The Truth Evaluability of Stoic Phantasiai : Adversus Mathematicos VII 242-46

T]he Truth Evaluability of Stoic Phantasiai : Adversus Mathematicos VII 242-46 CHRISTOPHER SHIELDS ORTHODOX STOICS ENDORSE each of the following propositions: (1) Phantasiai are true or false (i.e., are truth evaluable). (AM VII ~42-46 = SVF II 65 = LS 39 G, 3oF) ' (a) Only ax/6mata are true or false (i.e., are truth evaluable). (AM VIII.74 = SVF II.187 = LS 34B; cf. Stobaeus II.88 = SVF III 171 = LS 33 I, and Sextus, AM VII 151-57 = LS 4aC) (3) Nophantas/a is an ax/~ma, sincephantasiai are impressions in the soul,' and hence material, whereas axi6mata are /ekta, and hence immaterial. (AM VIII.74 = SVF II.187 = LS 34B; cf. Stobaeus II.88 = SVF III 17x = LS 33 I, and Sextus, AM VII x51-57 = LS 41C, and Simplicius, In Ar. Cat. 217.3~-~x8.1 = SVF II. 389 = LS 28L) These propositions cannot be true together; hence, if the Stoics hold each in an unqualified form, they have an incoherent doctrine about the semantic character ofphantasiai. Although there are some challenging ontological questions concerning why and in what sense the Stoics maintain (3),s the issue at hand is best regarded as a semantic problem, at least insofar as the potential inconsistency, as I will argue, is to be resolved by appeal to purely semantic ' Throughout I crosslist passages where possible to H. von Arnim, Stoicorumveterumfragmenta (SVF) (Leipzig, 19o3-5), and A. A. Long and D. Sedley, The HellenisticPhilosophers(LS) (Cambridge , x987). ' A phantas/a occurs in the soul, and is described in various contexts as a tup6sis, pathos, hetero/~s/s,or a//o~s/s (SVF II 53-59). sFor a discussion of the Stoic account of truth, see A. A. Long, "The Stoic Distinction between Truth (r &kfi0~La)and the True (z6 63.~0~g),"Les Stofc.iensel/cur Log/que,ed. J. Brunschwig (Paris: 1978), 297-315. [B~5] 326 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31:3 JULY 1993 considerations: the Stoics do not endorse proposition (l) in an unqualified way, and so do not commit themselves to this inconsistent triad. But if the considerations which show this derive exclusively from features of their semantic theory, then the resolution is logically independent of the ontological investigations (3) invites. This is a point of some significance, since discussions of Stoic ontology tend to overshadow investigations into their semantic theory, with the result that some subtleties in their analysis of the truth evaluability of phantasiai have gone largely unremarked. Here I would like to draw attention to one such subtlety in their account, primarily by investigating Sextus, Adversus MathenmticosVII 24~-46. Although I believe there may be some larger doxographical lessons to be gleaned from this passage, I will not press them here. Rather, I will argue that despite first appearances, AM VII 242-46 provides a coherent and plausible Stoic doctrine on the semantic character of phantasiai, and that this doctrine helps resolve the semantic problem encoded in (1)-(3). One upshot of this difficult passage is that the Stoics accept only a modified form of (1); but if this is correct, a second upshot is that Sextus himself fails to appreciate at least one central feature of the Stoic theory he recapitulates. I begin then with Sextus, AM VII 242-46, and argue that some features of the passage resist interpretation on the assumption that the Stoics maintain any simple form of a correspondence theory of truth for phantasiai (wl). But it is also implausible to regard the Stoics as implicitly adopting any form of coherence theory (w If they adopt neither, then their account of the truth evaluability for phantasiai is obscure. Even so, Sextus does provide a hint of a plausible Stoic position, according to which phantasiai are truth evaluable not in virtue of their intrinsic representational characteristics, but rather insofar as they inherit truth values from the ~ they can be used to express. If this is correct, then our initial inconsistent triad disappears, since the Stoics will rightly refrain from an unqualified commitment to (1), the claim that phantasiai are truth evaluable (w Despite the advantages of their adopting the proposed account of the truth evaluability...