The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia (review)

Crisis atmosphere and associated anxieties in a prewar or wartime era can often inspire heroic responses from a threatened country. Professor William C. Fuller's outstanding study of the trials of Lt. Colonel Sergei Nicholaevich Miasoedov and General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov shows that the converse can also arise from such conditions. Miasoedov was a gendarme, businessman, and intelligence agent, while Sukhomlinov was best known as Russia's War Minister from 1909 to 1915. In l915 Miasoedov was accused of treason, tried by a military court, hanged, and thereafter became Russia's most infamous traitor. His alleged treachery provided the Russians with the most comfortable explanation for the Empire's military catastrophes in 1915. Unfortunately, the trial of Miasoedov also stimulated a spy mania resulting in accusations against anyone associated with the traitor, many of whom happened to be Jews or Russian subjects of German origin. Therefore anti-Semitism and Germanophobia were intensified. The momentum of this pandemic was exacerbated when Sukhomlinov was linked to Miasoedov. His prosecution followed, seemingly identifying treason at the ministerial level. As if this occurrence were not injurious enough for the monarchy's declining prestige, it soon became widely known that Sukhomlinov was a patron of the Tsar. Revolution was further encouraged.

This remarkable study reads like the best works of Tom Clancy or Robert Ludlum—smooth, exciting, and hard to put down. In addition to war, espionage, and politics, the human relationships of betrayal and romance with intriguing women are all included. Unlike the novelists noted above, however, Fuller identifies no heroes.

Fuller's main contribution is his masterful use of new Russian archival sources to completely exonerate Miasoedov and Sukhomlinov of treason charges. Although neither man was guiltless of petty crimes, this analysis leaves no question that the two men were scapegoats victimized by petty jealousy, ethnic distrust, bad luck, political opportunism, and bureaucratic and military incompetence. Secondly, the author sheds new light on Russia's military failures and the causes of revolution through his appraisal of the damage caused by spy mania. Rightfully, more significance is attributed to the phenomenon than in previous studies. The war effort was damaged and monarchical instability amplified. Especially, Russia's productive capacity, as well as its transportation and food distribution system, deteriorated. Internecine political and ethnic disputes expanded. The use of scapegoats left real problems unidentified and unsolved. In short, spy mania played a major role in the destruction of the monarchy and the Provisional Government. Thirdly, all of this tragedy occurred at a time when the Tsarist regime and Provisional Government were supposedly moving toward a more liberal and humanistic tradition. Yet Fuller's description of the years 1905 to 1917 goes beyond the usual criticisms to reveal an uncommon injustice and malevolence.

While this volume is clearly a major contribution to our understanding of prewar and wartime Russia, its complexity is bound to spark some disagreement among scholars. For example, Fuller seems to suggest that the ingredients for spy mania have historically been ingrained in the Russian character. If so, why did spy mania not appear earlier during Russia's war with Japan? Defeat at the hands of "racially inferior" Japan should have more readily provoked suspicion of treason than defeat at the hands of the "formidable" Germans. Secondly, Fuller's apparently complete acceptance of the Fischer thesis will be questioned by some historians. One can easily agree that Germany was not without guilt, but who pushed the "button" that actually started war? It was the Tsar who tried to utilize a partial mobilization because he knew full mobilization would provoke war. The war's origins are more complicated than Fischer's explanation alone; for example, Poincaré's two visits to Russia in 1912 and 1914 have not been adequately examined. Finally, the author speculates that had the Miasoedov-Sukhomlinov affair not occurred, perhaps the worst...