When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers (review)

In the study of war and international crises, political scientists have often focused their research on Great Powers' confrontations over the security of other states. Danilovic draws upon the theoretical literature on deterrence to analyze such Great Power conflicts—specifically, cases of extended immediate deterrence. That is, she studies international crises in which a state (defender) seeks to prevent a military attack on an ally by threatening military retaliation against a potential attacker. Danilovic is mainly interested in addressing the well-known debate within the deterrence literature about the question of what factors determine the credibility of threats. To her, the influential claims of such early-deterrence theorists as Schelling that the credibility of deterrence threats are highly interdependent and that they are strengthened by various bargaining strategies designed to "manipulate risk" are open to serious logical criticisms.¹ They also need to be tested systematically against the historical record. Danilovic argues instead that the credibility of threats is more dependent on the "intrinsic" interests of states, and she seeks to show through new empirical tests that her argument is better supported by the available evidence.

Danilovic tests a series off alternative hypotheses about the credibility of threats by statistical analyses of a newly developed dataset of seventy deterrence cases from 1895 to 1985. She codes the outcome of each deterrence case according to one of three outcomes: defender acquiesces; challenger acquiesces; or the two sides compromise. She also uses this dataset to test hypotheses about which Great Powers will attempt extended immediate deterrence against a potential attacker. In her empirical tests on deterrence outcomes, she finds, for example, that democratic defenders are more likely to compromise as well as force challengers to back down, that defenders with strong regional security interests are far more likely to deter attacks, and that the past behavior and crisis bargaining moves of defenders have little effect in deterring challengers. Thus does Danilovic conclude that the credibility of defender threats has more to do with the tangible interests at stake in protecting an ally than signals of resolve communicated by bargaining moves and behavior in current or past crisis.

The strengths of the book include its integrated analysis of the reasons for, and the outcomes associated with, policies of deterrence; its nuanced analysis of deterrence outcomes beyond dichotomous conceptions of success or failure; and its creative measurement of "intrinsic interests" in terms of regional ties, which places the bilateral relationship between allies and defenders within the broader context of Great Power regional security interests. Critics might question how well the claims of Schelling and others regarding bargaining strategies of commitment or manipulating risk are actually measured in the empirical tests. On balance, this sophisticated and valuable book represents a welcome contribution to the scholarly literature on deterrence.