Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy (review)

684 .JOURNAL OF "rite HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:4 OCTOBER ~991 recasting of the argument of the book, showing the relevance of Hume's moral thought to the contemporary debate. Capaldi is especially concerned to show how the theoretical perspective has distorted social and political philosophy, and calls for a reform which would keep both firmly within the bounds of moral philosophy as understood from the Humean "We-Do" perspective. This book is not only the best account of just what Hume's moral philosophy is, it is also a philosophically challenging account. Those who read it will find new reasons to take Hume seriously as a moral philosopher. DONALD W. I.IVINGSTON Emory' University Richard L. Velkley. Freedom and the End o] Rea,~on: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989. Pp. xxi + 222. $29.95. This well-written and well-researched study should be of interest to a wide range of readers. Its major claims are that (i) Kant's "transcendental turn" is conditioned by a prior "Rousseauian turn" which (ii) "introduces an essential shift in Kant's determination of the end of reason based on new understandings of freedom and reason," (iii) in "response to a crisis in reason emerging in the eighteenth century" (xii). Velkley's work consists largely in tracing the implications of Kant's informal "Remarks " concerning Rousseau in 1764-65 . These were published by Lehmann in 1942 in the Academy edition of Kant's works (vol. 2o: 1-192 ). The new Kant Archive at Marburg will soon be presenting a new edition of the "Remarks" with considerable revisions of Lehmann. It is unfortunate that Velkley was not able to take this development into account. That Rousseau was a major influence on Kant has long been recognized, but Velkley's interpretation is unique because of the degree of influence that it claims and the mass of details it provides to support its claims. Velkley asserts that the "neglected ethical reflections of the 176os... are the necessary starting point for understanding the underlying logic" (1) of Kant's whole critical system. He takes Kant's "epistemological and moral idealisms" to be but "subordinate parts" of the doctrine of the "end of reason" which Kant developed in response to Rousseau. This doctrine involves accepting a primacy of practical reason which limits and unites all our reason through the "end" or goal of moral self-determination. What we know and what we are to do is to be determined not by things in themselves or given natural ends, but by the structure and telos of our own reason. Rousseau is important because he shows how reason itself is a problem, how the modern instrumental conception of it has led to a "crisis." We are caught with having to use reason to try to overcome the restlessness and increased unfreedom that the very development of reason in modern culture has brought with it. Kant comes from Rousseau with the idea of the need for a "theodicy of reason" to overcome its "peculiar self-conflicting... characteristics" (9). Velkley suggests this problem is a source of both Kant's notion of BOOK REVIEWS 685 antinomies and his doctrine of the highest good. Reason seeks an absolute whole, but while this cannot be found in the natural world, it is provided by the construct of a moral world of harmonious self-legislating agents. By building on the work of Schmucker and Henrich, Velkley can show that this idea of a moral end of all reason is not a late and desperate appendage to Kant's critical philosophy, but rather precedes and governs it. Theoretical philosophy becomes a "propadeutic" for turning back the "beclouding" of the morality of "common reason" by dogmatic or skeptical speculation. Unlike other moderns, Rousseau and Kant see this project as no mere moderate reform, but as aiming at a new "grounding of" the sacred and noble" (33) through philosophy, which brings us back from "self-inflicted alienation" (145) . Unlike Rousseau, Kant believes reason can provide its own pure source of motivation for this project through a demand for independence that is found in everyone and justifies an expectation...