Feminism, Jewish Philosophy, and Religious Pluralism

Although the writings of feminist Jewish thinkers have appeared in print for over two decades, most modern Jewish philosophers have yet to seriously respond or even acknowledge the existence of this work. ¹ A clarion call has been sounded in a recent essay by Hava Tirosh-Rothschild, who wrote:

To date, feminism has made no impact on the discipline of Jewish philosophy. Scholars of Jewish philosophy have virtually ignored the presence of feminism in the academy, the feminist critique of Western philosophy, and the feminist attempt to articulate an alternative to traditional philosophy. ²

This essay is one small effort to answer this call, in fact to offer an illustration of the richness that feminist Jewish thought, and feminist thought more generally, bring to the work of Jewish philosophy. However, this is no more than a brief exploration, a model, or thought-experiment. Focusing on the challenge of religious pluralism, I hope that it will provide hints of the fecundity that is promised by that neglected dialogue between feminist Jewish thought and Jewish philosophy. ³

However, before launching out, I would like to offer some working definitions about the parameters of this dialogue, at least for the sake of this essay. What is Jewish philosophy? What is feminist Jewish thought? Finally, what place does the issue of religious pluralism have in the agenda of modern Jewish philosophy?

There have been many discussions of the nature of Jewish philosophy. ⁴ Many scholars have defined it in terms of philosophical reflection on Judaism and others as a way of doing philosophy that emphasizes distinctive Jewish categories or points of departure. My suggestion about the scope of Jewish philosophy takes its lead from the early twentieth century figure, Franz Rosenzweig. Rosenzweig’s magnum opus, The Star of Redemption, is widely acknowledged as the greatest expression of Jewish philosophy in this century, if not in the entire modern period. ⁵ In order to reflect upon the parameters of Jewish philosophy, it might prove helpful to look at the contents of that work, a work which its author regarded as a “system of philosophy.” ⁶ The Star reflects Rosenzweig’s comprehensive definition of the nature of Jewish philosophy. He discusses our understanding and experience of the human being, the world, and God. His examination includes elements of all the classical segments of philosophy; an ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, metaphysics, and logic, as well as a critique of philosophy from the perspective of Jewish categories. It also contains treatments of Judaism, Christianity, and the “pagan” life-world.

Rosenzweig reflects upon such perennial philosophical issues as truth, and upon existential questions of meaning and authenticity in the face of death, from the historical experience, literature, categories, and ways of life of that accrued tradition we call Judaism. Additionally, since Rosenzweig offers a philosophy out of the sources of Judaism, his examination includes a thorough discussion of the nature and meaning of Jewish existence, and also the tradition that, for him, stands side by side with Judaism, i.e., Christianity.

In light of the Star, I will suggest here, in brief, that Jewish philosophy examines all the perennial questions of philosophy, as well as the nature of Judaism itself, from the accrued literature and historical experience of the Jewish tradition. Jewish philosophy is not a parochial endeavor in virtue of this distinctive ground or foundation. Every philosophical thinker grounds herself or himself in a particular culture, society, and community. The categories, presuppositions, language, distinctions, etc., that guide every philosophical investigation must come from somewhere. Following this, I would suggest, again in shorthand, as it were, that those who see themselves as plain “philosophers,” as “without presuppositions,” as the obvious owners of “Philosophy,” are actually those who belong to a majority or dominant group in a society and cannot or do not wish to appreciate the particularity of their perspectives. In the West, these are usually Christian or post-Christian philosophers and, to state the obvious—obvious because of some powerful feminist critiques ⁷ —usually of the male gender.

There have also been very extensive discussions of the nature of feminist thought. In light of the literature I have read and the conversations that I have had, it appears to me that feminist thinkers reflect upon questions from the foundation of their lives as women and their dialogue with, as well as study of the lives and works of, other women. This over-general and imprecise definition does indicate that for feminist thinkers the category of gender is central in fashioning a critique of the past and present, and for formulating new ways of thinking and living.

Following this, feminist Jewish thought would be the reflection of Jewish women who regard the category of gender as extremely salient in their critique and reconstruction of Judaism. A feminist Jewish philosopher ⁸ philosophizes from the experience/tradition of Judaism and finds the experience of Jewish women especially salient to her work. Therefore, at the outset, what feminist Jewish thought adds to the usual way of doing Jewish philosophy is the invaluable insight that it is male Jewish philosophers who have dominated the discipline; that is, Jewish philosophers who have been unaware of the gendered particularity of their work. Following this critique, feminist Jewish thought destabilizes and reorients Jewish philosophy by insisting that Jewish reflection also be animated by the self-understandings and the experiences of Jewish women.

The issue of the relation between Judaism and other religious traditions has been an important, but often overlooked, feature of modern Jewish philosophy since Moses Mendelssohn’s work of 1783, Jerusalem or On Religious Power and Judaism. ⁹ As part of their philosophical discussion of the challenges that modernity brings to Jewish life and thought, late nineteenth- and twentieth-century modern Jewish philosophers such as Hermann Cohen, Leo Baeck, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Abraham Heschel, Mordecai Kaplan, David Hartman, David Novak, and Eugene Borowitz have addressed the issue of the relationship between Judaism and other religions. The reflections of these thinkers have frequently focused on such elements as: Jewish notions of election, revelation, redemption, the role of Judaism in history, the possibilities and goals of inter-religious dialogue, the legitimacy of other religions and the authenticity of other ways of being religious. It is important to note that some of the most characteristic as well as powerful and profound insights of these Jewish philosophers emerged precisely from their engagements with the challenges of religious pluralism.

Although contemporary feminist Jewish thinkers have not been included in the usual studies of Judaism and religious pluralism, I find that two in particular, Judith Plaskow and Rita Gross, have addressed significant aspects of this challenge. Especially germane to the overall argument of this essay, the discussions of these two thinkers are the direct result of their reflections as feminist Jews.

Feminist Judaism and Pluralism

While the issue of religious pluralism has not appeared as a principal one in the published writings of many feminist Jews, ¹⁰ feminist Jewish thought can still provide important resources and directions for Jewish philosophy in terms of this challenge. One of the most engaging ideas offered by these thinkers to the discussion of pluralism involves the contention that the attitude toward women in Judaism has important similarities or parallels with the attitude toward the non-Jew. Although one of the first to speak of this was Drorah Setel, ¹¹ I have found Judith Plaskow to be the most forceful in outlining this contention, particularly in her work, Standing Again at Sinai.

When the issue of pluralism is seen in one of its most concise forms, in the question of recognition/acceptance of difference, then the possible connection between the attitude toward women and the attitude toward non-Jews begins to emerge. Plaskow finds that Judaism is troubled by diversity. It not only marks off that which is different from the norm, it valorizes this difference. She discusses this systematic valorization by referring to Judaism’s disposition to conceptualize difference in terms of “hierarchical separations.” In her words:

To understand more fully those aspects of Judaism that thwart Jewish acceptance of difference without gradation, we must examine further those ideas that have contributed to Judaism’s long history of conceptualizing difference in terms of hierarchical separations. . . . Paralleling external differentiation [of Jews and non-Jews] were a host of internal separations that set apart distinct and unequal objects, states, and modes of being. ¹²

In agreement with many feminist Jews, ¹³ Plaskow offers a many-faceted argument to demonstrate that gender is one of the central markers in Judaism and that in terms of gender the male is taken as normative. This principle of the normativeness of the male is omnipresent, equally apparent in classic Jewish texts, liturgy, practice, and institutions. The consequence of combining male normativeness with a hierarchical gradient is that Jewish women are regarded as both other and inferior.

The separation or difference between the male and the female Jew is certainly not the only difference recognized in Judaism. Perhaps the primary distinction posited throughout Jewish history has been that between the Jew and the non-Jew. In relation to the non-Jew, Plaskow believes that it is the concept of the chosen people which establishes and reflects the special, higher status of the Jew. It is true that Jewish thinkers have offered many interpretations of the meaning of chosenness or election, some of which clearly reflect an uneasiness with the possible link between the concept of chosenness and the claim of Jewish superiority. Still, Plaskow insists that there is no way to affirm chosenness without at least implying a superiority, that is, a hierarchical difference or privileged status for the Jew vis-à-vis the non-Jew. She writes:

Jewish difference is not one among many, the uniqueness of a people as all peoples are unique, having their own history and task. Jewish difference is a matter of God’s decision, God’s mysterious and singular choice bestowing upon the Jews an unparalleled spiritual destiny. This difference is a hierarchical difference, a statement of privilege—even if burdensome and unmerited privilege—in relation to those who are not chosen. ¹⁴

Plaskow concludes that in order to affirm the integrity and worth of the lives of Jewish women as well as the lives of those who have a religious commitment to communities that are not Jewish, Judaism must accept a thorough reconceptualization of the way that difference is understood and portrayed. In relation to the issue of pluralism, Jews will not be able to offer tolerance and respect to members of other communities unless they repudiate chosenness and the overall, systematic tendency to depict difference in terms of superiority/inferiority.

Does this not mean that Jews cannot see themselves as different from others? In Plaskow’s view, there are always differences between communities and among the members of a specific group/community. Distinctive features of our lives as individual persons and as members of particular communities are a natural outcome of being persons shaped by all the particularities of gender, language, history, and culture. However, seen in this way, differences do not imply hierarchical classifications or separations. This recognition of differences simply acknowledges that distinctive elements of individual and communal life are necessary and enriching features of our lives as humans.

Thus, as Plaskow notes, there is a special contribution that feminist Jews can bring to the discussion of pluralism. First, feminist thought uncovers the parallel between external differentiations and internal differentiations. Second, it reveals the strong tendencies in Judaism to valorize differences in terms of either dualisms or a hierarchical gradient. Third, it describes the fundamental nature of that corrective which will permit Jewish men and women as well as Jews and non-Jews to live in a climate of acceptance and equality.

Finally, Plaskow raises another question in terms of the issue of pluralism. She suggests that the full acceptance of pluralism might require another fundamental shift in Judaism. She asks whether, not only the concept of chosenness, but dimensions of the traditional notion of God must be jettisoned in order to purify Judaism of the hierarchies that inhere in it. ¹⁵ In her words;

I shall argue [that] . . . the notion of a supernatural deity who singles out a particular people is part of the dualistic, hierarchical understanding of reality that the feminist must repudiate. ¹⁶

Another contribution to the philosophic treatment of pluralism can be gleaned from the writings of Rita Gross. She addresses one of the most significant areas in the overall discussion of religious pluralism, the question of the proper goal or goals of dialogue and interaction. In order to assess the significance of Gross’s discussion, it might be helpful to briefly examine some of the different goals that have been suggested by modern Jewish thinkers. For example, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik has argued that the fundamental goal of pluralism should be the tolerance of the other. He also sees the desirability of cooperation between different religious communities as long as this is limited to shared social concerns. However, Soloveitchik rejects the view that one faith community can share or learn anything from another in terms of dogmas, doctrines, or values. He argues this by citing the uniqueness of each religious community’s faith-world. In his influential essay, “Confrontation,” Soloveitchik writes:

The word of faith reflects the intimate, the private, the paradoxically inexpressible cravings of the individual for and his linking up with his Maker. It reflects the numinous character and the strangeness of the act of faith of a particular community which is totally incomprehensible to the man of a different faith community. ¹⁷

Another position sees the goal of pluralism as religious interaction, an interaction that both includes and goes beyond collaborative social efforts by members of different communities. Abraham Heschel, in the essay, “No Religion is an Island,” discusses the reciprocal deepening of faith that is possible between communities. He writes of uncovering “a religious basis for communication and cooperation on matters relevant to their [Jewish and Christian] moral and spiritual concern in spite of disagreement.” ¹⁸ For Heschel, interaction between communities, especially between Jews and Christians, can lead both partners to deepen their faith standpoints, that “fear and trembling” that characterizes the life before God.

Rita Gross takes a stand that goes further than Heschel. Following a thorough feminist critique of Jewish religious language, Gross provides a special perspective upon the question of what one tradition may learn from another. She has written that “religious insights and images important for Jews can be found outside [the] Jewish tradition.” ¹⁹

In an often-cited article, “Steps toward Feminine Imagery of Deity in Jewish Theology,” Gross begins by furnishing a detailed argument about the unsuspected, albeit extensive, ramifications for Jewish women which result from the lack of female notions or images of God. Many of her points have been discussed by other feminists such as Plaskow and Marcia Falk. Gross commences by reflecting upon “the inherent limitations of any theological or religious language.” ²⁰ In her view, language about God is always “analogous and metaphorical.” Such language is the outcome of human attempts to express or convey an experience of something that transcends language. She finds that it is a great mistake, therefore, to take religious language about God literally or to believe that our images of God correspond to the divine reality. ²¹ Although Gross feels that there is a strong tendency in Judaism to “absolutize” the images and language about God, she labels this disposition as nothing less than idolatrous.

What is especially pernicious about this tendency to absolutize language is that the Jewish tradition links exclusively male or masculine pronouns and imagery with God. God is spoken of as a “He” and is often portrayed in terms of typical male roles, such as father, king, judge, warrior, etc. By apotheosizing the male or masculine as divine, the message emerges that men are the ultimate standard of value.

For Gross, since the divine reality transcends all efforts to describe it, Jewish religious language does not instruct us about the ultimate nature of the divine. However, it does powerfully inform us about the Jewish community’s understanding of itself and its highest values. ²² In addition to affirming the divinity of the male, this language bespeaks a tradition that is surreptitiously labelling the female or feminine as other, lesser or outside of the realm of the holy.

Judaism’s attitude toward Jewish women has recently become fully manifest, according to many feminist Jews, through the controversy raised by those who wish to add feminine images and metaphors to the repertoire of divine language. Gross writes, in an earlier article: “If it is daring, degrading or alienating to speak of God using female pronouns and imagery, that perhaps indicates something about the way women and the feminine are valued” by the community. ²³ As we have seen, she sees the ramifications of the exclusive male God-language as reaching to the conceptual and social realm.

As a corrective, Gross believes that the introduction and use of female pronouns and metaphors can have revolutionary effects upon Jewish life and thought. Among the results she sees emerging from this change in Jewish religious language are: overturning stereotypes of woman’s weakness, bringing into question the association of women with nature but not culture, a better recognition of the limits and finitude of human existence, and the appreciation of human life as embodied.

However, Gross finds that Judaism does not have the linguistic and conceptual resources to add significant notions and images of God as female. ²⁴ Although there are images of God as female in Judaism, in her view, these are still “too embedded in patriarchal contexts.” ²⁵ Gross believes that we must look to female imagery in other traditions to find a more fully developed notion of God as female, or the Goddess, as well as metaphors that speak of the “coequal balance of maleness and femaleness.” ²⁶ She has been impressed by the Hindu tradition as a helpful source for a Jewish speaking of the Goddess. There are, in all, five images that Gross suggests must be incorporated into Judaism. These are images of the Goddess who is: “the divine feminine who contains all opposites and manifests the coincidence of those opposites,” ²⁷ strong and beautiful, Mother, the patron of culture, and the sexual.

In conclusion, this analysis by Gross provides important insights into the deficiencies of notions and images of the divine in Judaism, the religious and social ramifications of such deficiencies, and the possibility of alleviating this problem through an examination of notions of the divine in another religious tradition. Her discussion of the role of the Goddess has, in particular, yielded a graphic example of how Judaism’s active engagement with the ideas and images of another religious tradition might help it overcome important obstacles in its way to creating an environment that furthers the religious expression of all Jews, both male and female.

Two Chrisian Feminists

I would now like to turn to two discussions of religious pluralism by Christian feminists in order to indicate what feminists in other communities might bring to both Jewish philosophy and feminist Jewish thinkers. In the essay, “Feminism and Jewish-Christian Dialogue,” Rosemary Radford Ruether outlines some of the insights that emerge from a feminist—here, a Christian feminist—reflection on Jewish-Christian dialogue. For her, both interreligious dialogue and feminism challenge the claims of any religion to be universal, or to have a monopoly on religious truth. In studying any single religion in the context of other traditions, the historical and cultural particularity of its development and understandings are illuminated. This leads to the insight that no religion can escape its finiteness or legitimately claim to embody the fullness of religious truth. Ruether pointedly criticizes Christian views of Judaism as incomplete and superseded, which are expressions of Christianity’s false universalism.

Feminism’s challenge to religion differs from that of pluralism. It highlights the marginalization of women as shapers and teachers of religion as well as the rejection of women’s experiences of the divine. Ruether finds that:

By and large, not only Judaism and Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, but even ancient tribal religions have not allowed the divine to be experienced in a way defined by women. Feminism looks back at the history of all religions as expressions of male-dominated cultures that have marginalized women to some extent. . . . ²⁸

Thus, feminism supplements the insights taken from pluralism, because it uncovers the limits, caused by androcentrism and patriarchy, and the false claims of universalism which inhere in religious traditions. She also believes that the commitment to feminism and interreligious dialogue can augment each other not only in the effort to correct the history of past oppression of women but in the development of new, alternative ways of experiencing the divine. Through sharing their critique of different traditions’ marginalization of women and their efforts at recovery and creation of women’s experiences of the divine, feminists can profoundly help one another. Ruether writes:

It (a “new feminist midrash on patriarchal texts and traditions”) must also open itself to dialogue with feminist exploration of religion in other traditions. There must certainly be a dialogue between Christian and Jewish feminists, and also with Muslim feminists as well. There must also be a dialogue between feminists engaged in the transformation of historical religions and feminists who break with these historical religions and seek to revive, from repressed memories of ancient goddesses and burned witches, visions of new possibilities for women’s spirituality today. ²⁹

Another Christian feminist, Marjorie Suchocki, has written an essay, “In Search of Justice: Religious Pluralism from a Feminist Perspective,” that both reinforces and extends some views we previously saw in Plaskow’s writings. She begins by pointing out the relationship between religious absolutism and the marginalization of women in a particular tradition, or what she calls “religious imperialism and sexism.” Suchocki finds that; “Absolutizing one religion, such that it becomes normative for all others, is a dynamic with clear parallels to sexism, whereby one gender is established as the norm for human existence.” ³⁰

The critique of the dynamics of sexism is very perspicacious. One process (“inclusivism”) is the universalization of the male experience as normative. Another mechanism is to attribute special characteristics to men and to women. What is pernicious about this “exclusivism” is that it projects onto women qualities that men do not want attributed to themselves. In this case, women become, in the words once used by the French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray, the “underside” of men. ³¹ The consequence of these processes, which the author insists are but two sides of the same coin, include the silencing of women’s voices, the exclusion of women from full participation in community, the oppression of women in all areas of life, and the distortion of both male and human experience.

The parallels Suchocki sees between sexism and Christian views of other traditions are full fledged. From her studies she finds that Christianity has applied its own norms to other traditions regardless of their own experiences, projected upon other communities repressed elements of Christian experience, devalued the possibilities of outside contributions to Christianity, and lost the ability to fairly evaluate itself.

However, Suchocki does not endorse a pluralism that enshrines relativism as its foundation, despite her argument concerning the particularity of every tradition. She offers a wide notion of justice or “physical, societal and personal” well-being as a category that can be used for self-critique and for the critique of others. What protects this category from becoming just another form of religious imperialism, that is, the use of a norm that has emerged from out of a specific tradition as a universal criterion that is applied to other religions, is the corrective process of interreligious dialogue. Such dialogue will allow the voices of different communities, and, of equal importance, the diverse voices within each religious community to shape and transform more limited notions of justice. She concludes:

The pluralism among religions then finds itself calling attention to the pluralism within each religion; dialogue engenders dialogues. Affirming one another’s diversity may grant us the privilege of “listening in” to the internal dialogues, in the hope of understanding and mutual transformations. One vision of justice can temper, criticize, and deepen another, and through dialogue each vision might grow richer in understanding and implementation. ³²

Suchocki’s analysis of the parallels between sexism and absolutism is similar to Plaskow’s discussion of the relationship between sexism and the concept of chosenness in Judaism. They also affirm that in allowing women to fully participate in a religion, that religion is also opened to other marginalized members and to dialogue with persons committed to other religious traditions. Suchocki’s extended deliberation about justice adds not only a new item to the agenda of interreligious dialogue, but also reaffirms the transformative possibilities of this key process.

Conclusion: “Respondeo Etsi Mutabor”

The history of Jewish philosophy is the history of a passionate and sustained dialogue with streams of thought that originated elsewhere. The works of such philosophers as Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and the twentieth-century existentialists have demarcated whole periods of Jewish philosophy. Surely it is time for Jewish philosophers to respond to the invitation of feminist philosophy as well as the critique and insights of feminist Jewish thinkers. The effects of such encounters hold great promise, as I have tried to indicate above in terms of the question of religious pluralism.

Feminist Jews have offered fresh insights into the issue of pluralism that could not have emerged from any other quarter. Plaskow’s study of the history, role, and status of women in Judaism brought her to uncover a pervasive dynamic driving many primary differentiations important to Judaism. Her conclusion that difference is not just identified, it is hierarchically valorized, seriously challenges all those who see feminism as a minor issue within Judaism and/or who believe that redressing the image of the non-Jew is a simple matter.

Gross’s complex analysis of the lack of female images of the divine in Judaism testifies to the urgency and great possibilities for Jewish encounter with the world’s religions. She raises the question of whether Judaism’s ability to remedy its stifling treatment of women might be dependent on the seriousness of its meeting with other religious traditions.

Ruether and Suchocki further demonstrate how interreligious dialogue can aid feminist Jewish work as well as Judaism overall. Ruether’s suggestive essay speaks of a retrieval of silenced voices of women as well as the creation of new experiences of the divine through feminists from different traditions, and outside traditions, exchanging their ideas. Suchocki’s correlation of religious imperialism and sexism reinforces the conclusion that there is a profound affinity between feminist and pluralist analyses. Her sensitive discussion of justice/well-being tackles the conundrum of relativism. She insists that we have a stake in the lives of others. She also shows that through dialogue the intensity of this commitment to others need not lead to another episode of imperialism.

Rosenzweig’s famous Christian dialogue-partner, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, offered as the motto of his life’s work; “respondeo etsi mutabor,” or “I respond although I shall be changed.” ³³ There is no doubt that in acknowledging and replying to feminist Jewish thought as well as to feminist philosophy, Jewish philosophy will be transformed. Yet for the sake of its integrity, vitality and relevance, Jewish philosophy cannot but respond.