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BOOK REVIEWS 141 apperception, consciousness, and reflective knowledge amount to the same thing. Both these authors, Kulstad claims, fail to take into consideration, among other things, that the apperception of external things cannot be self-consciousness (145-49)The final chapter ("Apperception in the Principles of Nature and of Grace') provides an interesting discussion of Leibniz's wavering on the topic of animal apperception in the various drafts of that work (x56-66). The chapter ends with an attempt to explore the reasons behind Leibniz's vacillations. Kulstad points out how Leibniz is torn between two conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, throughout his maturity he holds, contra Descartes, that animals do feel pain and pleasure and are in fact conscious. On the other, he wants to safeguard the gap between beasts and humans in order to deny personhood to the former. But, for him, consciousness involves at least simple reflection and, Kulstad claims, the step from simple reflection to full-blown focused reflection , which involves personhood, seems rather small, a mere matter of narrowing of focus. The result is that Leibniz does not quite know what to do and wavers between attributing apperception to animals, as in the New Essays,and denying it to them, as in the Principles of Nature and of Grace. Kulstad's discussion throughout the book is well-documented and generally persuasive . There are, however, some aspects of Leibniz's views on reflection which are important and which Kulstad could, and in my opinion should, clarify. For example, in the New Essays, II, ~7, 13, Leibniz claims that "the consciousness or reflection which accompanies inner activity cannot naturally deceive us." Here we have an epistemological claim which is intrinsically interesting and which presumably Leibniz believes to have significant metaphysical relevance as well, occurring as it does in the midst of his complex discussion of personal identity.' One would expect Kulstad to address such a topic or at least provide some reason for not addressing it. Kulstad's book is clearly written and a few typographical errors, e.g., on page 164, do not mar the good quality of the printing. The book's rather steep price is partially justified by its sturdy binding and good quality paper. In sum, this is a valuable book which will make a significant addition to the library of any Leibniz scholar. Ezlo VAILATI Southern Illinois University,Edwardsville Daniel E. Flage. David Hume's Theory of Mind. New York: Routledge, 199o. Pp. ix + 197. Cloth $65.oo. This book sets out to solve one of the puzzles which have been so much a part of Hume scholarship, viz., What is the conflict that leads Hume to lament the failure of his theory of mind in his famous confession in the Appendix of the Treatise? On Flage's stated view, in fact, "the first book of the Treatiseis an attempt to establish that the mind For an initial analysis of Leibniz's claim and some Leibnizian arguments for it, see my "Leibniz on Reflection and Its Natural Veridicality," JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy25 (1987): 247-6~. 142 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31:1 JANUARY i993 'is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity '" (~). As someone who has tried to construct a way out of Hume's "labyrinth," I was intrigued by a book offering this as its focal point. But Flage's claim is to some extent disingenuous. His attention to the "bundle" theory of mind is roughly proportional to the attention that Hume gave to it. Like Hume, he succeeds in clarifying many things without reference to this theory. There are insights about Hume's method, and about Hume's views on abstraction, substance, dualism, necessary connection, force, and vivacity. There is an account of Hume's "relative ideas" which is utilized to make sense of the discovery of a missing shade of blue and the possibility of the concept of an external world of objects. Few of these are dependent in any obvious way upon the bundle theory. DoxasticPathology: It is one of the virtues of Flage's work that...

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