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Journal of Modern Greek Studies 2.2 (2002) 421-424



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Book Review

United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974


Claude Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974. Mannheim and Mohnesee: Bibliopolis. 2001. a42.90. 483 pp. Bibliography, illustrations, index.

Given its power and regional interests, any account of the role of the United States in the events that led to the effective partitioning of Cyprus in 1974 should arouse considerable interest among scholars and the broader public on both sides of the Atlantic. The Cyprus question involves some of the central issues of the last century: the goals and values of the Western Alliance, anti-colonialism, ethnic conflict, and majority and minority rights in a democratic era. Despite the fact that a vast quantity of British and U.S. archival materials and a large number of oral histories and tape recordings have become available over the last decade, they have produced little response among historians or political scientists in the United States or Eastern Mediterranean. Instead, issues related to U.S. policy have remained largely the preserve of sensationalist journalists like Christopher Hitchens and ultra-nationalist academics, who generally form their conclusions before looking for material to support them. The contribution of both has been to solidify prejudices rather than stimulate careful thought about the role of the great power and the responsibilities of regional and local actors for the tragedies of 1954-1974.

Claude Nicolet's United Policy Toward Cyprus, is a landmark in scholarly research, although its appearance is sure to be unwelcome to those who have preferred to see events on the island as a morality play revolving around sinister conspiracies, virtuous small states, and malignant great powers. Nicolet has made judicious use of the massive files available in the U.S. and Britain, and integrated them with the recollections of participants and the voluminous secondary materials already published to produce a well-argued and broadly conceived study of United States policy.

U.S. policy towards Cyprus was not the monolithic pursuit of a set of fixed objectives but, as Nicolet demonstrates, shifted in response to developments on the island. Its one consistent goal was the preservation of the NATO alliance by preventing a war between Greece and Turkey. Although the U. S. was able to achieve this limited goal, its ability to impose its policy preferences on both sides was largely frustrated by its Greek and Turkish allies, and in particular by the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios III.

Eisenhower administration officials opted for an essentially hands off policy during the colonial phase of the Cyprus crisis (1954-1959). Britain, Greece, and Turkey all maneuvered to draw Washington into involvement [End Page 421] in support of their respective positions. While their natural affinity was for the U.K., American officials were aware that the British effort to retain control over Cyprus was unworkable and damaged NATO interests. They edged the Eden and Macmillan governments toward a solution that would involve recognition of Greek and Turkish interests. British attempts to retain control of the island failed in the face of Greek Cypriot resistance. By 1958 Macmillan's government was ready to accept any solution that met a minimum objective of retaining bases on the island. Greek and Turkish leaders stepped in, negotiated a compromise (1959) over the heads of the Cyprus communities, and created a Cyprus republic (1960) that few on the island wanted.

As the British retreated, with some relief, to a secondary role in the Cyprus story, the Kennedy administration (1961-1963) spent three frustrating years trying to encourage "nation-building" by the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. The U.S. exchanged economic assistance for intelligence stations and urged President Makarios to work for an accord with the Turkish Cypriots. Neither the Greek nor Turkish Cypriots had much interest in making the 1959 Geneva accords work. The Turks insisted on a narrow interpretation of the agreements that would render their community independent of Greek control. Greek Cypriots regarded the 1959 agreements as an impediment to enosis with Greece and sought to undermine them...

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