgments, a respect for persons, and the permanence of value. This relation was central to Kant's enterprise in the CritiqueofJudgment; by neglecting it in favor of exploring the cognitive features of aesthetic judgments, as some people have done, we do a disservice to ourselves and to Kant's deepest concerns. SALIM KEMAL Pennsylvania State University Robert B. Pippin. Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Pp. 3~7 + xii. Cloth, $44.5o. Paper, $a6.95. This is an important book, which adds not only in general to a constantly growing literature on Hegel's system, but in particular to the attempt to reassess the connection between Kant and Hegel. In this reassessment Pippin argues that Hegel's project is the Kantian project. Pippin has a good command of the relevant secondary literature, which he discusses in his very helpful notes to the text. His general thesis is that Hegel "extends and deepens Kantian antiempiricist, antinaturalist , antirationalist strategies" (6). The central issue for Hegel is "the apperception theme, Kant's claim about the... 'spontaneously' self-conscious character of all possible human experience" (6). This extension involves Hegel's "transformation of Kant's theory of concepts, his reinterpretation of Kant's account of the objectivityof concepts, and his different treatment of the notion of subjectivityrelevant to an idealist version of such issues" (7). In order to clarify what this means, Pippin then gives us a "formula" for getting Hegel from Kant in this way: "Keep the doctrine of pure concepts and the account of apperception that helps justify the necessary presupposition of pure concepts, keep the critical problem of a proof for the objectivity of these concepts, the question that began critical philosophy, but abandon the doctrine of 'pure sensible intuition', and the very possibility of a dear distinction between concept and intuition" (9)In Part 1 we are given a discussion of Kant, Fichte, and ScheUing which lays out a BOOK REVIEWS 503 transformative continuity between Kant and Hegel. This section involves a critical account of that development and is an excellent addition to the literature. In Part e, involving Chapters 5-7, Pippin offers an interpretation of the Phenomenology which essentially rejects the position that we are involved here in the education of natural consciousness to the absolute standpoint and the "existentialist" and Marxist themes which have often dominated the interpretation of the Phenomenology. Pippin's view is that Hegel's main objective is to establish absolute knowledge as science by "overcoming .., the possibility of skepticism about Absolute Knowledge" 003) and that to do this Hegel invents "a new form of philosophical argument." In place of Kant's transcendental deduction of the conditions for the possibility of experience Hegel gives us "a phenomenological account of the ideal development of constitutive forms of Spirit" (29x), an account which establishes the self-conscious spontaneity of thought. The account Hegel gives is dialectical, which Pippin argues is not a method showing the only possible resolution to difficulties encountered in each putative position covered, but showing...


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