Abstract

While financial globalization has created powerful incentives for Latin American governments to privatize old age pension systems, reliance on short-term capital flows has also constrained the ability of cash-strapped governments to enact that reform. Analysis of the technocratic process of pension reform in Argentina and Brazil provides evidence. Instead of simply generating unidirectional pressures for structural pension reform, financial globalization has created a double bind for Latin America's capital-scarce governments, fostering long-term incentives to privatize pension systems while heightening the risk of punishment in the short term.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1548-2456
Print ISSN
1531-426X
Pages
pp. 31-62
Launched on MUSE
2007-12-13
Open Access
No
Archive Status
Archived 2007
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.