Italy and the Greater Middle East: A Need for Resolute Patience

The Israeli-Lebanese conflict of summer 2006 marked the beginning of a new phase in Middle Eastern politics. For the first time, the Israeli government entrusted part of the state's security to an international guarantee and a robust multinational force—the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFR)—at its borders.

In the framework of cooperation with the United States and the United Nations, the European Union's role shifted from that of the key payer and major funding source of the past to key player with an important proactive political and military role. This is a potential turning point for the entire Middle East, provided the leading democracies find the courage and coherence to combine their collective resources and skills to induce political progress both in Lebanon and on the Israeli-Palestinian front.

The question is whether we can build sufficient momentum for such an ambitious agenda. Without steps toward a political settlement between Israel and its neighbors, UNIFIL II could rapidly find itself in a very delicate and risky position.

The commitment to peace and stability in Lebanon comes at a time when momentous decisions have to be made by regional and international actors. All the main actors in the Middle East, however, find themselves at some sort of impasse. While the United States suffers stalemate in Iraq, the situation is critical both for Israel, because of the collapse of Prime Minister Ehut Olmert's unilateral "convergence" strategy, and for the Palestinian Authority after the electoral victory of Hamas. Moreover, the emergence of transnationally organized Islamic jihadism weakens Arab governments, producing internal tensions on both nationalist and religious grounds. Finally, the internal collapse of Iraq is favoring Iran's regional rise.

Given this context, the Lebanon war must serve as a wake-up call: the situation in the Middle East could rapidly deteriorate unless the sources of conflicts are addressed through a collective effort by the United States, Europe, and the Arab states.

Historically, proud great powers seldom acknowledge policy mistakes. Yet the United States is now seeking cooperation with Europe and some of the local actors as it begins to address the failure of past initiatives in the region, starting with the stalemate in Iraq. Washington sees the merits of gradually creating consensus for a broad—possibly UN-based—international coalition. The Europeans also have made mistakes in both the distant and recent past: in particular—despite long-standing emotional engagement—they kept a de facto political detachment from the fate of the Middle East, an attitude that Europeans simply can no longer afford.

The violent clashes between Israeli and Hezbollah forces were the first major post-Iraq conflict in the region—and as such reflected some of the changes that the war in Iraq has been generating in the Middle East.

The growing influence of Iran is the first of these trends. Indeed, a crucial unintended consequence of the Iraqi invasion has been to remove a long-standing constraint on Tehran's freedom of action. Iran can no longer be contained by a solely regional balance of power. This growing Iranian influence was an important force behind the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. Interpretations of Hezbollah's actions as a war by proxy probably underestimate Hezbollah's national agenda. Similarly, looking to the conflict in southern Lebanon as the beginning of a conflict between Israel and Iran probably underestimates Lebanon's internal dynamics. There is no doubt, however, that Hezbollah's military strength and influence heavily depend on its ideological, religious, financial, and military ties with the Iranian regime—supported by Syria's role as transit route.

The second trend to be taken into account is a spreading radicalization resulting from the war in Iraq that is not only anti-American but anti-Western. Anti-Western feelings are sweeping the Arab and Islamic world. Even some of the democratization processes underway—whatever the good intentions behind them—end up nurturing the emergence of radical, Islamic political parties, sometimes with significant militant and armed wings.

A perfect example of this dynamic is Hamas, which won in the...