Fire at Sea: The Tragedy of the Soviet Submarine Komsomolets (review)

Komsomolets (K-278) was a large, deep-diving, nuclear-powered submarine of unique design with a titanium hull. On 25 February 1989, it set off on its first independent patrol for the Soviet Northern Fleet, but it never came back to base. During its return leg on 7 April, the submerged Komsomolets experienced a fire in its stern compartment. The fire triggered a series of events that led to the loss of the ship and 42 of its 64 crew members. Afterward, the Soviet Navy commissioned an investigation to determine what went wrong and why and to make recommendations to prevent similar accidents. A statement by the Soviet Main Naval Staff summarized the results as follows: "As far as causes . . . are concerned, numerous technical imperfections in the submarine's . . . systems should be mentioned first. These . . . may be attributed entirely to things left undone by the designers and shipbuilders" (p. xv). The crew was essentially absolved of responsibility and praised for its self-sacrifice and technical competence in the face of an impossible situation. Not surprisingly, the investigation's recommendations concentrated on design and equipment improvements.

The author of Fire at Sea, D. A. Romanov, is a civilian who was the assistant chief designer of Komsomolets. Distressed by the investigation's conclusions, he wrote his book to present the real story as he sees it. He argues that the official investigation was a whitewash intended to preserve the honor of the Soviet Navy, its commanders, and sailors by pinning the blame on the designers. Analyzing a list of design peculiarities and imperfections that the Navy singled out as contributing to the loss of the vessel and personnel, Romanov counters that none of the alleged shortcomings caused the loss of the submarine and that the real problem lay with the crew and the Navy's hierarchy. Specifically, too many Komsomolets sailors, he argues, did not possess the right qualifications or training, and their leaders made too many poor decisions both before and during the deployment, including when the mishaps arose. The Navy's refusal to acknowledge these deficiencies, Romanov contends, has resulted in a misguided approach to submarine safety, focusing on design instead of personnel.

Romanov's book is detailed and technically dense, and it reads like a plaintiff's brief rather than the analysis of a dispassionate observer. The book does not make for easy going and will appeal mainly to submariners and to those fascinated by the internal workings of the Soviet Navy and its Russian successor. Romanov has done his homework. He repeatedly cites specific naval regulations in order to make the case that the material conditions aboard the ship, the qualifications of its crew members, and the practices in which they engaged were not in conformity with the regulations. For example, article 173 prohibits going to sea when "faults in the hull, technical equipment, or rescue devices" are present (p. 6), yet the ship evidently was operating with an inaccurate oxygen gas analyzer in the compartment in which the fire started (excess oxygen probably contributed to the fire) and without television monitors that could have helped command personnel grasp the seriousness of the situation once the fire started. Romanov also walks the reader through the ship's log for the day of the fire (often pointing out lacunae and inconsistencies) to document the response both of on-scene responders and the ship's command.

Romanov does not hesitate to acknowledge deficiencies in equipment, but he turns the argument to his advantage when he writes, for instance, that such items "were designed on the basis of specifications of the Navy's institutes, and under their observation and leadership. The Navy accepted this equipment" (p. 213). In showing how a buildup of oxygen fed the fire, Romanov's argument is double-barreled. He points out that the crew allowed the level of oxygen to be higher than it should have been based on the Navy's own requirements. He...