The Battle of Heligoland Bight (review)

Less than a month after the beginning of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany in 1914, a British force of light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines raided the Heligoland Bight with the objective of scooping up German patrols deployed at the entrance to the Bight. The battle that followed was the first major clash between British and German naval forces of the war. It is usually described in a chapter or less in general naval histories but Eric Osborne correctly believes the encounter set important precedents, especially on the German side, and merits deeper study and a monograph of its own. On the British side the Admiralty committed an appalling blunder in not informing the leaders of the raid that they had reversed an earlier decision and units of the Grand Fleet would be out in support of the raid. The problem was compounded by the fact that British submarines had been deployed and there was no practical way of warning them of this new development. The result was that British submarines nearly attacked or were attacked by their own ships. There was as a result considerable confusion, evident at times in British reports. Poor visibility frequently added to the difficulties. The Germans responded with a piecemeal commitment of their forces while the heavy units of the High Sea Fleet were initially unable to cross the Jade bar because of low tide. This and the piecemeal commitment was fortunate for the British as they might have been opposed by a potentially superior force. In the end, the intervention of Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers was decisive and when the battle was over three German cruisers and a destroyer were sunk. The British lost no ships although some were badly damaged and likely saved only by Beatty's arrival.

The confused nature of the battle has always made it a difficult one to describe. Osborne generally succeeds although the charts (borrowed from earlier works) are not that helpful. The work is essentially based on printed sources and although the bibliography on the British side lists ADM 137 volumes in the British National Archives, most footnote citations refer to the printed Naval Staff monograph, a compilation based on the raw material usually found in ADM 137 volumes. This works reasonably well for the British side for those monographs were classified "Confidential" and not intended for the public although the author would have done well to heed the footnote about the uncritical nature of these studies in the fifth volume of Arthur Marder's From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (pp. 358–59). In contrast, the relevant volume of the German official history, Der Krieg zur See, was written for public consumption by the German naval officer Otto Groos shortly after the war (Osborne used a translation published by the Naval War College over a decade later). Groos appears to be the author's major source for the German side of the story. Groos certainly provides copious detail but one should note the cautionary words on the nature of the German series in works such as Charles S. Thomas's The German Navy in the Nazi Era (pp. 40–41) or Keith Bird's Erich Raeder (pp. 49–51). Osborne, who rightly stresses the importance of the German side, missed an opportunity for deeper research in the German archives. No startling new discoveries might result, but one never knows unless one looks. As for the British, while the author has used the Navy Records Society volumes of the Beatty, Jellicoe, and Keyes papers, only a fraction of the available manuscript material could be published. In short, there is still much opportunity for further research, especially on the German navy.

Despite the limitations of its sources, Osborne's book is still well worth reading by those interested in the naval history of the First World War. It may not break new ground but as a study based on material in print...