Africa Squadron: The U.S. Navy and the Slave Trade, 1842-1861 (review)

Historians of the Atlantic slave trade have given considerable attention to attempts at ending human trafficking. Nevertheless, such studies have tended to dismiss the efforts of the United States Africa Squadron to curb slave trading between 1842 and 1861. Donald L. Canney seeks to close this gap in the historiography with his study, Africa Squadron. Canney's book is essentially a chronicle of the activities of the Squadron, an American naval force created after the United States agreed to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in 1842. He details the actions of the squadron from the perspective of its officers from commander to commander. According to him, this is the only book-length examination to use this methodology (p. xiii). Canney challenges interpretations that the squadron did little to end the illicit trade because its commanders were southerners and therefore unsympathetic to their mission (pp. xii–xiii).

Canney begins by examining the history of the early anti–slave trade era and American actions designed to suppress the trade. A short analysis of the colonization of Liberia is included as part of the effort to end the slave trade. Though the United States banned the traffic beginning in 1808, it continued due to sporadic efforts by the American government to contain it. Canney concludes that repeated negative publicity stemming from the capture by other navies of American slavers forced the U.S. to begin a more organized patrol to end human trafficking (p. 24). As a result, the Africa Squadron is unique in American naval history because it was the only unit formed by Congress after accepting a treaty with Britain. Canney argues the squadron was unsuccessful partly because the Navy also made the protection of commercial interests a part of the duty assigned to the force (p. 39). Saddling an admittedly small naval force with this extra mission distracted some of the commanders, thus reducing the effectiveness of the squadron in deterring the trade in slaves.

The remainder of the study chronicles the activities of each commander of the squadron and offers lengthy descriptions of the vessels assigned to duty on the African coast. Canney deals extensively with these issues because some argue that the squadron was ineffective due to the poor quality of its vessels and, again, the fact that many of its commanders were southerners (p. xiii). Canney argues forcefully that southern commanders were hamstrung not by proslavery attitudes but by limited resources to do the job. Furthermore, he shows that the squadron was most successful after steam vessels were assigned; however, this did not happen until the last years of the fleet's existence (p. 201).

In his final assessment, Canney blames the failure of the squadron to slow slave trading on those "higher up than squadron commanders" (p. 224). It failed because in his view, secretaries of the navy "seemed to merely neglect the Africa Squadron" (p. 226). Though specialists may disagree with his final assessment, Canney nevertheless provides a valuable resource for those interested in the less studied endeavors of America's armed forces.