The Rebels. How Blair Mislaid his Majority (review)

The immediate claim of Philip Cowley's meticulous study of Labour backbench politics from 1997 to 2005 is that backbenchers have not been docile under the Blair government, and have in fact been more rebellious than any other set of backbenchers apart from those between 1974 and 1979. Starting with the 47 votes against the single parent benefit changes at the start of the new government, and running through what Cowley describes as 'the largest rebellion by government backbenchers since the beginning of modern British party politics', the 139 votes against government policy on Iraq in March 2003, to the revolts over top up fees and foundation hospitals, Cowley presents a chronicle of critical dissent.

But the book's sub-title which suggests even more than this is misleading, since Blair did not mislay his majority in the way that Callaghan did, only a part of it. And even without part of it, he continued as prime minister. Cowley can therefore credit the Blair governments from 1997 to 2005 as being the first since Harold Wilson's of 1966-70 to survive without a single Commons defeat. Even with the reduced majority delivered by the general election of 2005 the government successfully passed a series of contentious measures. However many parts of the government's majority may have fallen victim to wear and tear, legislative nakedeness had to wait until after the third Labour electoral victory in 2005 and the defeat of the government's proposal for 90 days detention for terrorist suspects.

Cowley's claim is that the Blair government has had a uniquely rebellious house of commons, and that just as the extent of the dissent has been overlooked, so has its effectiveness. One of the ways, Cowley points out, in which the government got its legislation, was by a series of concessions to its critics. And when the system worked, the government won because it responded to backbench opinions even before legislation was put to the vote. What Cowley calls 'a near perfect backbench rebellion' occurred over the 2003 Pensions Bill which was amended to cover company schemes which had already collapsed 'without a single dissenting vote being cast'.

Cowley's underlying and more important theme is therefore about the working of parliamentary government, the relations between government and its parliamentary supporters, the relative powers of each, and the reasons why backbench M.P.s both support and oppose a government of their own party. The book illustrates that party loyalty depends at least as much on a desire to prevent the opposing party from gaining office as from any positive enthusiasm for the policies of one's own. It is the principal of 'If you knows of a better 'ole, go to it.'

A prime minister who derives his original appointment from the control of parliament can, after that initial launch, continue very effectively despite considerable parliamentary opposition. This is partly because of what is misleadingly, or perhaps not so misleadingly, called 'the royal prerogative'. But it is also because of the party system and the manner of forming a government.

There are many reasons for M.P.s to support their government: personal ambition for office; a belief that that is the way to gain office and pursue beneficial policies; a belief that the government's policies are correct; a belief that the major part of the government's policies are correct, and that therefore it is better to assist the government despite disagreement over particular policies, in order to expedite the overall programme; a belief that not to do so would help the opposition, which is worse than the government however bad the government is. For M.P.s to oppose their government to the point of defeat requires a belief that the disagreement was so important that everything possible must be done to stop a policy; a belief that the leadership was so wrong or inappropriate that it must be undermined even if this gave temporary comfort to...