Victory Through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War (review)

Many books about the Western Front during the First World War have been based solely on research in one country. As a result, the historiography of Franco-British relations on the Western Front has been plagued by persistent stereotypes and myths. Elizabeth Greenhalgh's admirable study does much to remedy this problem. Based on extensive archival research in both the United Kingdom and France, it blends together the themes of strategy, civil-military relations, liaison, and logistics.

Greenhalgh's overall argument is that victory over the formidable German army was achieved only because Britain and France formed an effective partnership. That said, the path to 1918 was far from easy. The two countries began the war with no real tradition of military cooperation. This was reflected in Lord Kitchener's instructions that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) should cooperate with the French but that it should also maintain its independence. Relations between the two commanders-in-chief, Marshal Joseph Joffre and General Sir John French, were thus rocky from the beginning. While the two cooperated on occasion against their civilian masters, Joffre found it difficult from the outset to bend Sir John to his will in spite of the French army's numerical domination of the front. Joffre's authority was further eroded by the growth of the BEF and the ineffectiveness of the French Military Mission with the BEF, which was initially staffed by intriguers and anglophobes. As a result, the French and British armies fought parallel but separate battles on the Somme in 1916. The result was "a complete failure" (pp. 70–71).

Franco-British relations deteriorated further in 1917 as the politically divided British cabinet failed to exercise control over Sir Douglas Haig's bloody assaults. Events reached a nadir when British Prime Minister David Lloyd George plotted to undermine Haig by subordinating him to the ambitious new French commander-in-chief, Gen. Robert Nivelle. As a result of his support for Nivelle's disastrous offensive, Greenhalgh argues, Lloyd George bears considerable responsibility for both the French army mutiny and Haig's futile Passchendaele campaign (p. 154).

The creation of a new Supreme War Council in October 1917 gave more institutional strength to the alliance, but failed to force Pétain and Haig to give up control of their reserves in 1918, prompting Greenhalgh to label it "a talking shop" (p. 179). Only the German March offensive forced Haig to accept Marshal Ferdinand Foch as Allied commander-in-chief. Having learned from his experiences in Belgium in 1914 and at the Somme in 1916, Foch finally achieved effective unity of command through his judicious use of reserves and his ability to navigate the shoals of inter-Allied rivalries. Greenhalgh agrees with Canadian historian Tim Travers that Foch was chiefly responsible for the victorious Allied strategy on the western front in 1918 (p. 254).

Foch's successful command was supported by the Franco-British logistical effort. Following the French navy's lead, Britain successfully implemented the convoy system to overcome the U-boat challenge (p. 116). As a result, there were enough vessels to transport the American army and to meet the needs of both the civilian populations and the Allied armies. The creation of the Allied Military Board of Supply in 1918 under American and French leadership allowed Foch to shuttle reserves between crisis points on the Western Front and to pool resources. Though not free from suspicion and rivalry, the Allies' superior logistical coordination was "just as large an element in the final victory as unity of command" (p. 264).

Greenhalgh's analysis is rich and insightful but not above criticism. Although she has made better use of the papers of Franco-British liaison officers than any previous study, the result sometimes over-emphasizes the importance of relatively junior officers to the detriment of more important figures. For example...