Political Corruption: Thailand's Search for Accountability

The 1991 military takeover that deposed the elected government of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven was commonly, and correctly, viewed as one more chapter in Thailand's apparently interminable civil-military power struggle. On a deeper level, however, the coup revealed the acute lack of political accountability that plagues Thailand's version of parliamentary democracy.

Certainly this military takeover, the seventeenth coup or attempted coup in 60 years, demonstrated that a democratic consensus has not yet taken hold throughout Thailand. Democracy made gains under Chatichai, but they were not effectively reconciled with the military and bureaucratic power structure. In the eyes of this traditional oligarchy, democratization is a zero-sum game. As democratic institutions grew stronger the military began charging that the elected government had created a "parliamentary dictatorship," a term that most Thais found confusing, if not outright contradictory.

Although a political role for the military has never been institutionalized, the armed forces have served as unofficial power brokers throughout Thailand's history as a constitutional monarchy. A succession of constitutions, most of them drafted by the military itself, reshaped the Westminster model to suit military prerogatives. The 1978 constitution, which stood until it was suspended by this year's coup, provided for an elected lower house, but did not require (though it did not forbid) the prime minister and cabinet members to be MPs.

This gaping loophole enabled military officers or their hand-picked surrogates to become cabinet ministers, and was seen by some as a standing invitation to military intervention. Beyond that, it severed the organic link between the executive branch and the legislature that forms the basis of a parliamentary system. Under the 1978 constitution, the executive branch was only partially accountable to the legislature; parliament could pass a no-confidence vote against the government, but could not necessarily form a new administration. In reality, the executive branch was much more accountable to the armed forces. The Chatichai administration consisted mainly of elected MPs, bringing the system closer to a standard parliamentary model. But although accountability of the executive to the legislature might be promised, it was not required.

Apart from civil-military relations and the structure of the political system, the coup also called into question the ethics of elected politicians and the very nature of Thailand's political parties. Although the coup leaders (headed by armed forces supreme commander General Sunthorn Konsomphong and army commander-in-chief General Suchinda Kraprayoon) presented an extensive list of grievances against the Chatichai government, including charges of attempting to exert undue control over the military and to decimate the bureaucracy, they focused on the corruption of elected politicians. Of all the junta's charges, this one resonated most deeply with public opinion.

The perception of unabashed and mounting corruption in high government circles, inflamed by an export boom that gave Thailand the fastest-growing economy in the world, was a growing source of public discontent as the Chatichai administration entered the second half of its term. Recognition of the problem had spread to the government itself, and leading politicians, Chatichai included, grew increasingly worried about the weaknesses in the party system. Just days before the coup Chatichai publicly vowed that unless sufficient measures were taken to prevent widescale vote-buying in the next general election, he would not run for a second term. Although no one could claim that corruption in Thailand had originated with elected government, parliament and the parties were widely criticized for failing to address the problem. Indeed, the best evidence of the government's lack of credibility was less the coup itself than the public's acquiescence in the generals' actions.

In order to understand the problems of establishing political accountability in Thai democracy and to propose appropriate remedies, it is necessary to consider the roots of civil-military tensions, the development of political parties, and the character of popular participation in modern Thailand.

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