Schellings Mythologie: Zur Auslegung der Philosophie der Mythologie und der Offenbarung (review)

35 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:2 APRIL ~995 human beings admittedly relevant to deciding questions ofjustice in the real world (for example, the fact that not everyone is an independent citizen who will vote her interests qua rational agent, as opposed to qua servant or wife). Idealization is to be used, however, only in positing fundamental moral principles (for example, the universal principle of justice) and not in enacting legislation to govern day-to-day life in political society (for example, health care legislation). Nor is it to be used in deciding how properly to interpret that legislation in individual cases (for example, whether undocumented aliens should receive health insurance coverage under the new law). That for the purpose of outlining general principles we assume, say, independence, or the capacity to recognize and unanimously agree on the demands of justice, does not mean we must maintain these assumptions when we pass laws, or apply them to particular cases. By determining which of Kant's assumptions are part of his ideal argument for first principles, we can recognize which of them may be set aside when we use those principles in enacting or applying legislation. So, for instance, we may be able to show that Kant's theory does not unrealistically assume too much commonality of values or interests, as Yack fears. We also may realize when Kant's own applications are inconsistent with the principles he espouses, warranting rejection of his answers to contemporary political questions, but not of the theory itself. Thus, we might accept Kant's claim that citizens of an ideally just community would be free, equal, and independent, but reject (with Booth) the suggestion that various forms of servitude can satisfy this principle. This collection, while not all one might hope, is one of the few bringing together essays on Kant's often-neglected political theory. With offerings on widely different subjects and from divergent viewpoints, it adds usefully to the tools available for those working in Kant's political thought. SARAH WILLIAMS HOLTMAN University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill John Elbert Wilson. ScheUingsMythologie: Zur Auslegung derPhilosophiederMythologie und der Offenbarung. Spekulation und Erfahrung, Abteilung II, Band 3 I. StuttgartBad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1993. Pp. 292. N.P. That Schelling's philosophy of mythology richly deserves its reputation for difficulty and obscurity is denied by few scholars, and John Elbert Wilson cheerfully admits that the sheer volume of material, the opacity and obfuscation of Schelling's style, and above all the subject matter may seem insuperably daunting. Wilson acknowledges the recent revival of interest in Schelling but regrets that it has not extended to include the later philosophy: "it [the philosophy of mythology] stands in relationship to that in Schelling still regarded as valuable as paleontology does to biology" (11). In other words: this is regarded as suggestive, even revealing supplementary material for the earlier, better-known works, but is of merely historical significance today. Wilson's book boldly departs from this view, going beyond even his mentor Xavier BOOK REVIEWS 35 ~ Tilliette's claims for the importance of the philosophy of mythology. Where Tilliette (Une Philosophie en devenir [Paris, 197o]; La mythologie comprise [Naples, 1984]) interprets the philosophy of mythology as an integral part of Schelling's overall philosophical development, Wilson has chosen to leave most of the connections to the earlier works and other thinkers unexplored, save in a brief final section. His approach is less historical and more philosophical, despite the fact that he is well aware of the skepticism the mere mention of some of Schelling's central ideas may evoke: "Many stumble over a philosophy that contains a doctrine of the fallenness of the world. He who thinks and works out of the rationalistic ideal must find it dark and difficult" (24). He pleads for a renewed appreciation of the unique advantages of mythological expression to capture that which cannot otherwise be adequately expressed: creation and its powers and the intimate relation of good and evil. Nietzsche also recognized this special power of myth, in Wilson's view, and he notes the growing body of research linking Nietzsche's and Schelling's appropriation of mythology, of which the...