Mr. Lincoln Goes to War (review)

This book is rather a mixed bag. In large part it consists of detailed accounts of the three major Civil War battles (and Union losses) of 1861: Manassas, Wilson's Creek, and Ball's Bluff. It also contains a retelling of the undeniably outrageous injustice done to Union general Charles P. Stone, who was made the scapegoat for the defeat at Ball's Bluff and the death there of Abraham Lincoln's great friend Edward Dickinson Baker.

But the author's major intention is to indict President Lincoln for underestimating the consequences of refusing to allow the peaceful secession of seven Southern states and of risking war at Fort Sumter instead. According to Marvel, Lincoln thus prepared the way for the unprecedented but precedent-setting and unconstitutional invasions of the civil liberties of Americans that occurred during that first year of the resulting conflict and the bloodshed and misery that followed. In Marvel's words, "In his zeal to preserve the Union [Lincoln] abandoned statecraft, exploiting the delicate issue of Fort Sumter and committing the nation to a bloodbath far worse than he or any of his advisors ever envisioned" (282).

Such second-guessing is hard to contend with. Marvel is no doubt right on the above counts. Of course Lincoln was horrified and deeply remorseful at the Civil War's great cost. When blame for the cost of the war is handed out, Lincoln would be the first to admit that he deserves some of it. However, Marvel in turn understates some of the strongly felt convictions that governed Lincoln's behavior during the weeks after his inauguration, convictions contributing to what Marvel considers a blundering intransigence. A couple of examples may suffice. One of these is Lincoln's own conviction, as affirmed in his first inaugural message, that the Union is perpetual and older than the Federal Constitution. To say that Lincoln took seriously his solemn oath to protect the Constitution is hopefully to state what should therefore be obvious: that he did not consider himself to have been elected to preside over the immediate dissolution of the Union. Indeed he would have felt his obligation to preserve the Union with particular force at the beginning of his term. Marvel also understates Lincoln's disbelief in the possibility of an amicable separation of the Northern and Southern states, a disbelief also stated in the First Inaugural. Such issues as the return of fugitive slaves or the suppression of the foreign slave trade would be even worse irritants after separation than before. Issues that led to separation could not be quieted by separation; they would remain critical, and they would be even more poisonous after acquiring an unhealthy international character.

Doubtless it is useful to be reminded of the alternative courses that the new president might have pursued as he pondered the worst crisis in American history. "Deliberation on [Lincoln's] performance remains incomplete . . . without recognizing that other courses remained open to him," Marvel writes (286). The research that Marvel has done in making this case is massive, and his prose is positively lapidary. To his credit, Marvel makes no bones about the fact that it is indeed a case that he is arguing, against Lincoln. Readers should address his book with this understanding at the outset.