Scientific Dissent amid the United Kingdom Government's Nuclear Weapons Programme

Fig. 1.

Zuckerman at Tobruk, 1943.

'The Irrational Consequence of a Technological Obsession'

From January 1947, when a small group of ministers formally authorized a research and development programme aimed at developing an atomic device for the United Kingdom government, to the present-day discussions about the possible replacement of the Trident nuclear-weapon system, the issue of how, and why, the government's nuclear-weapon capability should be maintained has been a significant aspect of defence policy.¹ For many years national security considerations have limited the release of official documentation concerning the nuclear-weapons programme into the National Archives. Recent changes, including the end of the Cold War, the decreased centrality of nuclear weapons to security policy and the withdrawal from service of those nuclear weapons designed in the 1960s, have made substantial numbers of new documents available, allowing detailed archival examination

Fig. 2.

Solly Zuckerman at the Ministry of Defence, 1965.

Fig. 3.

'The presentation has dealt with one megaton bombs. Are they not enough?' –Zuckerman lecturing.

Fig. 4.

A Pensive Zuckerman in the Galapagos, 1971.

of this policy area for the first time. As research develops it is becoming increasingly clear that, although the United Kingdom government's nuclear-weapons programme has been underway without a break for almost sixty years, the project has seen intense differences among the small group of ministers, military professionals, scientists and civil servants selected to guide it. Critical in this debate, although it has not received due attention, was the dissent expressed by some senior scientists in respect of nuclear weapons policy.

This scientific dissent is explored here by concentrating on the role taken in these debates by Professor Sir Solly Zuckerman, later Lord Zuckerman – an anatomist and endocrinologist who in 1960 became Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence (MOD), and then held the position of the first Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government until 1971. Zuckerman is significant in relation to the nuclear-weapons programme because he was involved at the highest levels of its decision-making mechanisms, sitting, for example, on the influential British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group (BNDSG). He is, furthermore, recognized as one of the most important members of the twentieth-century scientific community, especially in relation to public policy. As the noted scientist Lord Dainton explained, 'Solly Zuckerman was unique. No scientist this century can match him in the timespan and weight of his influence on governments in peace or war. Embraced by the Establishment, he could stand aloof from it and be its severest critic'.²

At the same time, Zuckerman was, and remains, a controversial man, especially among those who worked on the nuclear-weapons programme. He was an inveterate plotter, revelling in the 'backstairs' dealings that are the common currency of Whitehall. For many, moreover, his genuine brilliance and conviction that he was always correct, along with an often-noted ability to read himself into a subject within a matter of minutes, were both irritating and intimidating.³ At the same time, his charm and undoubted talent enabled him to establish significant alliances with important figures, associations that assisted his entré e to, and advance in, government. Chief among these close contacts was another contentious individual, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Forged in the Second World War, their association was termed the 'Zuckbatten Axis' and engendered much distrust among opponents, but was pivotal in Zuckerman's Whitehall career.⁴ Not only was it an important factor in the scientist's advancement in government, but it also provided him with a powerful protector, especially when Zuckerman chose to criticize nuclear-weapons policy. This was a difficult path to follow for, as Burke Trend, the secretary to the Cabinet, told Harold Wilson in 1967, 'there are few empires, or sub-empires, as jealously guarded as the nuclear one', and Zuckerman's activity in that area earned him significant hostility, something that at times...